The Defence Committee today publishes its First Report on Missile Defence, which focuses on the rationale for and implications of an upgrade of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning station at RAF Fylingdales, requested by the US Government.  The report  is also available on the Committee's website.  (A separate volume of written and oral evidence on which the report is based will be published tomorrow-HC 290-II).

The Committee conclude that there is a real and increasing threat from the proliferation of ballistic missiles.  The United States is justified in believing that it is a principal potential target of that threat.  It is therefore justified in taking steps to counteract it.

The US Missile Defence programme is one such step, although it cannot be the whole solution.   It would be capable of defending against at most a handful of missiles:  It is not the son of 'Star Wars' as envisaged in the 1980s to provide an inpenetrable shield for the USA.  There are still significant technical obstacles to be overcome, and at great cost, before an effective system could be deployed.  But the US has made substantial progress. In doing so it has so far not caused the international instability which many had predicted.

One element of the proposed Missile Defence system involves the upgrade of computer software and hardware for the radar at RAF Fylingdales.  Fylingdales, although a British base operated by the RAF, is one of four US Ballistic Missile Early Warning System stations.  The upgrade would allow information which the radar already captures  to be used to track missiles more accurately so that interceptors in the USA or on board US warships could be targeted at them.  Although it is a discrete proposition which would not imply consent to any further development or UK involvement, it would in effect draw the UK a little way down the path to active participation.

The Committee conclude that the UK should agree to the upgrade at Fylingdales.  The factors in favour of that agreement-the importance of the UK-US relationship, the improvement to the early warning capability, the opportunity to keep open the prospect of future missile defence for the UK and the potential for UK industrial participation in the programme's further development-outweigh the arguments against.

The Committee strongly regret, however, the way in which the issue has been handled by the Government.  It was a mistake on the part of the MoD to fail to respond to calls for a public debate of this issue for much of last year.   But, by announcing on 15 January that it was his preliminary conclusion that the UK must agree to the request,  the Secretary of State effectively prevented that debate from taking place.  The MoD then told the Committee that the Government's decision might be formally passed to the US Government as soon as 31 January 2003.  The Committee can find no reason for this sudden urgency.  In order to produce this report within this apparently arbitrary timescale the Committee have had to agree it without allowing local people and organisations to appear before us (although it took into account the many written submissions received).

The Committee deplore the manner in which the public debate on the issue of the upgrade of facilities at RAF Fylingdales has been handled by the Ministry of Defence. It has shown no respect for either the views of those affected locally by the decision or for the arguments of those opposed to the upgrade in principle.  Despite the Secretary of State's unequivocal statement that he wanted the decision to be informed by public and parliamentary discussion, he has acted in a way that has effectively curtailed such discussions.

The Committee felt obliged to publish a report setting out our views on the US request within the timescale imposed upon us by the Ministry of Defence.  But this does not conclude its interest in the subject.  The Committee intend to continue its inquiries by looking more broadly at missile defence issues including the potential security benefits of missile defence both for the UK itself and for forces deployed overseas, and to what extent the UK might benefit from the US programme in terms of industrial participation.  The Committee will also wish to follow up those matters relating to the upgrade of RAF Fylingdales which could not be addressed fully in this report.