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31 January 2002 |
In July 2000 the European Parliament set up a special committee to ascertain whether the following allegations were true: “There is a global interception system organised by the United States National Security Agency (NSA), with which all electronic communication (telephone, e-mail, fax, mobile phone) can be intercepted world-wide, i.e. also in Europe. This system is allegedly operated by a group of states which includes one of the Member States of the European Union, namely the United Kingdom. The system, code-named Echelon, is now mainly being used for economic espionage for the benefit of the United States.” The committee was composed of 36 Members from all political quarters of the House, but finally there was a broad majority which backed the report and its findings. This was a difficult investigative mission, because the European Parliament has no access at all under any circumstances to the files of the intelligence services of the EU Member States, let alone access to details of the activities of American agencies.
I The main findings of the Temporary Committee
However, after a year of painstaking investigation, we were able to
communicate the following to the House without any lingering shadow of
doubt:
Therefore, the possibilities of a global interception system have been over-estimated in the press to a big extent.
These are the most important findings, and let me add that we are not simply hypothesising. That establishes the difference to some journalists, who have already in the past written about the interception system. They have without doubt their merits, but we can back up our statements with such a strong chain of evidence that it could stand up in a court of law. Those who wish to know precise details will have to read the report for themselves. Suffice to say that, if we had made any false allegations in this report, you can safely assume that the intelligence services of the countries in question would have been only too delighted to take us apart in public! This they did not do, which speaks volumes.
II How did we prove the existence of a global interception system?
It is only natural that secret services do not disclose details of their
work. Consequently there is, at least officially, no statement of all of
the ECHELON states that they work together to operate a global
interception system. The existence of such a system thus needs to be
proved by gathering as many clues as possible, thereby building up a
convincing body of evidence.
The trail of clues which constitutes evidence of this kind is made up of
three elements:
We were able to prove that all this is the case!
1. At least in democracies, intelligence services work on the basis of laws
which define their purpose and powers. It is thus easy to prove that in
many of these countries foreign intelligence services exist which
intercept private and business communications entering and leaving their
territory. Moreover, from within a country’s
own territory, it is also possible to intercept a part of the satellite
communication which is destined for recipients in foreign countries.
2. The only restriction on the attempt to build up world-wide monitoring of
satellite communications arises from the technical constraints imposed
by these communications themselves. There is no place from which all
satellite communications can be intercepted. Therefore interception
stations are needed in certain parts of the world. In order to intercept
international communication processed via INTELSAT communication
satellites, interception facilities are necessary in at least three
geographic areas, for reasons linked to the anatomy of the satellite
system (the antenna cannot look "around corners").
These are:
Stations can indeed be found in these areas exactly in the footprints of
the satellites. I will tell you later how we identified the listening
posts.
3. Normally cooperation between intelligence services takes place bilaterally and on
the basis of an exchange of evaluated material. A multilateral union is
in itself something very unusual; if one adds to this the regular
exchange of raw material, this would be a qualitatively new form of
cooperation. This union for interception exists in the framework of the
UKUSA Agreement. Thus far, not all of the signatory states have
officially acknowledged the existence of the UKUSA-Agreement.
Nevertheless there is a striking chain of evidence which clearly proves
its existence. I will mention only two points stemming from official
sources:
In the annual report 1999 of the British Intelligence and Security
Committee, the UKUSA Agreement is expressly mentioned: “The quality of
intelligence gathered clearly reflects the value of the close
co-operation under the UKUSA agreement. A recent illustration of this
occurred when the US National Security Agency's (NSA) equipment
accidentally failed and for some three days US customers, as well as
GCHQ's normal UK customers, were served directly from GCHQ”
In a publication of the New Zealand Department of the Prime Minister from
2000, concerning the management of national intelligence services, the
participating countries are named: "... the GCSB ...(New Zealand)
..., USA's National Security Agency (NSA), the UK's Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) Australia's Defence Signals
Directorate (DSD), and Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSE)"
With the many existing indications, one can show without any doubt that at
least one globally operating interception system exists. III How can a satellite communications interception station be recognised? Criterion 1: Accessibility of the installation Installations with large antennae belonging to the post office, broadcasting organisations or research institutions are accessible to visitors, at least by appointment; interception stations are not. They are generally operated, at least in name, by the military, which also carries out at least parts of the technical work of interception. This arrangement enables the installations to be guarded with military efficiency and at the same time serves as cover. Criterion 2: Type of antenna Various types of antennae are used in the installations which fulfil criterion 1, each with a different characteristic shape, which provides evidence as to the purpose of the interception station. To receive satellite signals, however, usually parabolic antennae are used. If the parabolic antennae are standing on an open site, it is possible to calculate on the basis of their position, their elevation and their compass (azimuth) angle which satellite is being received. Criterion 3: Size of antenna Satellite receiving antennae on a site which meets criterion 1 may be intended for various purposes:
It is not possible to tell from outside what function these antennae or radomes serve. However, the diameter of the antennae gives some clues as to their purpose. There are minimum sizes, dictated by technical requirements, for antennae intended to receive the ‘global beam’ in the C-band of satellite-based civilian international communications (INTELSAT). The first generation of these satellites needed antennae with a diameter of 25-30 m; nowadays 13-18 m is enough. The automatic computer filtering of signals received calls for the highest possible signal quality, so for intelligence purposes an antenna at the upper end of the scale is chosen. In the sphere of military communications as well, command centres have two types of antenna with a diameter of roughly 18 m (AN/FSC-78 and AN/FSC-79). However, most antennae for military communications have a much smaller diameter, since they must be transportable (tactical stations). In view of the nature of the signals transmitted back to the station (high degree of focusing and high frequency), earth stations for SIGINT satellites need only small antennae. This also applies to antennae which receive signals from spy satellites. If a site houses two or more satellite antennae with a diameter of at least 18 m, one of its tasks is certainly that of intercepting civilian communications. In the case of a station housing US forces, one of the antennae may also be used to receive military communications. Criterion 4: Evidence from official sources Official descriptions of the tasks of some stations have been published. In that connection governments and military units are regarded as official sources. If this criterion has been met, the others become superfluous. IV The UKUSA Agreement
The agreement on which the intelligence cooperation between those states
which run the global working interception system is based was formed in
1948. To understand why a SIGINT agreement was signed in 1948 between
the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia, Canada and New
Zealand one has to look into the history of World War II. It was the
Americans who instigated the establishment of a SIGINT alliance at a
meeting with the British in London in August 1940. America's entry into
the war led to a closer SIGINT cooperation. The liaison between the
submarine tracking rooms in London, Washington and, from May 1943
onwards, Ottawa in Canada was so close that, according to a statement by
one individual involved at the time, they worked like a single
organisation.
The interesting thing is: after the war the UK was the prime mover behind the continuation of a SIGINT
alliance. The foundations were laid in the course of a world tour
undertaken in spring 1945 by British intelligence agents. One aim was to
transfer SIGINT personnel from Europe to the Pacific to take part in the
war against Japan. In that connection, an agreement was reached to
provide the Australian intelligence services with resources and
personnel (British). The intelligence agents returned to the USA via New
Zealand and Canada. In September 1945 Truman signed a top-secret
memorandum whose provisions formed the cornerstone of a peacetime SIGINT
alliance. Immediately thereafter, negotiations on an agreement opened
between the British and Americans. In addition, a British delegation
made contact with the Canadian and Australians with a view to discussing
their involvement. In February and March 1946 a top-secret
Anglo-American SIGINT conference took place at which the details of an
alliance were discussed. The British were authorised by the Canadians
and Australians to act on their behalf. The conference produced what was
still a classified agreement, running to some 25 pages, which laid down
the detailed arrangements for a SIGINT agreement between the United
States and the British Commonwealth. Further discussions took place
during the two following years, culminating in the signing of the
definitive text of the UKUSA Agreement in June 1948.
V The possible role of the Menwith Hill site for SIGINT As already mentioned there are a lot of tasks for signal intelligence. Eavesdropping on civil communication is only a small part of it. It might be that after the end of the cold war it became more important for the intelligence services – but basically it is still not the main task! There is a need for only one listening post in western Europe to intercept civil communication coming down to Europe from geostationary satellites (Intelsat, Intersputnik etc.), within the UKUSA-cooperation. However, we know that there are three sites in Europe where either the USA or the UK are involved: Bad Aibling, Menwith Hill and Morwenstow (Cornwall). The simple question is: which one is in charge of intercepting our e-mail to Aunt Mary in Libya? As already mentioned: from outside one can not see for what purpose antennas are built. But there is another method to find out the truth. A global interception system must grow as communications develop. Accordingly, the start of the satellite communications area must lead to the establishment of stations and the introduction of new generations of satellites must lead the building of new satellite antennae which can cope with the new technical requirements. The number of satellite antennae must increase whenever this is necessary in order to cover the full volume of communications traffic. Comparing the development of the INTELSAT communication system with the erection and the size of new satellite dishes, it is rather clear that the interception of civil communication based on satellites is done in Morwenstow by GCHQ. The sites in Bad Aibling and Menwith Hill have different tasks. From a press release of the base itself, we know that it serves as the European Rely Ground Station for the space-based infrared system to detect missile launches. In my opinion both bases – Menwith Hill and Bad Aibling - serve as ground stations for other types of spy satellites and intercept Russian civil and military communication satellites – but I do not have any exact prove for this. Therefore, I am very reluctant to make this statement. VI What is espionage? Governments have a need for systematic collection and evaluation of information about certain situations in other states. This serves as a basis for decisions concerning the armed forces, foreign policy a. s. o. They therefore maintain foreign intelligence services, part of whose task is to systematically assess information available from public sources. However, particularly significant information in the fields concerned is kept secret from governments or businesses and is therefore not publicly accessible. Anyone who nonetheless wishes to obtain it has to steal it. Espionage is simply the organised theft of information. The classic targets of espionage are military secrets, other government secrets or information concerning the stability of or dangers to governments. These may for example comprise new weapons systems, military strategies or information about the stationing of troops. No less important is information about forthcoming decisions in the fields of foreign policy, monetary decisions or inside information about tensions within a government. In addition there is also interest in economically significant information. This may include information about sectors of economy as well as details of new technologies or foreign transactions. Where possible, services try to replace the use of agents with non-human espionage. This is easiest in the case of the analysis of radio signals from military establishments or vehicles. The form of espionage by technical means with which the public are most familiar is that which uses satellite photography. In addition, however, electromagnetic signals of any kind are intercepted and analysed (‘signals intelligence’, SIGINT). As already mentioned there are a lot of tasks for signal intelligence. Eavesdropping of normal civil communication is only a small part oft it. In some states, services are also authorised to monitor incoming or outgoing communications in their own country. In democracies, intelligence services’ monitoring of the communications of the country’s own citizens is subject to certain triggering conditions and controls. However, domestic law in general only protects nationals within the territory of their own country and other residents of the country concerned.
VII Economic Espionage
One of the central questions is: can this globally acting interception
system be abused for competitive espionage? Is it suitable for
industrial espionage? The answer is: yes, but it is not the master tool
for that purpose!
The strategic monitoring of international telecommunications can produce
useful information for industrial espionage purposes, but only by
chance. In fact, sensitive industrial information is primarily to be
found in the firms themselves, which means that industrial
espionage is carried out primarily by attempting to obtain the
information via employees or infiltrators or by breaking into
internal computer networks. Only where sensitive data is sent outside
via cable or radio (satellite) a communications surveillance system can
be used for industrial espionage. This occurs systematically only in the
following three cases:
VIII The USA and economic espionage
The United States, as you know, has been under the heaviest criticism. It
has always denied that intelligence is passed on directly to US
companies. It has admitted, however, that they intercept detailed
communications concerning major contracts that are open to international
tender. The argument used to justify these measures is the allegation
that European companies offer bribes and that there is a need for a
defence against that.
The position adopted by the former CIA Director James Woolsey and the
chairman of the House of Representatives Secret Service Monitoring
Committee, Porter Goss, in our discussions can be summarised as follows:
1. The USA monitors international telecommunications in order to obtain
general information about economic developments, shipments of dual-use
goods and compliance with embargoes.
2. The USA monitors on a targeted basis communications by individual
firms in connection with contract-award procedures in order to prevent
corruption-related distortions of competition to the detriment of US
firms.
American firms are banned by law from paying bribes and accountants are
required to report evidence of such payments. If a telecommunications
surveillance operation reveals evidence of bribery in connection with
public contracts, the US ambassador makes representations to the
government of the country concerned. However, US firms competing for the
contract are not directly informed.
This position, to put it very politely and diplomatically, must be
scrutinised:
First of all, we know that US corporations engage in bribery too. In the
latest Bribe Payers Index published by Transparency International, the
United States occupies a mid-table position among the world' s major
exporting countries.
Secondly, this type of thing is now prohibited within the OECD by a
Convention, which the Member States of the European Union have
transposed into national law. For the United States, despite this, to
remain entrenched in the cowboy mentality which holds that might is
right would be a denial of the principle that such problems can be
solved by formal international agreements.
We did not find any proven case that the US Services have used the result
of SIGINT-operations for competitive espionage.
Open questions in connection with the Advocacy Center
Last but not least, questions remain in connection with the
Advocacy Center, which is attached to the US Department of Commerce.
Since its establishment in 1993, the Center has helped hundreds of US
firms to win public contracts abroad. The Center focuses the resources
of the US Administration, ranging from experts in individual sectors,
via the economic attachés posted to embassies, right up to the White
House.
Since the US Administration did not allow the planned discussion between
members of the committee and representatives of the Center to take
place, there are two areas of doubt which could not be cleared up:
a. the committee has documents in its possession (published by the
center itself in the internet) which seem to provide evidence of CIA
involvement in the work of the Center;
b. on the basis of information placed on the Internet, the center
acknowledges that it focuses the resources of 19 'US government
agencies'. Elsewhere, however, only 18 such agencies are listed, raising
the issue of why 1 agency cannot be named in public.
The real political problem, basically, is that, in the European public
debate, the United States is considered capable of such measures. The
political problem highlighted by this whole issue is the prevalence of
profound mistrust. This mistrust has to be weeded out.
IX Summary
How do we assess these findings? One of our assessment criteria must be
to ask what our own services actually do. That is not the sole
criterion, but it must be taken into consideration if we intend to hold
an honest debate on this subject. Most of the intelligence services in
the EU Member States engage in strategic communications monitoring. Only
Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal do not use
such technology.
Secondly the purpose for which strategic monitoring is used affects our
assessment. If it is targeted at internationally organised crime, drug
trafficking, trafficking in human beings, the arms trade, terrorism,
proliferation or sanctions busting, or if it is used to protect national
security, there can be no questioning the legitimacy of its purpose as
such. But if it is being used to spy on foreign companies in order to
tip the competitive balance in favour of domestic industries, that is
quite a different matter.
Thirdly, the end does not justify the means. In short, the end is not
everything; each individual case of eavesdropping is an invasion of
privacy. It is not a problem of quantity either. Human rights are
individual rights; they are not a matter of statistics. Such an invasion
of privacy is only permissible on certain conditions. The case law of
the European Court of Human Rights is crystal clear in this respect.
Briefly, the conditions are as follows: there must be a legal basis for
such an operation – it cannot be arbitrary; a value judgement must be
made, the breach of privacy being weighed against the morality of its
purpose; the operation must be foreseeable, which means that the general
public must know that such a system exists, and recourse to interception
must only be permitted if there is no alternative. It is, in other
words, an ultima ratio.
In Menwith Hill as well as in Bad Aibling in Germany authorisation has
been given to the USA for the use of land for the sole purpose of
housing a satellite receiving facility. If, in these stations, a US
intelligence service were to engage in the interception of civil
communications from a party which signed the European Convention on
Human Rights, supervisory requirements would come into play under this
convention. In practical terms: as ECHR contracting parties Germany and
the United Kingdom are required to establish that the activities of the
American intelligence services do not represent a violation of the
convention of human rights.
There are Members of our House who agree that it is acceptable for the
police to intercept communications in pursuance of a court order for the
purpose of criminal prosecution. But in the case of the intelligence
services, they call it an infringement of human rights. I fully
understand anyone expressing political opposition to this type of action
by the secret services. I can see the logic of that. It is not my
position, but I can follow their reasoning. But anyone who says it is
illegal is disregarding the rulings of our own European Court of Human
Rights.
We have developed a lot of proposals, some of which relate to the
monitoring of the intelligence services here in Europe, for a code of
conduct for the EU Member States. Ultimately, however, it all boils down
to one simple main problem: the protection of privacy is guaranteed by
the national legal systems, but communications are becoming increasingly
international. There is no world government to protect them. This is one
of the many problems posed by globalisation. We must reach agreements
and enshrine them in international law so that privacy is protected
world-wide.
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