Days after Clinton's announcement to defer a deployment decision to the next administration, the New York Times (9/4/00) was quick to promote theater missile defenses, or what they called "lesser-known antimissile weapons," while the Wall Street Journal (9/7/00) went even further, praising laser weapons and talking up the "advantages" of sea-based missile defenses. The article asserted that sea-based systems "could be deployed quickly, [and] relatively inexpensively." Congressional NMD supporters and Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush are also advocating a more expansive missile defense system that would use, not only land-based systems, but sea- and space-based systems too. But, just in time, two new reports have been released challenging this new push for alternative missile defense systems.

The first report, FROM THE SEA: NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE IS NEITHER CHEAP NOR EASY, by Charles Pena was released by the CATO Institute on September 6, 2000. Among its findings are:

• The current Navy Theater Wide (NTW) system does not have boost-phase capability against ICBMs. The NTW interceptor, which is being designed to provide midcourse intercept capability against slower, shorter range theater ballistic missiles, cannot be easily and cheaply modified to provide such capability. In fact, a new interceptor would have to be designed and built, and a faster, larger interceptor with boost-phase capability might not be compatible with the vertical launchers on Aegis ships.

• The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) has also voiced its skepticism over the technical concerns and costs of a sea-based system stating that "deployment of a partial sea-based NMD capability, while feasible, has technical risks and engineering challenges that have not yet been proven or demonstrated." In regards to the costs, the BMDO cost estimates reflect the assessment that land- and sea-based NMD costs are likely to be comparable. BMDO cost estimate for land-based NMD system is $13b to $14b, whereas the sea-based cost is estimated to be $16b to $19b.

• A sea-based NMD would have operational and deployment drawbacks too.

  The Navy would need more Aegis ships to make up for the ones being used for NMD missions. New Aegis ships cost approximately $1 billion plus $20 million per year to operate. The Navy would also need to train and retain the requisite manpower for the added ships. Another operational problem is the relatively short timelines for boost-phase intercept, a theater commander would not have a significant amount of time to assess the potential threat and attempt an intercept. Additionally, Aegis ships deployed forward near the threatening nation could become lucrative targets to be attacked from the sea and air.

While the report may help take some of the steam out of supporters of sea-based options, the report gives backing to the Clinton administration's land based system which has proven to be 'neither cheap nor easy' as well.

The second report, TAKING NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE TO SEA: A CRITIQUE OF SEA-BASED AND BOOST PHASE PROPOSALS, by Rodney W. Jones was released in October by the Council for a Livable World Education Fund. Like the CATO report, the 48-page Council report concluded that sea-based and boost-phase alternatives to NMD could cost between $30 and $36 billion, would be detrimental to other Navy operations, and could not be deployed until 2014. In addition to discussing the costs, technology, and constraints of sea-based systems, the CLW report highlights the many proposals (from Richard Garwin, Theodore Postol, Dean Wilkening, and former senior defense officials John Deutch, Harold Brown, and John White) that have emerged advocating boost-phase systems. Portions of the executive summary of the report is below:

Developing and deploying a global sea-based NMD system would not be cheap, quick, or easy, and installing NMD interceptors in AEGIS ships would compete with other Navy fleet and area defense requirements:

• IT WOULD NOT BE CHEAP. Whereas some proponents claim the sea-based layer of a global NMD could be mounted on AEGIS ships at a cost of only $2 to $3 billion, the Pentagon's 1998 estimate for an AEGIS-based, "limited" NMD system counted at least $16 to $19 billion in direct costs. A more plausible but still conservative cost estimate raises the likely price tag to between $30 and $36 billion, without counting hidden costs to the Navy and the defense budget of replacing assets to cover traditional fleet defense missions, and without adding any of the cost of space-based tracking sensors. The addition of just seven more AEGIS ships to cope with simultaneous geographical threats could raise the above mentioned base price to between $37 and $43 billion.

• IT WOULD NOT BE QUICK. Proponents of sea-based NMD claim that the sea-based elements of such a system could be partially deployed by 2003 or 2004, and fully deployed by 2009. The Pentagon's 1998-99 judgment was that initial deployment might begin by FY 2011, if accelerated, but otherwise not before FY 2014, while full deployment would not be completed until about FY 2020.

• IT WOULD NOT BE EASY. Most sea-based NMD schemes call for installation of Standard Missile- type interceptors in the Vertical Launch System (VLS) on AEGIS ships, along with other hardware and software upgrades for long-range missile defense communications and guidance. Interceptors capable of NMD performance will be larger and heavier than those currently used in standard VLS missile cells. Retrofit will require VLS equipment modifications and related manufacturing time and expense, and could pose new safety hazards for operation in inclement weather. It would be impractical to incorporate boost-phase interceptors with very high acceleration and high burnout velocity on AEGIS ships in VLS modules.

• IT WOULD COMPETE WITH OTHER NAVY REQUIREMENTS. AEGIS missile cells normally are fitted out in homeport, with various types of missiles allocated to land-attack and fleet defense missions, as well as to new theater missile defense missions. The normal inventory will be reduced by NMD interceptors, constraining conventional naval operations. Repositioning of AEGIS ships for NMD assignments will also draw down their availability for fleet defense and other naval missions. These actions will either degrade the scope of routine naval operations or require more ships, or both, with eventual escalation of Navy budgets.

Recently, interest in the sea-based NMD idea has taken a different twist. Several proposals have emerged to explore the use of interceptors in boost-phase mode against missiles that could be launched by so-called "states of concern" (formerly referred to as "rogue states"). Richard Garwin and Theodore Postol both have argued that dedicated boost-phase interceptors, comparable in size and performance to Spartan missiles or the ground-based interceptor (GBI) being developed for the U.S. territorial NMD, would be preferable to deployment of the ground-based NMD scheme.

Boost-phase interceptors, they argue, could be installed in fixed sites on land, in cooperation with Russia, or at sea on easily monitored naval cargo ships. Garwin and Postol believe that basing their heavy boost-phase interceptors on the Navy's AEGIS platforms would be impractical. Restricted land- or sea-based locations could, they suggest, enable the interceptors to counter long-range missiles from North Korea, Iran, or Iraq shortly after launch, without threatening Russia's or China's strategic arsenals.

Russian president Vladimir Putin made statements before and after the U.S.-Russian Moscow summit on June 4, 2000, hinting at potential Russian interest in cooperative development of such an arrangement for the defense of Europe.

From a more traditional perspective, former senior defense officials John Deutch, Harold Brown, and John White have urged deferral of a U.S. ground-based NMD and advocate instead accelerated deployment of AEGIS-based theater missile defense systems. Their scheme favors modifying the interceptors to operate in a boost-phase mode, close in, against long-range as well as theater missile threats from states of concern, providing a limited sea-based NMD capability against the near term threats. Stanford researcher Dean Wilkening has outlined yet another alternative airborne boost-phase defense for limited NMD objectives against states of concern.

More confident about the efficacy of U.S. deterrent capabilities against long-range missile threats from "states of concern." Wilkening advocates that the United States go slow on a ground-based NMD, leave TMD programs to mature at a normal pace for planned missions against theater missile threats, but expedite development of airborne boost-phase capabilities to counter long-range missile threats from states of concern.

Estimating meaningful price tags or deployment time frames for each of these proposals would be difficult at this time. The Garwin-Postol proposals simply that technology choices, locations and operational control would be subject to U.S.-Russian negotiation as well as new development programs, making their scope, cost and implementation both politically and technically uncertain. The Deutch-Brown-White idea is technically unconvincing. Wilkening's proposal relies on conceptually realistic but less mature technologies than the Navy's planned upper tier TMD, suggesting a long period for technical development and solution of current operational limitations.

Before the next administration moves any distance down the paths of global sea-based NMD or regional boost-phase interceptor systems, it should demonstrate conclusively that the technologies will work and make public what the likely costs would be. Moreover, the public should be apprised of any distinctive implications of forward-deployed mid-course NMD and boost-phase systems for global and regional stability. Close-in boost-phase concepts depend on virtually instantaneous and therefore automatic reaction. The tyranny of reaction time can be so short that the "man in the loop" disappears and the potential for serious accidents rises correspondingly.

The Multinational Monitor will be publishing an article by Bill Hartung on the corporate role in pushing National Missile Defense. It will eventually be on the web at http://www.essential.org/monitor/monitor.html.

Frida Berrigan
Research Associate,
World Policy Institute
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