Missile defence

265. The row which erupted with Russia in 2007 over planned anti-ballistic missile defence (BMD) deployments in Europe began with the announcement by the US Department of Defense in January that the US was opening talks with the Czech Republic and Poland on the deployment there of elements of its BMD system.[562] US officials had given initial indications in March 2006 that sites in Central Europe were being considered for BMD deployments. The planned US deployments in Central Europe would form part of the integrated multi-continental and multi-faceted BMD system which is aimed against the perceived post-Cold War threat of ballistic missile acquisition and use by rogue states or terrorists. President George W. Bush promised to develop such a system during his 2000 presidential election campaign and announced the plans as President in December 2002. The Bush Administration's BMD plans build on those for National Missile Defense set out by former President Clinton in 1999, but they are more ambitious, aiming to cover not only the continental US but also US allies and US troops deployed overseas, and to be able to intercept all types and ranges of ballistic missile at any point during a missile's trajectory. His wish to develop such a system caused President Bush, after negotiations with Russia had failed, to announce in December 2001 the United States' unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The ABM Treaty had placed severe limits on the deployment of BMD systems by the US and USSR, in order to sustain the form of stability that came with mutually assured destruction between the then superpowers.

266. The initial phase of the planned US BMD system involves the deployment of radar and other sensors on satellites, at sea, and on land in Alaska, Greenland and the UK, and of interceptors at sea and at two land sites, Alaska and California. An initial BMD operational capability was achieved by the end of 2005 and the system was temporarily activated in July 2006 when North Korea tested a missile. The US plans involving the Czech Republic and Poland are for a further phase of the BMD system. The US plans the deployment of an early warning radar to the Czech Republic and 10 interceptor missiles to underground silos at a site in northern Poland. The US plans to achieve initial deployment of its Central European BMD elements in 2011 and their full operational capability by 2013. With the deployment of further additional elements, the complete BMD system is planned to be in place by 2015. The entire BMD system is being funded by the US only. The bases involved in the planned US BMD deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland would remain the host states' sovereign territory, but host state permission would not be required for an interceptor missile launch.

267. Whether the full US plans for the BMD system will be realised, on time or at all, remains uncertain. There are doubts about the technical effectiveness of several elements of the system, and about the willingness of the US Congress to provide the necessary funding. Justifying their unwillingness to provide the full funding requested by the Administration, some US legislators have pointed to political opposition to the BMD plans in the Czech Republic and Poland, and to a perceived lack of adequate consultation with NATO allies.[563]

268. Russia has reacted angrily to the planned US BMD deployments in Central Europe. Partly, Russia denies that the threat from rogue states which the BMD system is designed to counter is likely to exist in the timeframe covered by the US plans. In his February Munich speech, President Putin said "Missile weapons with a range of about five to eight thousand kilometres that really pose a threat to Europe do not exist in any of the so-called problem countries. And in the near future and prospects, this will not happen and is not even foreseeable."[564] Russia also argues that the deployment sites in Central Europe are not ones that make sense if the aim is to counter missiles launched primarily from the Middle East.[565] Moscow alleges that the BMD deployments are in fact aimed at Russia. US officials have sought to counter such claims, pointing out that the few interceptors planned for Poland could have no impact against Russia's missile arsenal. However, Russian officials often seem to find such assurances inadequate, instead believing that the purpose and nature of the proposed Central European facilities could be changed once they are established.

269. Whether or not Russia's opposition to the US BMD plans reflects a genuine belief that the facilities could be used against Russia, our witnesses felt that Russia's opposition to the proposals definitely reflected their symbolic value and a general sense of Russian insecurity in the region. For example, Dr Pravda told us that "there is genuine concern about missile defence systems, but it is more of a symbolic than of a military material nature. They are seen as symptomatic of an offensive and aggressive intention on the part of the United States."[566] Dr Pravda went on:

Moscow sees [the deployment of defensive systems] in Eastern Europe, alongside an extending NATO infrastructure, as evidence of American military expansionism. Russian protests reflect real concern about an expansive strategy that could impinge on and eventually embrace Georgia and Ukraine.[567]

Professor Light told us that "the question of missile defence and the placement of missile defence in the European countries bordering Russia is very deeply felt. It goes back to the genuine concern about the abrogation of the ABM treaty and what that has done to the strategic stability of the world."[568] Similarly, Ms Aldis told us that Russia sees the proposed US deployments in Central Europe as a "deliberate policy of encirclement of Russia by the West".[569]

270. At the G8 summit in June 2007, President Putin appeared to surprise President Bush by suggesting cooperation on BMD, via joint US and Russian use of an existing radar facility at Gabala in Azerbaijan which Russia currently leases.[570] The Minister for Europe welcomed the Russian offer, saying that "by the nature of the Russian offer there is an acceptance of the capacity of the equipment and the intention of its deployment and that is a positive signal."[571] Meeting President Bush in July, President Putin offered to transform BMD into a 'strategic partnership', perhaps involving joint early-warning centres. The US has also made proposals for cooperation on BMD. However, the US has made clear that it would regard the Azerbaijani radar at most as a complement to, not a replacement for, its existing BMD plans in Central Europe.[572]

271. In October 2007, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates went to Moscow for talks with their Russian counterparts, primarily on the US BMD plans. The US delegation proposed that Russian inspectors be given access to the planned BMD sites in Central Europe, and that Russia be included in some way in the BMD system.[573] The US officials also offered to delay activating the BMD system until Russia and the US both agreed that there was a threat from Iran.[574] Russian officials reportedly regarded this idea as "promising" and a "positive signal",[575] but Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov maintained that the planned BMD deployments themselves were "anti-Russian".[576] Russia wants to see development of the Czech and Polish sites halted while further talks take place.[577]

272. NATO appears latterly to be gaining a greater role in the discussion of the US BMD plans. Several NATO members, most notably Germany, have called for the BMD issue to be handled primarily through the Alliance, both among the Western allies and with Russia, via the NATO-Russia Council. At a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council in April 2007, ministers noted that Russia had "fundamental concerns" about BMD and said that there was "consensus on the need to take this discussion forward in the NATO-Russia Council in the future, focusing in particular on threat assessment."[578] In his evidence to us, the Minister for Europe agreed that "The Russia-NATO dialogue is the key way of potentially resolving the issue".[579] In June 2007, the Alliance agreed by February 2008 to carry out an assessment of the US BMD plans. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has appeared most concerned about the prospect that the US BMD shield would cover only some European NATO members. In April 2007, NATO members agreed to try to link the US BMD plans with NATO's own for theatre missile defence, so as to create a shield covering the whole Alliance.

273. We conclude that Russian opposition to US ballistic missile defence (BMD) plans in Central Europe largely reflects Moscow's sensitivity about the presence of NATO infrastructure in its former satellite states. As such, Russian opposition will be hard to overcome. We welcome signs that the US, Russia and the NATO allies may be engaging in a more substantive dialogue and search for cooperation on BMD. As long as it remains committed to the US BMD plans, we recommend that the Government seek ways to build cooperation around them, both within NATO and with Russia, so that they do not become a source of further divisions in Europe.

274. As for the UK's involvement, in 2003 London agreed to a US request for the upgrading of the radar at RAF Fylingdales, so that it could be incorporated into the BMD system. However, on 25 July 2007, in a written statement the day before the House rose for recess, the Government announced that equipment would also be installed and operated by the US at RAF Menwith Hill to receive satellite warnings of missile launches. The Government's statement ran:

On 5 February 2003 the Secretary of State for Defence announced the Government's agreement to a request from the US to upgrade the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar at RAF Fylingdales. The UK already makes a contribution to US capability in the area of missile warning, through our operation of the radar at RAF Fylingdales. That upgrade process is now complete and we expect that the radar will switch its operations to the new equipment from August 2007. There is no change to the existing UK-US mission for the radar and the station remains under full UK command. Its primary mission is to warn of ballistic missile attack, with secondary functions of space surveillance and satellite warning. The radar will contribute to the US ballistic missile defence system, alongside a global network of other US-owned sensors based on land, at sea and in space and the data it produces is shared between the UK and US military authorities. The UK will have full insight into the operation of the US missile defence system when missile engagements take place that are wholly or partly influenced by data from the radar at RAF Fylingdales.

Also, at RAF Menwith Hill, equipment will be installed and operated by the US Government to allow receipt of satellite warnings of potentially hostile missile launches, and will pass this warning data to both UK and US authorities. The data will also be fed into the US ballistic missile defence system for use in their response to any missile attack on the US. This will guarantee the UK's continued access to essential missile attack warning data, as well as enhancing the US's ability to deal with any attack aimed at their country.

The Government welcome US plans to place further missile defence assets in Europe to address the emerging threat from rogue states. We welcome assurances from the US that the UK and other European allies will be covered by the system elements they propose to deploy to Poland and the Czech Republic and we have been exploring ways in which the UK can continue to contribute to the US system as well as to any future NATO missile defence system.

These developments reflect the Government's continuing commitment to supporting the development of the US missile defence system. We continue to regard this system as a building block to enhance our national and collective security. NATO has made no decisions about acquiring missile defence for the alliance, and we want to examine how the US system can be complemented and built upon to provide wider coverage for Europe. We have no plans to site missile interceptors in the UK but will keep this under review as the threat evolves. We also want to reassure Russia about the defensive nature and intent of the US system as it develops and to take forward alliance cooperation with them in the field of missile defence.[580]

275. The previous substantive Government statement on BMD came in a written answer on 4 June. On that occasion, the Government had said that "discussions are at an early stage and there are no formal proposals."[581] We regret the manner and timing of the Government's announcement that RAF Menwith Hill is to participate in the US ballistic missile defence (BMD) system, and the resulting lack of Parliamentary debate on the issue. In its response to this Report, we recommend that the Government inform us of the date on which it received the formal proposal from the US to include Menwith Hill in the BMD system. We recommend that there should be a full Parliamentary debate on these proposals.

RUSSIA'S RESPONSE

280. In his February 2007 speech in Munich, President Putin suggested that, while Russia continued to fulfil its obligations under the Adapted CFE Treaty and work towards withdrawal from Georgia and Moldova, the NATO states had not ratified the Treaty, and meanwhile the US was planning to open new bases in Eastern Europe. President Putin suggested that NATO was using the situation created by its Member States' non-ratification of the Adapted Treaty to "put its frontline forces on [Russia's] borders".[582]

281. President Putin expanded on his criticisms of the situation regarding the CFE Treaty in his Annual Address to the Federal Assembly on 26 April 2007. In his speech, President Putin suggested that if no progress could be made towards ratification of the Adapted Treaty, Russia would "examine the possibility of suspending [its] commitments under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty". President Putin said that "the right course of action is for Russia to declare a moratorium on its observance of this treaty until such time as all NATO members without exception ratify it and start strictly observing its provisions, as Russia has been doing so far on a unilateral basis." President Putin implied that the CFE Treaty made no sense following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and said that under current circumstances the Treaty meant only that Russia "face[s] restrictions on deploying conventional forces on [its] own territory." While Russia had observed its obligations under the CFE Treaty, President Putin said that the Treaty's NATO signatories had not ratified the Adapted Treaty and were meanwhile "taking advantage of the situation to build up their own system of military bases along [Russia's] borders" and planning missile defence deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland. President Putin said that Russia was working towards fulfilment of its Istanbul commitments, but denied that there was any legal linkage between these and ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty in any case.[583]

282. On 14 July, President Putin signed a decree ordering the suspension of Russia's participation in the CFE Treaty. President Putin gave instructions that the other states parties to the Treaty be given formal notification of Russia's decision to suspend its participation. [584] As provided for under the Treaty, suspension of Russia's participation will take effect 150 days after such notification was provided (i.e. 12 December 2007).

283. The CSRC suggested that Russia wanted to withdraw from the CFE Treaty—and the INF Treaty, discussed below—in any case, and was using the US BMD plans as an excuse.[585] Professor Fedorov pointed out that a suspension of Russian participation in the CFE Treaty was a less provocative response to the US BMD plans than possible withdrawal from the INF Treaty, a step which Russia has not so far taken. However, Professor Fedorov was of the view that securing international observance of the Adapted CFE Treaty was "militarily very important for Russia".[586] Russia's suspension of its participation in the CFE Treaty would appear to make NATO ratification of the Adapted Treaty even less likely.

284. The FCO told us that it rejected the linkage that Russia had made between the US BMD plans and the INF and CFE Treaties.[587] The Minister for Europe told us that he did not regard Russia's action as to do with the CFE process at all, but as "a continuing part of Russia's assessment of itself and its international posture, and its continued, understandable intention to be a world player, across the globe, but more importantly for it, on its borders."[588]

285. Our witnesses agreed that the main immediate impact of Russia's suspension of its participation in the CFE Treaty would come via Russia's presumed withdrawal from the Treaty's mutual inspection regimes. Ms Aldis said that these "have been a major stabilising factor in mutual confidence building".[589] According to Dr Allison, Russia's withdrawal from the inspection regime "is likely to further undermine trust and transparency in Russian security relations with NATO."[590] We are concerned by Russia's decision to suspend its participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty with effect from mid-December 2007. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government provide us with its assessment of the practical and political impact of Russia's step. We further recommend that the Government update us on the steps it is taking to encourage Russia to fulfil its Istanbul commitments.

INF Treaty

286. Under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed in 1987, the US and the USSR agreed to eliminate all their ground-launched nuclear-armed missiles with a range of 500-5,500 kilometres. Following the Soviet Union's dissolution, its commitments under the Treaty were taken over by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The relevant missiles were destroyed by 1991, although the associated verification system was wound up only in 2001.[591]

287. In his February 2007 Munich speech, President Putin hinted that the global proliferation of missiles might cause Russia to question the INF Treaty. The agreement did "not have a universal character", noted President Putin. He went on:

Today many other countries have these missiles, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan and Israel. Many countries are working on these systems and plan to incorporate them as part of their weapons arsenals. And only the United States and Russia bear the responsibility to not create such weapons systems. It is obvious that in these conditions we must think about ensuring our own security.[592]

288. Later in February, Russia's army Chief of Staff General Yury Baluyevsky said explicitly that Russia might unilaterally withdraw from the INF Treaty. Justifying the possible move, General Baluyevsky said that "many countries are developing and perfecting medium range rockets". However, he also linked Russia's possible withdrawal to the US BMD plans, saying that "What they are doing today, creating a third positioning region for the anti-missile system in Europe, is inexplicable."[593] The commander of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces, General Nikolai Solovtsov, stated shortly afterwards that it would be "easy enough" for Russia to resume production of the missiles banned under the INF deal.[594]

289. In October 2007, during the Moscow visit of US Secretary of State Rice and Defense Secretary Gates, President Putin said that unless further countries were to come into the INF regime, "it will be difficult for [Russia] to keep within the framework of the  treaty  in a situation where other countries do develop such weapons systems, and among those are countries in our near vicinity."[595] However, President Putin's spokesman said that "our joint goal is to take measures for international security, and it would be wise for all of us to think of modernising the  INF treaty".[596]

290. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government provide us with its assessment of the likelihood and possible implications of a renunciation by Russia of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

Missile targeting and development

291. In February 2007, the commander of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces, General Nikolai Solovtsov, warned that Russia could target the proposed locations of the US BMD deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland if the two countries acceded to the US request for their participation in the system.[597] The general warned, "If the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic take such a step, the strategic  missile  forces will be capable of targeting these facilities".[598]

292. In early June 2007, ahead of the G8 summit, President Putin similarly appeared to threaten to retarget Russian missiles at European targets. President Putin said, "It is obvious that if part of the strategic nuclear potential of the United States is located in Europe we will have to respond […] What kind of steps are we going to take in response? Of course we are going to acquire new targets in Europe."[599] In subsequent remarks, both Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov and the President's spokesman clarified that President Putin had meant to refer only to the proposed BMD deployment sites, not to other possible European targets.[600]

293. In July 2007, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said that Russia could site missiles in its Kaliningrad exclave, between Poland and Lithuania, if the US plans for BMD deployments in Central Europe went ahead.[601]

294. Russia has also linked the US European BMD plans to the development of new missiles. In February 2007, President Putin said that Russia would develop a new generation of missiles capable of penetrating the planned BMD shield.[602] In May 2007, Russia successfully tested a new RS24 intercontinental ballistic missile, capable of carrying multiple warheads, and an improved version of its short-range Iskander missile. First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said that the "new missiles […] are capable of overcoming any existing or future  missile  defence systems."[603] In August 2007, the commander of the Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Masorin, announced that Russia had decided to start production of a new Bulava-M submarine-based intercontinental missile, following a successful test.[604]

295. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government share with us its assessment of the likelihood of Moscow retargeting its strategic missile forces if the US ballistic missile defence deployment in Europe goes ahead.

Notes

562   This section draws on "Ballistic Missile Defence: Recent Developments", Standard Note SN/IA/4378, House of Commons Library, 29 June 2007.

563   "US House panel cuts East Europe missile shield funds", Defense News, 2 May 2007

564   Text available via www.securityconference.de

565   "Arms race fears as Putin attacks US missiles plan", Daily Telegraph, 2 February 2007; "Russians accuse US of European military expansion", Financial Times, 10 February 2007

566   Q 15; see also Ev 136 [Dr Marshall].

567   Ev 20

568   Q 17

569   Q 69

570   President Putin made his offer concerning the Azerbaijani facility while we were in Baku; see Ev 175.

571   Q 152

572   "US missile plan to forge ahead", Financial Times, 15 June 2007

573   "Defence shield offer to Russia 'makes progress'", The Daily Telegraph, 19 October 2007

574   "Washington offers to delay activating missile defence shield", The Guardian, 24 October 2007

575   "Washington offers to delay activating missile defence shield", The Guardian, 24 October 2007

576  "Putin on the attack over US missile defence", The Independent, 13 October 2007

577   "Washington offers to delay activating missile defence shield", The Guardian, 24 October 2007

578   "NATO-Russia Ministers hold intensive discussions", NATO press release, 26 April 2007, via www.nato.int

579   Q 152

580   HC Deb, 25 July 2007, col 71WS

581   HC Deb, 4 June 2007, col 237W

582   Text available via www.securityconference.de

583   Text via the Kremlin website, www.kremlin.ru

584   "Vladimir Putin signed a decree on suspending Russia's participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe", statement available via the website of the Russian Foreign Ministry, www.mid.ru

585   Ev 28

586   Q 70

587   Ev 80

588   Q 154

589   Q 70

590   Ev 19

591   "Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction", Standard Note SN/IA/1404, House of Commons Library, 9 December 2005

592   Text available via www.securityconference.de

593   "Russia threat to quit nuclear treaty over US shield plans", Financial Times, 16 February 2007

594   "Russian missile threat to Poles and Czechs over US shield plan", Financial Times, 20 February 2007

595   "We will dump nuclear treaty, Putin warns", The Guardian, 13 October 2007

596   "Putin on the attack over US missile defence", The Independent, 13 October 2007

597   "Defence shield sites threatened by Russia", Daily Telegraph, 20 February 2007

598   "War of words as east Europeans welcome US missile shield", The Guardian, 20 February 2007

599   "G8 Summit 2007: Putin in nuclear threat to Europe", Daily Telegraph, 4 June 2007

600   "Russia backs down over threat to aim missiles at Europe", Daily Telegraph, 15 June 2007

601   "Russians threaten missile site to counter US shield", Financial Times, 5 July 2007

602   "Arms race fears as Putin attacks US missiles plan", Daily Telegraph, 2 February 2007

603   "Russian missile test adds to arms race fears", The Guardian, 30 May 2007