19 October 2002
Surveillance Remains Most Pressing Space Control Need
JEREMY SINGER, OMAHA, NEB

Satellites on orbit today already are less vulnerable to attack due to improved U.S. space-surveillance capabilities, said U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Richard Geraci, deputy director of the Pentagon's National Security Space Office. But U.S. access to space systems is by no means guaranteed, said retired U.S. Air Force general Howell Estes, a former commander of U.S. Space Command.

Geraci and Estes were among the participants in an Oct. 6 panel discussion on space control here at the Strategic Space 2004 conference. The event was sponsored by the Space Foundation and Space News.

Space control, or space superiority, is a military term that refers to the ability to maintain unfettered access to one's own space capabilities while negating those of an adversary. It has been a hot topic in U.S. military circles in recent years due to the increasingly critical role satellites play in U.S. military operations and the global proliferation of space systems either owned by or accessible to U.S. adversaries.

The National Security Space Office is working to raise the awareness of space control throughout the military and plans to brief Air Force Undersecretary Peter B. Teets in late October on the results of several recent studies on what it will take to achieve it, Geraci said.

Systems and methods for both protecting and negating space capabilities all depend heavily on reliable and near-immediate awareness of what is happening in the orbital environment, said U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Thomas E. Zelibor, director of global operations at U.S. Strategic Command. "Without space situational awareness, the rest won't happen," he said.

Currently the U.S. military relies primarily on ground-based telescopes and radars for space situational awareness. Improving U.S. capabilities in this area will require upgrades to these assets as well as deployment of space systems such as the Space
Based Space Surveillance System, now in development, and the Orbital Deep Space Imager, Zelibor said.

New missile-warning and ground-reconnaissance satellites also have a role to play in
identifying threats to U.S. space assets, Zelibor said. He did not elaborate, but such assets could detect launches of anti-satellite weapons and related activities on the ground.

Better coordination of all assets used to monitor threats to satellites also is important, said Zelibor. The goal should be an automated common picture of the orbital environment that can be viewed by military officials all around the world, he said.

The Air Force's organizational plan for achieving space superiority are detailed in a document entitled "Counterspace Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 2:2-1," which is dated Aug. 2.

In a forward to the document, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John P. Jumper described it as the service's first publication that addresses how so-called counterspace measures would be applied. "Counterspace operations have defensive and offensive elements, both of which depend on robust situational awareness. These capabilities
may be utilized throughout the spectrum of conflict and may achieve a variety of effects from temporary denial to complete destruction of the adversary's space capability," he wrote.

The document identifies three main pillars of space superiority: space situational awareness, defensive counterspace and offensive counterspace. Defensive counterspace measures are identified as those that protect U.S. space capabilities and range from passive, such as hardening satellites against jamming, to bombing satellite-signal jamming devices. The latter measure was taken in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom, where hostile Iraqi forces attempted to jam U.S. GPS satellite signals.

Offensive counterspace measures range from simple deception techniques to temporarily disrupting or destroying satellites used by adversaries. Weapons that could be used against satellites include lasers and kinetic devices that destroy
satellites by ramming them. Satellite ground stations and launch sites used by adversaries also could be disrupted or taken out entirely, the document said.

The document also addresses challenges the Air Force could face in conducting counterspace operations, such as enemy ground stations located among civilian populations. Enemy use of satellites owned by third parties, such as commercial communications or imaging craft, pose another challenge, the document said.

"The importance of third party providers must not be understated as they provide space capabilities to numerous clients, including friendly and adversary military operations," the document states. It can be difficult to gather intelligence on who is using commercial space systems and in what way, the document said.

The document listed third party satellites among the space-related assets that could be engaged "using a variety of reversible and/or permanent means. ... The 'Five D's' - deception, disruption, denial, degradation, and destruction - are possible desired effects when targeting an adversary's space capability."

Theresa Hitchens, vice president of the Center for Defense Information, a Washington-based think tank, criticized the doctrine document as an indication that the Air Force wants open up space as a warfare medium without a national policy debate.

Decisions on the conduct for space warfare should flow through the White House and be debated by Congress before a military doctrine is set, Hitchens said in a Sept. 30 telephone interview.

U.S. government agencies like the State and Commerce departments should be consulted due to the international and economic implications of interfering with or destroying satellites before the Pentagon set its path in this area, Hitchens said.

Air Force Maj. Gen. William Shelton, director of policy, resources and requirements at
U.S. Strategic Command, said during another panel discussion at the Strategic Space conference that a debate would take place before the Pentagon deploys any anti-satellite weapons.

Comments: jsinger@space.com