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16 September 2002 |
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http://www.spacedaily.com/news/mars2003-02c1.html |
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Los Angeles - Sept 16, 2002
Spooked by back-to-back failures at Mars in 1999, NASA is considering alternate launch plans that would delay the missions until fully assured the landers have the
maximum chance of successfully landing on Mars using the Pathfinder hard landing technique of cushioning the lander for final touchdown within a cocoon of shock absorbing
balloons.
SpaceDaily learned of these concerns at the latest quarterly meeting of NASA's Advisory Council, held last week at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena. Generally
the Council focuses on two or three main subjects at each of these meetings.
For this meeting the main topics of discussion were, firstly, NASA's most serious problem - the International Space Station - and, secondly, the current form of
America's Mars Exploration Program.
Separately from concerns about the 2003 rovers, NASA's Mars program continues to undergo changes as the difficulty of flying a sample return mission from Mars becomes
more and more apparent. In retrospect, the absurdity of plans that until just a few years ago envisaged a sample return mission to Mars by 2008 has become painfully
clear.
Last year, NASA assigned contracts to four aerospace firms to design and appraise possible Mars sample return missions, and they agreed that the first such mission
would cost $1.3 to 2 billion - and probably near the higher end of the spectrum.
Meanwhile, it has become quite clear that any chance of launching the first Mars sample return mission in 2011 has now disappeared, just like NASA's earlier plan to
start the sample-return mission in 2003 and finish it in 2008. Indeed, it now seems impossible for NASA to start the mission until 2016 -- unless it radically revises it,
which it is now in the process of doing.
Although the Mars program is not about to collapse in disaster, it has become clear that a radical redesign of the program for next decade will be necessary.
Recognizing the inevitable, NASA has spent the past year working up a new program for the next decade that it expects to have finalized by the end of this year.
The Dog Days Of Mars Continue
Separately, problems are emerging in NASA's Mars exploration plan through 2009, requiring substantial redesign efforts for some of this decade's missions.
At last week's Advisory Council meeting, NASA's Mars Exploration Program director Orlando Figueroa and JPL's Mars program manager Firouz Naderi delivered a status
report, which included details on some of the problems connected with the very next U.S. Mars mission: the two Mars Exploration Rovers scheduled for launch next May and
June.
These two 170-kg rovers - based on the "Athena" design created by Cornell University - are slated to land on Mars three weeks apart in January 2004, and
spend at least three months crawling anywhere from 600 meters to a kilometer along the surface.
They are designed to travel as far as 100 meters per day, receiving instructions from Earth the night before on their next stop, and then crawling across the surface
while analyzing stereo photos from their navigation cameras to automatically identify dangerous obstacles ahead, swerve around them, and then resume moving toward their
original preset goal.
They will, however, actually spend most of their time studying individual patches of landscape in detail with their onboard cameras and infrared spectrometers,
locating interesting rocks, and edging up directly to them, before examining them in greater detail with an instrumented arm carrying two more spectrometers, a magnifying
imager, and a grinding wheel to remove weathering from the rock's surface.
Their purpose is to study the geology and mineralogy of Mars' surface rocks and soil in unprecedented detail, trying in particular to determine the extent to which
those rocks and minerals have been exposed to - or actually formed by - liquid water and associated processes during the planet's earlier and perhaps more hospitable
days. Such rocks and minerals might also be a possible location for fossilized evidence of microscopic life that could have evolved on ancient Mars, although the MER
rovers themselves cannot detect such fossils.
The MERs will also be crucial in "ground-truthing" the observations made by the cameras and spectrometers on Mars orbiters, providing the information
necessary to allow correct interpretation of the extensive orbital observations conducted in recent years by Mars Global Surveyor and Mars Odyssey.
The MER twin rovers are ambitious missions, but as any engineer will tell you, the God of Engineering has a perverse sense of humor.
The most genuinely complex and original part of the MER mission - the Athena rovers themselves - have run into very few problems in design, building, or testing.
The major problem, it turns out, is almost entirely from that part of the MER mission which was supposed to be the simplest and cheapest: namely, the rovers' landing
systems which are based on the "hard landing" technique pioneered by the famous 1997 Mars Pathfinder mission.
In fact, the supposed ease of adapting the Pathfinder landing system for getting the rovers down safely on to Mars was the key factor in their selection as a mission.
After the failure of both 1998 U.S. Mars missions, NASA was forced to cancel the stationary lander which was part of its 2001 Mars mission, and to radically revise the
later program - something which would have been necessary even if the 1998 missions had succeeded, since it had already become clear that its original hopes of launching
the first lander component of its planned sample return mission in 2003, and completing the mission by 2008, was utterly absurd.
NASA therefore had to select a new 2003 Mars mission in 2000, as opposed to the usual four- or five-year gap between selecting and flying a mission.
Several alternatives - including a modified version of the 2001 lander, and a sophisticated new Mars orbiter which has since been selected as the 2005 mission - were
rejected in favor of a single MER rover, because a hastily done two-month-long preliminary study made it appear that an Athena rover (already intended as part of the
payload for the cancelled bigger 2003 sample-return lander) could be fit into an almost unchanged copy of the Pathfinder hard lander, greatly cutting mission development
costs. No such luck. Within just a few months after mission selection, more detailed design work on the Athena rover made it clear that it simply could not be crammed into a
duplicate of the Pathfinder landing system without having its scientific capabilities crippled - both its weight and its volume were about 10 percent too great.
The Pathfinder design would have to be scaled up in size, and a great many detailed changes would have to be made in it to keep the spacecraft's total mass from
exceeding its Delta 2 booster's payload limit for a Mars mission.
The estimated total cost for the two missions has now risen to over $800 million. JPL's Planetary Flight Projects Director Chris Jones told the Council that, had this
been known at the time, MER almost certainly would not have been selected as the 2003 U.S. Mars mission.
That, however, is not the worst part. The reliability of the enlarged landing system - its ability to land the rover safely with adequate confidence - has given
project managers conniption fits, and is still a serious problem less than 9 months before launch. The central problem can be summed up in two words: horizontal winds.
After the spectacular success on a shoestring budget of the Mars Pathfinder mission in 1997, many observers [including this journal] jumped to the conclusion that its
new hard-landing system - far simpler than the intricate soft-landing systems of America's earlier Moon and Mars spacecraft - was the wave of the future.
The earlier Viking Mars landers, after their heat shields and parachutes had braked them to a descent speed of a few hundred km per hour in Mars' wispy air, had cut
their chutes loose and lowered themselves the last few thousand meters using multiple throttled liquid-fueled rocket engines controlled by a computer using multiple radar
beams to constantly monitor the craft's altitude and vertical and horizontal speeds.
By contrast, Pathfinder held onto its parachute until it was just 80 meters above the ground - with the chute being attached to the lander's aft cover, from which the
lander had already lowered itself on a long bridle cable like a spider from its thread.
At that altitude, a simple radar altimeter ignited three powerful solid rockets fastened to the aft cover to blast away for 2 seconds, yanking the lander to something
reasonably close to a dead stop - after which the lander immediately cut itself loose and simply dropped the remaining 12 meters or so to the ground, nestled in a big
cocoon of 24 inflated airbags that absorbed the landing shock.
It was a nice simple system - and supposedly far tougher than soft landers, which with their footpads and landing legs are seriously vulnerable to boulders and slopes.
The airbags were designed to be robust enough to survive if the spacecraft hit the surface a lot faster than the estimated nominal figure. But the system has an Achilles
heel of its own that has received little publicity in the wake of Pathfinder's success.
The problem is basically building the airbags tough enough.
Pathfinder's own airbags ripped repeatedly during simulated landings on Earth; they finally ended up having to consist of four layers instead of one, weighing fully 85
kg rather than the originally planned 15 kg - and effectively making up one-quarter of the lander's total landed weight! In all likelihood, a more complex soft-landing
system for Pathfinder would have weighed a good deal less.
But the greater weight of the MER lander package is not the main problem.
Pathfinder landed during Mars' pre-dawn hours, when Martian winds are at their minimum - and even then it had come down traveling sideways fast enough to bounce and
roll across the surface for fully a kilometer after touchdown.
For the MER landers, due to their trajectories towards Mars, landing will instead take place mid-afternoon, when the winds are likely to be much stronger.
In various Earth based tests undertaken over the years, it appears that hitting sharp rocks at a fast horizontal clip is the main cause of airbag rips. By contrast, a
soft lander cancels out all of its sideways drift by the time of landing.
Tests in 2001 showed that, given the probability of strong horizontal daytime winds, there was simply no way to make MER's airbags tough enough to be confident of
surviving a landing without making them so heavy that the Delta booster couldn't carry the total spacecraft to Mars.
The result was that in 2001 the Transverse Impulse Rocket Subsystem (TIRS) was added to the landing system. This system consists of a ring of three smaller solid
rockets on the aft shell of the lander, pointing out in different directions.
Sensors on the lander will provide an estimate of the likely horizontal direction and speed of its impact, and - if necessary - one or two of the horizontal rockets
will be ignited at the same moment as the big main braking solid rockets to cancel out much of the lander's sideways drift.
And even if the rockets end up overcompensating and TIRS shoves the lander somewhat in the reverse direction, any resulting horizontal landing speed less than 16
meters/second will be acceptable for the $400 million Martian beach ball Mark II to bounce down on to Mars and survive.
The main danger of a fast sideways landing was thought to come from sudden wind gusts that would swing the dangling lander sideways on its cable, in turn tilting the
aft cover hanging from the parachute so that its powerful braking rockets actually fired downwards at an angle and pushed the lander sideways.
So the first control sensor added to TIRS was a package of gyros and accelerometers on the aft cover to measure its tilt at the moment the braking rockets fired and
ignite some of the TIRS rockets to compensate.
But as our knowledge of Mars' meteorology and horizontal wind patterns grows, concerns have also grown about steadier, longer-period horizontal winds that might be
capable of blowing a lander strongly sideways at the time its braking rockets fire - without providing sufficient tilt to its aft cover to warn of trouble. The DIMES system involves adding a lightweight camera to the lander that would take three successive photos of the surface in the 18 seconds before the braking rocket
is ignited. The photos would then be immediately analyzed by the spacecraft's computer to locate surface features and calculate an estimate of the lander's sideways drift
that would be added to the gyro package's tilt data to decide which TIRS rockets to fire up.
The DIMES camera system seems to work well in tests - but the decision as to whether it's worthwhile to add it to the MER spacecraft to further reduce landing risks
won't be made until November or December.
And even with the whole TIRS system added, winds still remain a serious problem for the engineers building the MER landers to fully factor in.
Already, new data on possible wind speeds in different places on Mars has forced two of the top six candidates for MER landing sites to be rejected at last March's MER
landing site selection workshop - both of the very scientifically interesting sites within the great Marineris Valley, which unsurprisingly channels winds to higher
speeds.
Since then, another site - in the Athabasca Valley, which may be the site of recent volcanic eruptions and geothermal liquid-water outbursts less than 20 million years
ago - has been rejected because Earth-based radar studies indicate that its ground may be unacceptably rough and rocky. And of the remaining three sites, studies are
still going on to determine whether two of them have horizontal winds too strong for the landing risk to be acceptable.
The only original candidate site which scientists are certain has acceptably low winds and smooth terrain is the giant field of hematite - again, probably deposited by
ancient liquid water - which the Mars Global Surveyor's IR spectrometer has mapped in the Terra Meridiani region.
It's now a near-certainty that one of the two MER rovers will land there - but, while Gusev is the other favorite judged strictly by scientific interest, it may be
that both it and Isidis will ultimately also have to be rejected due to excessive wind risks.
This has led to the landing site selection committee hastily locating one more backup landing site -- a flat, scientifically rather dull site on the Elysium Plain that
is a candidate only because it has low winds.
The final selection of the MERs' two landing sites won't be made until next January. And - even with all this - it is still not entirely certain that it will be
considered safe to launch either of the MERs next year.
The final tests of the ultimately selected airbag design are still underway, and three candidates for the MER's big landing parachute also remain to be tested to
determine which of them best combines good braking ability with the minimum tendency to be blown sideways by winds.
Officially JPL remains highly confident that the final designs for both the chute and the airbags will have been picked by the end of October - but if more unexpected
problems turn up and satisfactory airbag and parachute designs still haven't been picked by next February, it will become impossible to launch the MERs to Mars in 2003.
Moreover, if additional problems rear their heads in the next few months, NASA will have to seriously consider delaying one of the MERs to a later launch window,
allowing the remaining project funding to be fully focused on finishing adequate design and testing for the one remaining MER so that it can meet the 2003 deadline.
The cost-effectiveness of this is questionable, however. And in any case, NASA would like to avoid delaying either rover to a later launch if at all possible, because
2003 is an unusually favorable launch opportunity to Mars with a higher payload capacity available.
By contrast, the next opportunity in 2005 is one of the worst launch windows in the cycle. If one or both rovers do have to be delayed, the current feeling is that
their landing on Mars will be set not to occur until 2008.
This doesn't necessarily require that their launch be delayed all the way into 2007, however - especially since the U.S. already plans one other Mars launch in both
2005 and 2007.
Instead, the delayed MERs may be launched in 2006, onto a path that allows them to complete one and a half orbits of the Sun before finally intercepting Mars. (The
same strategy was followed with the Magellan Venus probe.) They might even be launched in 2004 and carry out three and a half solar orbits before reaching Mars, if the
Mars Program's overall funding profile favors such a deployment.
Moreover, any delayed launches -- since 2003 was an unusually favorable Mars launch opportunity -- will probably have to use the bigger and considerably more expensive
Atlas 3 booster (which is already planned for the 2005 U.S. Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter)." It should be emphasized, however, that this is strictly worst-case
planning. MER's managers feel that they finally do have a good handle on the project's problems, that launch of both rovers in 2003 is now highly probable, and that
simulations show that each one has a 90 percent or so chance of surviving landing even without the DIMES sensor added.
But this project has given JPL - and NASA - a vastly harder time than anyone dreamed possible when it was picked, and has played a major role in convincing engineers
that Pathfinder's "simple" hard landing system is much less preferable to soft landing systems than had been thought. |
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