http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-01l.html
Nikolai Sokov is a senior research associate at the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California.
At a meeting with NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson on 20
February, the then Russian Minister of Defence Igor Sergeev tabled a
document with a proposal for a missile defence system intended to defend Europe.
This document detailed the idea first voiced by Russian President
Vladimir Putin on 6 June 2000 during a trip to Europe. The cautious,
even sceptical, response from the West is understandable, but probably
less than the initiative deserves.
The lukewarm welcome is not surprising, however, since the document is
very general. At a minimum, Russia could have benefited from the
services of public relations specialists in both 'packaging' the
proposals and 'selling' them. The most obvious mistake was that the
document was not made available to the public and experts - even the US
Embassy in Moscow was initially refused a copy.
The result was numerous misinterpretations and mistakes.
For example, media reports and even statements of some NATO officials
alleged Russia had admitted the existence of a missile threat to Europe
or the USA. Instead, the document only proposed consultations to
determine whether such a threat exists today or might emerge in 5, 10 or
15 years.
The document lacks one key element which would have given it genuine
credibility: it should have included a description of the future
European ballistic missile defence (BMD) system and references to
technologies which either exist or can be developed in the foreseeable
future.
Instead, it proposes a series of consultations: first determining
whether a missile threat to Europe exists, then discussing
characteristics of the system needed to defend Europe from these
threats.
Vagueness, however, may be intentional. The document is a product of a
domestic political compromise and espouses several agendas
simultaneously: a desire to avoid confrontation over missile defence; an
attempt to win Europe over to Russia's side in the dispute with the USA
about the latter's intention to deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD)
system and withdraw from the ABM Treaty; a need to defend Russia itself
against potential future missile threats "from the south"; and a hope of
the defence industry for lucrative contracts.
Furthermore, one can detect simple reticence - Russia categorically
refuses even to hint at who might threaten Europe with missiles.
Although countries like Iran, Iraq or Libya are perceived by Washington
and its NATO allies as likely candidates, they are important potential,
or actual, customers of Russian weapons. Moscow thus cedes the task of
naming the source of threat to NATO.
The proposal about consultations is probably the most interesting part
of the document and also the one that is definitely worth accepting even
if the rest is rejected. The proposed agenda includes the following
topics: the nature and scale of missile proliferation in regions of
potential concern for Europe; the prospect that non-strategic missiles
may be developed there; capabilities of these missiles; creation of a
joint database for missile programmes; assessment of alternative
political and economic means to counter these threats; and security
consequences of a Euro BMD.
The proposal is vague. But even vagueness can be perceived as an
advantage because it allows NATO to shape an agenda of its own and, to a
large extent, determine the outcome of consultations. In fact, the
ceding of the initiative by Russia might be intentional - we cannot
agree with you unless you go through the motions of persuading us.
Careful reading of the proposal suggests that it contains a number of
assumptions and aspirations which are not spelled out. The first among
them is the belief that not only is there not a missile threat to Europe
or the USA today, but that strategic missiles will not appear in
countries of concern in any foreseeable future.
Russian experts reveal in private interviews that, in their view,
countries (including those that are identified as states of concern by
Washington) capable of creating intermediate-range missiles in the next
5 to 15 years will not be able to develop strategic missiles. The fact
that, for example, Iraq can improve old Soviet 'Scuds' does not mean
that it can cover the technological gap to strategic missiles.
On the other hand, many countries can acquire intermediate-range
missiles in the foreseeable future, meaning that, although there will be
no threat to the USA, Europe and even Russia may come under threat. In
this regard, particularly where the defence of Russia is concerned, the
initiative on Euro BMD might be genuine. This means that Russia's
military leaders have already conducted an assessment of missile
developments worldwide (which is their job, after all) and know exactly
what they are going to say at consultations. But it is equally clear
that they want to avoid finger-pointing: it falls to NATO to 'convince'
them where the threat will be coming from.
Indirect evidence that the proposal on consultations is genuine is the
report that the Russian and US security services were supposed to hold
consultations on potential missile threats later this year. It now seems
likely that, after mutual expulsions of diplomats, these contacts will
be cancelled. Still, if Russia was prepared for consultations with
Washington, it would make even more sense to hold them with Europe.
Consultations are also intended to give substance to the dialogue with
NATO that so far has been largely hollow. Russia is not satisfied with
receiving information about decisions NATO has already made. An in-depth
discussion of the security situation in Europe can, in the eyes of a
certain part of the Russian political-military establishment, provide a
positive agenda for the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. This goal
is not uniformly shared in Russia but it seems advisable to use the
council if NATO wants to develop this body into something serious.
Based on the outcome of consultations in which the nature of the threat
is discussed, participants, according to the Russian proposal, should
decide on the 'architecture' of the future defence system. This part of
the proposal is actually vaguer than the one on consultations. More
precise language would have inevitably involved naming the countries
against which the system is intended. There are only several broad
principles in the proposal:
Like in medicine, uncertain diagnosis does not rule out a prescription;
the proposal about consultations with regard to a potential missile
threat to Europe could be accepted. In fact, this appears to be the
heart of the proposal from the Russian viewpoint, Ministry of Defence
officials dubbed the document given to Robertson "an invitation to a
dialogue".
Another important element of the proposal is the fact that it espouses
the distinct interests of the defence industry. So far, the armed forces
in Russia have been allowed to control the agenda of missile defence
issues. Industrialists may become a new and potentially significant
element of the political landscape. This is something worth very serious
contemplation.
This part of the proposal combines two agendas. One is espoused by the
armed forces and includes as an important component, which should figure
in NATO analysis, the use of Western assistance to create a missile
defence for Russia itself. Another is the agenda of Russia's defence
industry which is prepared to do almost anything to win contracts that
are legitimate in the eyes of the West.