http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/29/world/29CHIN.html
BEIJING - Fearful that an antimissile defense could embolden the
United States to intervene in crises on China's doorstep, Beijing is
focusing on low-cost ways to thwart the plan, including ways to attack
the defense system itself, China's top arms control official said.
"We have seen that the United States wantonly bombed Yugoslavia and that
Yugoslavia had no means to retaliate," the official, Sha Zukang, said in
an interview. "Once the United States believes it has both a strong
spear and a strong shield, it could lead them to conclude that nobody
can harm the United States and they can harm anyone they like anywhere
in the world. There could be many more bombings like what happened in Kosovo."
Determined to establish its sovereignty over Taiwan, or at least to stop
Taiwan from declaring its independence, China has steadily built up its
military power in the region. In so doing, it has become a rival of the
United States for influence in the western Pacific. The conflicting
interests led to the recent collision between a United States Navy
reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter. They ripple through the
highly charged debate over American arms sales to Taiwan.
And now they are shaping the debate over missile defense, an issue that
is moving to the top of the Chinese-American agenda as the Pentagon
develops its plan for a missile shield.
Mr. Sha, a veteran arms-control official famous for his blustery style,
spoke in English at the hourlong interview. He made plain that China's
fear was not that the United States would launch a surprise attack on
China, but that a missile shield would lead American politicians to
believe that the United States was so powerful and well protected that
it could act with virtual impunity.
"Even when national missile defense was not there they bombed the Sudan,
they bombed Afghanistan and they bombed Iraq," he said. "It could lead
to the development of a tendency of the use or threat of use of force,
more often than is necessary by the United States, in the conduct of
international relations."
Mr. Sha did not directly refer to the tense situation in the Taiwan
Strait. But even though he talked of Yugoslavia, his comments reflected
deep-seated Chinese concerns that the Pentagon would develop closer ties
with Taiwan's armed forces and that a missile shield might make
Washington more comfortable in rushing to the island's defense.
It is not yet clear when an American missile defense might be developed
or how well it might work.
But some American officials say that an antimissile system could be
useful in a future crisis over Taiwan. They reason that it might protect
American territory against potential Chinese missile threats and could
provide Washington with more diplomatic leverage.
Indeed, during the election campaign President Bush spoke of the need to
defend against nuclear-tipped Chinese missiles. The dispute over missile
defense is compounded by the modest size of China's nuclear force.
Unlike Russia, which has enough warheads to overwhelm a limited American
missile defense, China has what arms control specialists call a minimal
deterrent. So any substantial American effort to build a missile defense
might neutralize China's small force - even if that is not the intent
- and that is a big worry for Beijing.
Apparently in an effort to ease Chinese concerns, Mr. Bush has proposed
a discussion on strategic issues in a letter to President Jiang Zemin,
Mr. Sha said. China is willing to listen to any ideas that the Bush
administration may have. But Mr. Sha said the dialogue had not yet begun
because the Bush administration was still putting its national security team in place.
He also stressed that deep cuts in American nuclear arms would not
placate China if they were made in parallel with the development of a
missile defense. The Bush administration has been working on a plan for
deep cuts in the hopes that it would make missile defense more
politically acceptable to allied nations, as well as to Russia and China.
Certainly, the American force is so large that even deep cuts would
leave the United States with an overwhelming advantage over China's
small deterrent. China's long-range nuclear force consists of 18 DF-5
missiles; they are old, liquid-fueled weapons that are maintained at a
low level of alert, and their warheads are stored separately. The United
States has a triad of air-, sea- and land-based nuclear weapons. But
China has no intercontinental-range bomber force, and its lone strategic
submarine rarely leaves port.
To upgrade its arsenal, China is developing the DF-31, a solid-fuel
mobile missile with the range to strike Alaska and the northwestern
United States, as well as a long-range follow-up, the DF-41. There has
been considerable discussion about how China might respond to a missile
defense program and speculation that China might expand its projected
arsenal of DF-31 and DF-41 missiles to be sure to maintain its retaliatory punch.
But Mr. Sha suggested that instead of engaging in a large, costly
buildup, China would concentrate on a range of relatively low-cost
responses, such as developing plans to attack the radar network and
communication nodes that would form the nervous system of America's defense.
"We will do whatever possible to ensure that our security will not be
compromised, and we are confident that we can succeed without an arms
race," he said. "We believe defense itself needs defense. It is a
defense system. It has many, many parts and most of them are vulnerable to an attack."
Mr. Sha did not say in detail how that might be done. But American
experts say that the Chinese, for example, could target
battle-management radar for the United States with land-based ballistic
missiles, submarine-launched missiles, cruise missiles or other means.
Another response, he implied, could be to put sophisticated decoys on missiles.
Yan Xuetong of Qinghua University suggested a possible compromise on the
missile defense issue. The United States could build a system that could
intercept no more than five missiles. That, he said, would protect
against a possible threat from, say, Iran or Iraq without jeopardizing
China's force. But the multitiered defenses the Pentagon has in mind are
more ambitious than that.