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17 Ocotober 2002
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Excerpts relating to Missile Defence From ‘Defence in the World’ debate in House of Commons Geoff Hoon: … Our work over the past 12 months has been focused on one simple proposition: the need to defend the people of the United Kingdom, their interests and their allies. 17 Oct 2002 : Column 503 We face many threats in an increasingly unpredictable world, but above all else we have to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The recent admission by North Korea that it has a nuclear weapons programme illustrates how critical that is. The terrible nature and power of these weapons in unscrupulous hands is such that there can be few more important challenges than protecting ourselves and our friends and allies from their potentially devastating impact. Let us make no mistake: there are people who are more than willing to use such weapons against us. I have spoken of Iraq, but the possibility of any one of a range of terrorist groups acquiring a chemical, biological, radiological or even nuclear weapon is far from fantasy. They are trying to acquire such weapons, and we cannot be certain that they will not succeed. In terms of the death and destruction that they can cause and the strategic effect that they can achieve, many of these weapons are neither costly nor even complex to manufacture. Linked to the threat from weapons of mass destruction is that of ballistic missile proliferation. Such missiles pose a threat in themselves, but it is their capability to deliver WMD warheads that make them still more of a concern. Right hon. and hon. Members may therefore find it helpful if I say a few words about the work in the United States on the development of ballistic missile defence systems, and this Government's position on such systems. The United States' withdrawal from the anti-ballistic missile treaty took effect on 13 June. Contrary to some commentators' expectations, that did not prove to be the prelude to a new strategic arms race. In fact, it coincided with the negotiation and conclusion of the Moscow treaty, under which the United States and Russia agreed to steep reductions in the numbers of their deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The US missile defence programme is gathering momentum, as Monday evening's successful test illustrates. In particular, the United States has plans for a test-bed in the Pacific, to be used to develop and evaluate options for a basic missile defence system capable of addressing the full range of missile threats. Developing effective ballistic missile defence is a hugely challenging task. Any system will inevitably have to develop on an evolutionary basis, as understanding increases of the technological and other risks and opportunities involved. During the summer, US officials visited London and other European capitals, as well as NATO headquarters in Brussels, to set
out possible approaches to missile defence and to repeat US willingness to offer protection to friends and allies. It is right that we recognise the potential
contribution of missile defence to a comprehensive strategy to deal with the threat from ballistic missiles—a strategy that also includes non-proliferation and
counter-proliferation measures, diplomacy and deterrence. If a US request for the use of Fylingdales—or any other UK facility for missile defence purposes—is received, we will consider it very seriously. The Government would agree to such a request only if we were satisfied that the overall security of the UK and the alliance would be enhanced. Since this subject is highly complex and one of considerable interest to the House, I have asked for some detailed analytical work to be completed on the implications of missile defence and its relationship with other elements of a comprehensive strategy against the ballistic missile threat. We welcome parliamentary and public discussion of the issues involved. I therefore intend to make available in the coming months further analytical and discussion material as our work progresses, and we will be ready to discuss these issues in the House at the appropriate time. Jeremy Corbyn:
Has the Secretary of State not just made a coded statement that Britain will take part in missile defence and will support the United States in this costly
disaster—the proposed star wars in the sky—which will cost this country dear, and line us up ever more closely with the United States and all its interests, against
the rest of the world? Mr. Prisk: As the Secretary of State will recall, I have asked him about this issue repeatedly over the last year, and I am pleased that we are finally achieving a little parity. May I tease out a little more from him on what he described as the close access that the Government have enjoyed? Over the last year, in answering questions from me and others, he has said that there has been no direct involvement. Is he now saying that there have been links? Can he confirm that a Royal Air Force officer who is already operating and working at NATO is participating in the programme there? I welcome the progress, but I hope that he can be clear on the matter. Mr. Hoon: I assure the hon. Gentleman that at no stage have I misled the House on these matters. In answer to parliamentary questions, we have made it clear that a research programme has been continuing in the Ministry of Defence for some time on the technical matters to which I have just referred. The material to which I have referred and the co-operation that is enjoyed by the United Kingdom with the United States is about basic research principles. That has been disclosed to the House on many previous occasions. Mr. Keetch: I am glad that the Government will, effectively, produce a dossier on Britain's potential involvement in national missile defence, and that there might be a debate. Can the Secretary of State tell us wen it might be? Will he assure the House that, if there is to be a dossier and a debate, we will have more time to look at it than we did in relation to the dossier on Iraq? Mr. Hoon:
The fair answer to that is that it will take place when we are ready. Mr. Hoon: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his common-sense approach. Perhaps he might assist in advising some of my other colleagues on the circumstances in question. Dr. Julian Lewis: Will the Secretary of State at least agree that those of his Back-Bench colleagues who are so opposed to taking action against Saddam Hussein, and who feel that Saddam should be left at liberty to go on developing ballistic missiles, should at least experience a belated conversion to ballistic missile defence? That might make their other recommendations a little more credible. Mr. Hoon: I am sure that my hon. Friends heard the hon. Gentleman's observations. Patrick Mercer (Newark): Ballistic missiles apart, can the Secretary of State guarantee that, as, when and if our troops are deployed into harm's way—from people such as Saddam Hussein—theatre missile defence will be in place to protect them in the same way that American, Italian, French and German troops have that protection? Mr. Hoon: The hon. Gentleman and I have debated the matter before. I have answered that question on several previous occasions, and I am not sure that we will take the matter further. I will not give guarantees of anything, as, clearly, it would not be appropriate at this stage to make the kind of assumptions that he is making. I want to make progress, because I have detained the House longer than I should have done. …. 17 Oct 2002 : Column 508 Mr. Bernard Jenkin (North Essex): I welcome the Secretary of State's announcement on missile defence. Although it does not constitute a change of policy or involve a marked shift in expenditure or a commitment to a particular programme, it marks a considerable shift in his tone. I did not come to the Chamber today with the intention of majoring on the subject of missile defence, because I took the view that, after the Bali attack, to carry on highlighting the absence of ministerial commitment to missile defence would do nothing but add to public anxiety. Therefore, the right hon. Gentleman's timing is well chosen. The public require reassurance on this issue. Weapons proliferation continues and we know that investigation into possible programmes has continued in the right hon. Gentleman's Department and that the NATO working party, in which the UK is a prime facilitator, has continued its work on missile defence, so it has become increasingly ridiculous for the Government to insist that "no decisions have been made." I very much welcome the movement that the Secretary of State has made today, but I must point out that Her Majesty's Opposition have been pleading with the Government on this issue for some time; my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition raised the issue of missile defence long before the last election, and such a statement from the Secretary of State was long overdue. I welcome it unreservedly and look forward to seeing the papers that he will lay before the House and to engaging in the debate that he says he will now welcome. I stress a point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer). At a recent conference that I attended on missile defence, it was noticeable that Britain is virtually the only country in Europe that is not well down the track of developing a deployable theatre missile defence system. I have no desire to set hares running as I have no doubt that whatever is required to protect forces in theatre will be provided, but my hon. Friend deserves a fuller answer in the fullness of time than the Secretary of State felt able to give today. As we embark on this debate, I see nothing to be gained on the Government's part unless there is absolute openness. At a time when public anxiety about terrorist attacks and weapons of mass destruction is running high, surely we should do everything that we can to reassure the public and give them confidence in what we are saying and doing. ….. 4.9 pm Mr. Nigel Beard (Bexleyheath and Crayford): If two antagonists both deploy military forces for attack, the military balance is unstable because either side might gain an advantage from striking first. That was the nature of the balance of strategic nuclear weapons during the cold war. The concept of mutually assured destruction is still the basis of the strategic balance of offensive weapons between the old cold war antagonists. However, a missile might be fired in error or a malicious or deranged officer may become convinced that the circumstances are right for first strike to gain an advantage. Either possibility could trigger a devastating response that no Government intended. To address those and other problems, Presidents Bush and Putin, to their credit, recently agreed to cut their strategic nuclear weapons by two thirds, but that still leaves 2,000 nuclear missiles on each side, plus weapons owned by the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and so on. When the use of any one of those weapons would be a disaster for the world, that remains a frightening arsenal. 17 Oct 2002 : Column 531 Let us imagine a notable success in arms reduction negotiations so that both sides have no more than a few hundred nuclear weapons each. How do they get below that number? Any move to reduce towards zero will raise suspicions that side A will secretly retain a capability and so leave side B exposed if it complies by reducing to zero. The inevitable suspicion will mean that neither side will ever voluntarily reduce weapons to zero. It was because of similar suspicions that mutual and balanced forced reductions of conventional forces could not be agreed in the past. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty was intended to limit the spread of such weapons outside the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China. It has not succeeded. India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea all possess nuclear weapons. That encourages states with which they may come into conflict to acquire them too. Containment is a vain hope, especially when both nuclear and ballistic technology are transferred between states or by the migration of experts from the Soviet Union. A missile defence system, such as the one under discussion, may provide a solution to those problems. First, it would enable a strategic balance to be achieved by means of defensive weapons that is essentially stable, unlike the inherent instability that goes with a balance of offensive weapons. Secondly, the risk of a nuclear exchange being triggered in error by an insubordinate or maverick custodian would be eliminated. Thirdly, a missile defence shield, available to both sides, would provide a climate for safe negotiation towards zero arsenals of nuclear weapons. Fourthly, it would give direct protection against the malicious acts of rogue states. Fifthly, if countries can be offered a place under a missile defence umbrella, they have everything to gain from signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. What then are the obstacles to all that becoming a reality? A major objection is that the missile defence system proposed today is no more than a rehash of President Reagan's star wars concept. Not only was star wars technologically impossible to achieve, it would have made the world a more dangerous place. It would have nullified the deterrent effect of the Soviet Union's strategic weapons, so creating the possibility of a pre-emptive strike against the star wars system or of an arms race. Those objections were, and remain, valid, but that is not the missile defence system that the United States now proposes. The concept is of a system that could withstand an attack of up to 100 missiles at most. It could not therefore wipe out Russia's ability to respond to a United States attack, so it would not upset the current strategic balance. On that basis, the Russian Government have agreed to it being an exception to the anti-ballistic missile treaty between
themselves and the United States of America. 17 Oct 2002 : Column 532 The outstanding question now is what diplomatic and technological conditions are required to achieve the various benefits of missile defence in practice. Diplomatically, there must be agreement from the beginning that protection will be given to north America, Europe and Russia. Any scheme designed solely to protect north America would divide and possibly destroy the NATO alliance. Unless Russia is included, there would be no incentive for Russia to negotiate strategic arms reductions below presently agreed levels, and the stability of Russian democracy and European security could be threatened. The second diplomatic requirement is a willingness to extend the protective umbrella to any state that has signed and adhered
to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The ultimate obstacle to the missile defence concept could be the difficulty and expense of developing reliable technology. Some commentators have pronounced the proposed scheme to be technologically impossible to achieve. No doubt they draw some of that certainty from the abandonment of star wars because the technology proved too difficult to develop. But that system, which aimed to intercept several thousand missiles at once faultlessly, had an infinitely more complex task than intercepting 100 or fewer. Some of the technology, such as sensors, radars, computing, communications, is not new. Some research and development is needed, but given clear objectives for the development programme, experts, such as the RAND Corporation, who have assessed what is needed, do not see the technology as out of reach. The important question is how development and production will be organised. If the whole missile defence system were to fall under the technological hegemony of the USA, then the strategic concept would most likely be rejected by European countries and Russia on that ground alone. Co-development and co-production by NATO countries and Russia, under American leadership, must spread the technological and economic benefits equitably and, at the same time, build confidence. Negotiated co-operation in design, development and production will be as essential to the success of the project as co-operation in deployment. I urge the Government to persuade the United States Government of a strategic role and purpose of missile defence similar to
the role that I have attempted to outline; to persuade other NATO allies of that role and purpose and to engage their active commitment to the project; and to join the
United States in establishing arrangements by which NATO allies and Russia may co-operate in designing, developing and producing the required technology. The British
Government have a pivotal role to play in achieving all that, which I hope will become a new dimension of United Kingdom foreign and defence policy. If we can achieve a
missile defence system on those terms, it will be an infinitely more precious legacy for future generations than a world littered with nuclear missiles that might be used
at any time. The Government also need to be more upfront on the realities of our and Europe's weakening position. Why, for instance, have they been sitting on the fence with regard to America's national missile defence proposals? Earlier today the Secretary of State moved towards a positive position on the issue, but not quite. Surely it is in our best interests that America feels safe from attack. Why not help it to feel safe in a way that would enable us to receive the benefit of the missile shield against nuclear proliferation? Given our overall relationship with America, surely it is highly unlikely that a missile threat against America would not also pose a threat to us. Effective defence measures do not begin and end with star wars projects. Indeed, our civil defence capability is widely seen as inadequate and underfunded. How many terror incidents must there be before we sort out our civil defence? 17 Oct 2002 : Column 546 Finally, the Government need to appreciate that if we are to maintain our severely stretched operational capability and
improve the technical capability of our military, we will simply have to increase spending on our armed forces. Like my hon. Friend the shadow Secretary of State for Defence, I warmly welcome the statement made by the Secretary of State. However, the House will recognise that once again the development of a ballistic missile defence has enormous strategic connotations and will be challenging for the defence budget. It also means that we in Britain are just about keeping up with the United States of America in its military technological advances. Most of our European neighbours are way behind, with the exception of France. Unless we are very careful, we are likely to see a two-tier NATO, with the USA on one tier, Britain somewhere in the middle, and the rest of Europe on the other. Within the next two or three years, the difference will be like that between an old horse-drawn, foot-mounted infantry division and a mechanised armoured division. That will mean that the ability of the European members of NATO, including us, to participate in American-style operations will be extremely limited.
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