(Below is the section of the report relating to arms control. The
report also includes a number of memoranda from non-governmental
organizations that can also be read at the end of the report.)
Missile defence and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
CURRENT US POLICY ON MISSILE DEFENCE
38. The Bush Administration's determination to develop a ballistic
missile shield for the United States stems from its conviction that the
security environment in which the US and its allies operate has changed
profoundly. On 1 May 2001, in a speech to the US National Defense
University, President Bush set out the rationale underlying his
Administration's decision to develop a limited system of ballistic
missile defence. The President described a "vastly different
world" from that of the Cold War, which remains
"dangerous" but is also "less certain, less
predictable." He stated that "today's most urgent threat stems
not from thousands of ballistic missiles in the Soviet hands, but from a
small number of missiles" possessed by "some of the world's
least responsible states... for whom terror and blackmail are a way of
life."[27]
39. The vision of defence described by President Bush and his senior
officials requires a "new framework that allows us to build missile
defenses to counter the different threats of today's world."[28] Missile defences, the
Administration believes, are crucial because "our lack of defenses
against ballistic missiles creates incentives for missile proliferation
which, combined with the development of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons of mass destruction, will give future adversaries the ability to
hold our populations hostage to terror and to blackmail... Effective
missile defense could... discourage potential adversaries from investing
in ballistic missiles that threaten the US and allied population centres."[29]
40. The current US Administration's overall decision to develop a system
of ballistic missile defence is similar in many respects to that of the
Clinton Administration, although the Bush Administration has highlighted
some specific areas of policy difference. One such difference is that
the ballistic missile defence programme was initially described by the
Clinton Administration as National Missile Defence. However, the Bush
Administration re-named the programme Missile Defence, to indicate that
the programme might also be developed to protect allies, including the
United Kingdom. The re-naming was also undertaken because the Bush
Administration sees no logic in distinguishing between theatre missile
defence and defence against long range threats.
41. The Bush Administration has also undertaken a significant expansion
from pursuit of a
single, ground based system against long range missiles, to a much
broader research, development, testing and evaluation programme which
also looks at sea based and space based systems. The technical
challenges are greater than the more modest programme being pursued by
the Clinton Administration. The political challenges are also greater,
because the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty specifically prohibits the
systems and tests that are being developed under the current
Administration.
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS TOWARDS ESTABLISHING A MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM
42. Though the technological challenges to establishing a missile
defence system are huge (and insuperable, according to some
commentators), the US is confident that it is making progress. A central
aim of the current research programme is to establish whether a
'layered' system can be developed. The proposed system should enable the
US to have multiple shots at incoming missiles in the boost, mid-course
and terminal phases, and also to destroy short, medium and long range
missiles.
43. Despite media reports to the contrary, the US already has the
capability to destroy missiles in flight. The Patriot system, which hits
missiles in the terminal phase of their flight, has been improved
significantly since the Gulf War. In tests, eight out of nine attempted
intercepts have been successful. The THAAD system protects a larger area
than the Patriot system, intercepting intermediate range missiles, and
two successful intercepts have been achieved. THAAD might be fielded in
2006-07.
44. The US is also testing an intercontinental missile defence system
which is designed to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles high in
the atmosphere. Of five trials of this intercontinental system, three
have been 'successful,' although critics assert that the trials were
insufficiently thorough and were manipulated to ensure success. The most
recent test, conducted on 3 December 2001, was delayed for two days
because of poor visibility; some scientists have raised doubts about the
radar system used to guide the missile interceptor system, arguing that
the US could not rely on good weather in war time. All of these systems
use kinetic energy alone to destroy incoming missiles.
45. The US is also developing an airborne laser system, which they plan
to test in 2004. The purpose of the laser system is to enable the US to
hit missiles in the boost phase in regions in which it cannot station
anti-ballistic missile launching facilities.
THE 1972 ABM TREATY
46. Technical challenges are not the only obstacle to progress towards a
missile defence shield for the United States. The US is currently bound
by the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was signed by the United
States and the Soviet Union in 1972. The Treaty and its related 1974
Protocol impose strict limits on the number and location of strategic
interceptor missiles deployed by both parties. The Treaty was a product
of the rough parity between the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers by
the late 1960s, and was designed to ensure mutual vulnerability
(Mutually Assured Destruction) by preventing the US or the Soviet Union
from developing an ABM system capable of nullifying the other's
strategic retaliatory forces.[30]
47. The Bush Administration has made it clear that the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty will not prevent it from deploying a system of
missile defences. President Bush has explained that "No treaty that
prevents us from addressing today's threats, that prohibits us from
pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and
allies is in our interests or in the interests of world peace."[31] The President, the Defence
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz
have all articulated repeatedly their belief that "moving
beyond" the ABM Treaty is essential. According to Secretary
Wolfowitz, the "ABM Treaty codifies a Cold War relationship that is
no longer relevant to the 21st century."[32] Donald Rumsfeld has described
the ABM Treaty as "ancient history."[33] In August 2001, President Bush
restated his intention to "withdraw from the ABM Treaty on our
timetable at a time convenient to America."[34]
48. We heard on our visit to Washington that the provisions of the 1972
ABM Treaty are currently holding up the testing of some aspects of the
US missile defence programme. The Treaty prohibits the testing,
development and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based or
mobile land based ABM systems or components, or the deployment of a
mobile land based system, and the US currently plans to develop such
systems.[35]
This accounts for the US Administration's immediate wish to reach a deal
with the Russian government over the future status of the Treaty.
49. We were told that the Treaty had been very carefully written, and
that there was no flexibility. Even very extensive amendments of the
Treaty were therefore unlikely to give the US Government the freedom it
requires to pursue its research and testing programme. According to the
current US Government, the policy of the previous Clinton Administration
was to work to the greatest extent possible within the confines of the
ABM Treaty. However, the Bush Administration has clearly articulated its
desire to 'move beyond' the ABM Treaty and draw up an entirely new
strategic framework with Russia. In the view of the Bush Administration,
this represents a significant policy change from that of its
predecessor.
50. A clause in the ABM Treaty permits unilateral withdrawal from its
provisions by either party on six months' notice, although the US has
not yet taken this step.[36] The Foreign Secretary told us
that the United States "has made it crystal clear to me, as I think
it has publicly, that it has no intention of breaking international law
in the steps it is taking."[37]
US NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA OVER MISSILE DEFENCE AND THE ABM TREATY
51. The question of missile defence emerged as a major point of
contention with between the US and Russia early in the life of the Bush
Administration, with some commentators anticipating an "acute and
all-embracing crisis" between the two countries as President Bush
made his views on missile defence clear.[38] When Secretary of State for
Defence Donald Rumsfeld visited Moscow in August 2001, he was blunt to
his hosts about the US approach to the ABM Treaty and other agreements
signed during the Cold War: "The Soviet Union is gone," he
said, and referred to a "whole network of treaties set up a quarter
of a century ago. We don't have that network or system of linkages with
other states, friendly states."[39]
52. Following Secretary Rumsfeld's visit, the prospects of reaching
agreement with Russia over the future of the ABM Treaty looked fairly
bleak. However, following 11 September attacks, Russia's warm and
supportive response to the crisis led many commentators to anticipate
early resolution of the issue.
53. Presidents Bush and Putin met at Crawford in Texas on 11-14
November, a week after we visited the United States. The summit was
hailed by the US Administration as a success in cementing the personal
relationship between the Presidents. The two Presidents also agreed at
Crawford that over the next ten years they would cut by roughly two
thirds the size of their respective strategic nuclear arsenals, to
between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads. However, no agreement was reached over
the ABM Treaty, in spite of earlier expectations to that effect.
54. Russia and China have, in the recent past, expressed grave concern
at the development of the US missile defence programme. In his evidence
to the Foreign Affairs Committee in the last Parliament, Professor Paul
Rogers explained the basis of this concern. The US has made assurances
that the missile defence system being developed is strictly
"limited," would only counter small salvos of missiles, and
would thus have little impact on the strategic balance between the US,
Russia and China. However,
"Frankly, in Moscow and Beijing they do not believe a word of it.
They see a limited NMD [missile defence system] as the start of a bigger
programme, and when you look at the details already coming up from the
Ballistic Missile Defence Offices it is clear that there are a number of
stages and one would end up with an NMD system which is really quite
comprehensive."[40]
55. Professor Rogers' evidence was submitted in the aftermath of the
Kosovo conflict, when relations between Russia, China and the US were
distinctly sour. The contrast with the current situation is quite
strong: both Russia and China have been supportive of the US response to
the 11 September attacks. Both also claim to be facing terrorist threats
on their own territory. President Putin was the first world leader to
contact President Bush in the aftermath of the attacks, and has since
indicated that Russia wishes to co-operate fully with the US, the
European Union and other coalition partners in eliminating international
terrorism. In the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, the Russian
President stated that he is prepared to review Russia's opposition to
NATO enlargement: Russia's relations with NATO are dealt with in more
detail below.
56. President Putin did state after the conclusion of the Crawford
Summit that he was optimistic about the prospects of reaching agreement
over missile defence: "We differ in the ways and means we perceive
that are suitable for reaching the same objective." He went on to
argue that, "given the nature of the relationship between the
United States and Russia, one can rest assured that whatever final
solution is found, it will not threaten or put to threat the interests
of both our countries and of the world. And we shall continue our
discussions."[41]
57. After the Crawford Summit, US National Security Advisor Condoleezza
Rice described the relationship between Russia and the United States as
"substantially changed." The difference over the issue of
missile defence is now, in her assessment, a "smaller element of
the US-Russia relationship than it was several months ago, and certainly
than it was before September 11th." Rice said that Afghanistan and
the war on terrorism, rather than differences over missile defence, were
the main topics of conversation between Presidents Bush and Putin at the
Summit.[42]
BRITISH POLICY AND INVOLVEMENT
58. Britain "shares US concerns about the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and missile technology and agrees on the need to
counter these developments."[43] The Prime Minister stated in
the House on 24 October that the United Kingdom's broadly supportive
position on US plans for missile defence had not changed as a
consequence of the events of 11 September: "We believe that it is
important to tackle the potential threat from ballistic missiles with a
comprehensive strategy that includes arms control and
counter-proliferation, diplomacy, deterrence and defensive measures . .
. We understand the role that missile defence can play as one element of
that comprehensive strategy, but as yet we have had no specific proposal
from the United States."[44] The Foreign Secretary told us
that he believed that the "overall case for new forms of missile
defence has been strengthened since 11 September, not least because the
world is much more aware than it was of the extreme nature of the
threats that we can face."[45]
59. In our discussions with officials in Washington, we heard that the
United Kingdom is a valued partner to the US in the development of
missile defence systems, because the United Kingdom and the US share
technologies. The use of the United Kingdom base at Fylingdales would
also improve the effectiveness of the proposed US system: the closer the
radar sensors are to the threat, the greater likelihood that ballistic
missiles will be intercepted. However, the Government says that it is
"too early to say whether a role for facilities in the United
Kingdom might be envisaged" in US plans.[46]
60. We were reassured that the destruction of warheads armed with
chemical or biological agents above the United Kingdom would have no
effect on the United Kingdom, because agents would be destroyed by the
sheer impact of the missile and interceptor collision.
DOMESTIC AND EUROPEAN OPPOSITION TO US POLICIES FOR MISSILE DEFENCE
61. We are aware of a significant level of concern about the US plans
for missile defence among sections of the British public. European
governments—as well as Russia and China—have also expressed serious
misgivings about the missile defence plans of both the Clinton and Bush
Administrations. The Oxford Research Group argued that US international
security policy during both the Bush and Clinton Administrations had
been characterised by a "unilateralist... outlook" which
"saw little value in arms control treaties and regarded itself as a
fundamentally independent player acting in its own security interests
rather than working with its allies in Europe and elsewhere." This
attitude, the Oxford Research Group claim, "has created major
strains in transatlantic relations... even if most of the criticisms
from European political leaders have been expressed in private. Opinion
formers and commentators across Europe have expressed much more open
dismay and consternation, and their views have been exemplified in many
areas of security and foreign policy where clear transatlantic
differences are emerging."[47]
62. Our immediate predecessor Foreign Affairs Committee, in its 2000
Report on Weapons of Mass Destruction, also expressed concerns about
missile defence. The Committee recommended that "the Government
articulate the very strong concerns that have been expressed about NMD
[National Missile Defence] within the UK. We are not convinced that the
US plans to deploy NMD represent an appropriate response to the
proliferation problems faced by the international community. We
recommend that the Government encourage the USA to seek other ways of
reducing the threat it perceives."[48]
63. However, against this, in his evidence to us, Dr John Chipman wrote
that "If European leaders stand up and argue that the ABM Treaty is
a 'cornerstone of strategic stability' the present US Administration
will wonder if they were on a different planet on September 11th... As
the US gives Home Defence new primacy, it will be hard for outsiders to
argue that the US should be denied the right in law to spend its own
taxpayers money to erect an imperfect defence against small salvos of
ballistic missiles."[49]
64. In this evidence, Dr Chipman articulates a view held by many to whom
we spoke during our visit to the US. Indeed, in discussions with senior
Administration officials and independent analysts during our visit, we
found little comprehension of European concerns about the US's missile
defence plans. In the views of their elected representatives, the US
public does not share the concern felt by some sections of the British
and European publics about the wisdom of scrapping the ABM Treaty, or of
developing an extremely costly system of missile defence. Many people in
the US think that such a system exists already. With homeland security
such an overwhelming priority for the US Government, it would be very
hard politically for Senators to oppose the massive expenditure demanded
for the continuation of the missile defence programme.
65. Though some officials expressed the belief that the US has not
succeeded in winning hearts and minds to the cause of missile defence
globally, it seems unlikely that hostility to the programme in European
countries is perceived by the US government as a serious obstacle to its
progress.
66. Cohesion with respect to matters of defence and security is of
crucial importance, especially as the campaign against terrorism is
likely to continue for a number of years. We were presented with a
strong case for the emerging US proposals on missile defence. We
recommend that these proposals are most carefully considered by the
Government and that it should have due regard for the concerns expressed
in the United Kingdom and among our European partners before coming to a
final decision on any definitive proposals.
67. We are also concerned about the possible long term implications of
any decision by the US to 'move away' from existing international
agreements on missile defences and other aspects of arms control without
establishing new, legally binding arrangements.
68. We share the concerns, articulated by the United States
Administration, about new threats from proliferation of nuclear,
chemical, biological and radiological weapons and ballistic missiles. We
also welcome the US Administration's determination to develop a new
relationship with Russia which is no longer based on mutually assured
destruction. One of the few positive developments arising from the 11
September attacks has been a distinct warming of relations between
Russia and the United States, which contributed to the agreements over
nuclear weapons reductions at Crawford. China has also reacted in a
positive way to the US response to the attacks.
69. However, current goodwill is not sufficient to guarantee a robust
international framework for future weapons reductions and for global
co-operation against proliferation. Though relations between the US and
China are currently quite warm, the development of a missile shield by
the United States might, in some foreseeable circumstances, encourage
China to develop further nuclear weapons in order to ensure that it
could maintain its status as a strategic competitor to the US.
70. Though we do not share all of their concerns, we recognise the
validity of arguments presented to us by Dr Stephen Pullinger of the
International Security Information Service (ISIS) and the Oxford
Research Group with respect to the potential reactions of China to
current US policy. Dr Pullinger warned us that "China's reaction to
missile defence is likely to be to continue with, and probably
accelerate, the modernisation of its strategic nuclear forces, which
could have detrimental regional repercussions if India and thence
Pakistan felt compelled to respond by weaponising their latent nuclear
capabilities."[50]
71. Dr Pullinger also argued that the abandonment of the ABM Treaty and
other measures to control nuclear proliferation could also encourage
China to "revert to its bad old ways in terms of missile and
nuclear exports, a course from which it is still only painstakingly
being teased."[51] The Oxford Research Group find
it "easy to envisage missile defence as a welcome way of forcing
China, " which is viewed as an economic as well as a strategic
competitor of the US, "to spend heavily on nuclear forces. This
would divert resources and expertise from its civil economy."[52]
72. While it is certainly possible that China may expand its nuclear
capability in any event, we recommend that the Government use its
influence with the US to ensure that the effects of any missile defence
programme on China and on other nuclear powers are carefully assessed.
73. We were also warned that if relations with Russia deteriorate, US
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could have serious consequences for
British and global security. Dr Stephen Pullinger wrote that "if
the ABM Treaty falls, Russian co-operation regarding limitations on its
missile technology exports could be jeopardised, along with any prospect
of reversing its close nuclear relationship with Iran. It might even
halt the current programmes through which it receives assistance with
the dismantling of its nuclear weaponry and infrastructure, as part of a
general move to become less transparent. In summary, an affronted
Russia, seeking ways of annoying the US and maximising its foreign
currency receipts could act in ways seriously detrimental to western
security interests."[53]
74. The United Kingdom can and should play a role in defining this new
security environment. The Foreign Secretary told us that Britain has
played an important role in fostering warmer relations between Russia
and the United States.[54] We recommend that the
Government seek to ensure that if either party to the ABM Treaty
exercises its right to withdraw, the United States and Russia establish
an alternative mutually satisfactory and legally binding agreement on
the development of missile defence systems, which might include other
states.
Arms control
75. The United States has, in general, been less willing than the United
Kingdom to support international arms control regimes. The British
American Security Information Council (BASIC) note that the Bush
Administration's policy in this area is characterised by a
"dangerous unilateralist approach... that places the fragile
international network of non-proliferation regimes at risk. The vast
matrix of treaties, agreements, and protocols that help guide government
policy and decision-making for nuclear technology and material transfer
has been shaken by recent US decisions." BASIC contrast the US
approach with that of the United Kingdom, which, it argues, has
"over the years... invested extensive time and energy to promote a
'diplomacy first' policy for arms control."[55]
76. The Foreign Secretary also acknowledged that "this is one area
where there are significant differences of view between ourselves and
the United States and it is important that we should be open about
that." In drawing up international regimes for the control of
Biological and Toxin Weapons, nuclear weapons testing, the use of
anti-personnel landmines and the flow of small arms and light weapons,
"the United Kingdom has been in the lead."[56] In contrast, the United States
has refused to ratify or to support a number of international agreements
in these areas.
77. The United Kingdom has taken a twin track approach to pushing the
United States towards a more positive approach to international arms
control regimes. The Foreign Secretary told us that, in addition to
pressing the United States at a diplomatic and official level to support
the various UN conventions and associated verification protocols—often
in association with other EU countries—there is also "a process
there of education with the US. If we cannot get them in the short term
to agree to take part in these conventions and treaty operations, we can
sometimes get them to do the same by other routes and to observe
effectively their terms without signing up to them."[57] The Foreign Secretary pointed
out that it was important to "open up debates" within the
Senate and the House of Representatives, both of which determine to a
significant extent the "framework in which any President and
Secretary of State within the United States can operate." Towards
this end, the Foreign Secretary had "made it my business to go and
talk to" the appropriate people in the Senate and the House of
Representatives, "to maintain relations there."[58]
78. The United States Administration's approach to specific arms control
regimes is described below.
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY
79. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1996. It has been ratified by thirty one of
the forty four states named in the Treaty, but in order for the Treaty
to enter into force all these forty four states must ratify.
80. Though the United States did sign the CTBT in 1996, ratification was
rejected by the Senate in 1999. Sections of American society still hold
to the view that the Treaty is "unverifiable and incompatible with
American security."[59] The Bush Administration has
stated that it has no plans to resubmit the CTBT for ratification,
though it has agreed not to operate nuclear tests and to observe a large
part of what is specified in the Treaty in practice. The current US
position therefore appears to have become more hawkish in tone since
Secretary of State Colin Powell said at his confirmation hearing in
January 2001 that
"We also need to review our approach to curbing proliferation. As
you know, we will not be asking for the Congress to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in its next session. We are mindful of the
work that was done by President Clinton's Special Advisor and my
colleague General Shalikashvili. We will examine that work, but we
believe that there are still flaws with the Treaty as it was voted down
in 1999. Nevertheless, we will continue to examine the elements of that
Treaty as part of our overall strategic review."[60]
81. In August 2001, at the CTBT Preparatory Committee meeting in Vienna,
the United States announced that it would restrict its financial
contributions to the CTBT Organisation. The US announced that it would
only pay that part of its contributions which covered the International
Monitoring System to detect nuclear tests (as opposed to other CTBTO
activity such as inspections). The United States remains the largest
single contributor to the CTBT Preparatory Committee.
82. The United States also vetoed a United Nations General Assembly
motion in November 2001, which would enable an early coming into effect
of the CTBT. In this instance, the United States' was the sole vote
against 140 states in favour of an early coming into effect of the CTBT.
83. Dr Stephen Pullinger described the US policy with respect to the
CTBT as "a major setback for the treaty's prospects of entry into
force," which "jeopardises efforts to completely de-legitimize
nuclear testing. In other words, it threatens to make it easier for
rogue states and others to justify testing their nuclear weapons and
thereby to develop offensive nuclear capabilities."[61]
84. The United Kingdom, with its EU partners, is on record as regretting
the reduction in United States contributions to the CTBT Preparatory
Committee. The British Government continues to "discuss the CTBT
with the United States Administration and urge a renewal of United
States support for the Treaty,"[62] though the Foreign Secretary
admitted that on this issue "I doubt we will get them to move, but
we might."[63]
85. We note the importance of ensuring a comprehensive ban on nuclear
testing, and believe that unilateral cuts in the US nuclear arsenal do
not substitute for the establishment and maintenance of global
non-proliferation agreements. We recommend that the Government renew its
efforts to press the United States to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty.
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)
86. The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) underpins
all international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and
to achieve their complete abolition. The NPT is an agreement between the
five powers (the USA, Russia, France, China and the United Kingdom),
which are permitted to possess nuclear weapons until they can negotiate
them away, and all other states parties that are forbidden from
possessing nuclear weapons, in return for which they are allowed access
to civil nuclear energy.
87. Since its entry into force in 1970, the NPT has been subject to five
yearly review conferences, the last of which was held in 2000. The last
Review Conference was hailed as a success: Peter Hain, Minister of State
at the FCO, stated after the 2000 Conference that the final document of
the Conference contained the "most explicit pledge ever made by the
Nuclear Weapons States to work for complete global nuclear
disarmament."[64]
88. BASIC argue that "no arms control regime will be threatened
more greatly overall [by US policy with respect to the CTB and ABM
Treaties] than the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While
forbidding non-nuclear states from possessing nuclear weapons or
participating in their development, it also constrains nuclear weapons
states from acting in ways that would cause proliferation. US refusal to
ratify the CTBT and efforts to undermine the ABM Treaty contradict the
'practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts' to move
towards nuclear disarmament, which were agreed by member states at the
May 2000 NPT Review Conference."[65]
89. In its evidence regarding the NPT, the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office states that the United Kingdom has agreed with the United States
to a review of the "counter-proliferation toolbox," with a
view to countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
missiles.[66]
90. The Committee supports the Government in its determination to
review the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty is
currently 'leaking', and we recommend that the Government works in the
closest conjunction with the US Administration to devise further
specific and effective measures to enforce this crucial arms control
agreement. The Committee expects to receive from the Government details
of such measures.
BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION
91. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which bans the
development, testing, production and stockpiling of bacteriological
(biological) and toxin weapons, came into force in 1975. There are
currently no agreed procedures to verify compliance with the Convention.
The United Kingdom has played a leading role in negotiations among an Ad
Hoc Group of states, which has met twenty three times since 1995 to
strengthen the BTWC through inclusion of a legally-binding verification
protocol.
92. On 26 July 2001 the United States representative to the Ad Hoc
Group, Ambassador Donald A. Mahley, announced that, despite six and a
half years of arduous negotiations, the United States was "unable
to support the current text" of the verification protocol
"even with changes, as an appropriate outcome of Ad Hoc Group
efforts." Ambassador Mahley claimed that the proposed verification
mechanisms would not enable the Ad Hoc Group to "achieve their
objectives," and that in the US's assessment "the draft
Protocol would put national security and confidential business
information at risk."[67] The United States is concerned
that its "pharmaceutical industry and defence services might have
key intelligence taken from them by the process of verification."[68]
93. Following the United States' rejection of the draft BTW Protocol,
the Ad Hoc Group suspended negotiations for this year. The process was
not seen as viable without the engagement of the United States.
94. At the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference meeting on 19
November 2001, John R. Bolton, Under Secretary General for Arms Control
and International Security at the State Department, proposed some
alternative measures to be undertaken by states to strengthen their
implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention. The US proposal
included enactment of national criminal legislation to enhance bilateral
extradition procedures with respect to biological weapons offenses, and
national measures to ensure more strict standards for the security of
pathogenic microorganisms.
95. The United States also proposed the establishment of a
"mechanism for the international investigation of suspicious
disease outbreaks and/or alleged BW incidents" which "would
require Parties to accept international inspectors upon determination by
the UN Secretary General that an inspection should take place." The
US would support the establishment of a "voluntary co-operative
mechanism for clarifying and resolving compliance concerns by mutual
consent." They also proposed that states adopt and implement
bio-safety procedures in co-operation with the World Health Organisation.[69]
96. At the 19 November meeting, Mr Bolton also restated the US's
opposition to the "flawed mechanisms" of the Ad Hoc Group's
Protocol, which in the United States view would have allowed countries
to sign up and then "ignore their commitments," so that such
states and "certain non-state actors" (such as al-Qaida) would
"never have been hampered by the Protocol."[70]
97. On 20 November, the Foreign Secretary told us that "on the
Protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention we have a different view
from the United States."[71] The United Kingdom Government
believes that establishing international agreement to on the ground
inspection procedures, as specified in the Ad Hoc Group draft Protocol,
is the only way to ensure verification: in order to be able to push
states such as Iraq towards agreeing to inspections of suspected
biological weapons development facilities, the United Kingdom, the
United States and other major NATO countries must agree to be subjected
to inspection in the same way. The Foreign Secretary told the Committee
that he believed the United States Government's worries about its
pharmaceutical and defence industries "are unfounded and that the
benefits of a thorough verifications system are very substantial... Why
we need a good verification system is in respect of countries which may
or may not have signed up to the Convention but are covertly developing
such weapons systems."[72]
98. The Foreign Secretary said that he had "gone into great detail
with colleagues in the United States to ascertain the strength of their
concerns about this... and to take them through our arguments against
the position which they have adopted."[73] He also informed us that the
United Kingdom has taken up the question with United States Secretary of
State Colin Powell and there has been some movement of the United States
position, but "not sufficient."[74] However, negotiations on the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention "illustrate the nature of
the relationship that... we continue the discussions in a co-operative
way and we hope to see some movement on this by the United
States."[75]
99. We conclude that the only way to establish whether states are
developing biological and toxin weapons is to establish a mandatory, on
the ground challenge inspection system to verify compliance to the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We recommend that the
Government work with the US and other allies to agree such a
verification regime, by which states' compliance with the BTWC can be
established.
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMMES
100. US Senators Nunn and Lugar championed the Soviet Nuclear Threat
Reduction Act through Congress in 1991. Through the Act, which was
renamed the Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme in 1993, the
US has provided assistance to Russia and other post-Soviet states to
minimise the threat of nuclear proliferation, through the destruction of
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, fissile
material, and associated infrastructure and through establishing
verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.[76]
101. Work is still under way in Congress on the Administration's budget
request for 2002, which included a proposed reduction from US$872
million to US$774 million for Department of Energy funding for similar
CTR programmes. Department of Defence funding will be substantially
unchanged by the proposed budget. Congress has yet to respond the
budgetary request for such programmes.
102. The FCO has stated that the United Kingdom attaches "great
importance to the significant contribution that the US has made to
non-proliferation in the former Soviet Union with nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons projects." The United Kingdom's response to any
change to the US funding of such projects would "necessarily depend
upon the decision to be made by Congress in this regard." The
mooted US$89 million cut in Department of Energy CTR programmes alone is
"many times greater than the current total EU budget in this
area."[77]
103. We note the crucial importance of co-operative threat reduction
programmes in preventing further proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Our predecessor Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that
"the Government use its position in both the G8 and the EU to
accelerate progress in helping the Russian Government to destroy its
surplus nuclear materials or convert them to civil use."[78] We welcome the Government's
response that "It will continue to work both in the G8 and other
fora to develop a cooperative framework and international financing plan
to take this work forward."[79] In view of the US
Administration's proposal to cut the Department of Energy's funding for
Co-operative Threat Reduction programmes, we recommend that the
Government continues to stress to the US the utmost importance it
attaches to such programmes and reports to the Committee on progress to
establish an international financing plan for them.
1967 OUTER SPACE TREATY
104. The United Kingdom is a party to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which
prohibits the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space and
military activity on the moon and other celestial bodies.
105. We were told that, while the United States was not yet ready to
present detailed plans on its missile defence programme, the Rumsfeld
Commission's report into missile defence had recommended that the United
States make substantial use of outer space. According to the US, the
1967 Outer Space Treaty does not present an obstacle to this.
106. The FCO informed us that they were "not aware of any proposal
amend the Treaty in order to accommodate missile defence, or for any
other purpose. None of the proposals we have seen from the US for a
missile defence system would violate the terms of the Outer Space
Treaty."[80]
107. We recommend that the FCO continues to maintain close scrutiny
of the arms control implications of the militarisation of outer space.
Note especially the following conclusion of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report British-US Relations:
ARMS CONTROL: CONCLUSIONS
121. We recognise that the United States does not wish to sign what it
perceives to be 'bad treaties.' However, we believe that legally binding
international agreements, with mandatory verification mechanisms, are
essential to prevent the proliferation of biological, chemical, toxin,
radiological and other weapons of mass destruction. This is particularly
important with respect to biological weapons, the development of which
is almost impossible to detect without on the ground inspection regimes.
We recommend that the Government highlight to the US Government the
value and importance of securing legally-binding multilateral agreements
to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We welcome
efforts made by the Government to curb the flow of small arms to
developing countries through the UN system, and to ban the use of
anti-personnel land mines, and endorse its efforts to persuade the US to
support such initiatives.
