In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, C“te d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Against: Albania, Andorra, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
Abstain: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Iceland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Norway, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.
Absent: Dominica, Federated States of Micronesia, Namibia, Palau.
NEW AGENDA COALITION RESOLUTION IN UNGA
From: Jim Wurst, UN Coordinator, The Middle Powers Initiative
The UN General Assembly adopted the New Agenda Coalition resolution by a vote of 114 in favor, 18 opposed, with 38 abstentions. This is an excellent outcome: opponents of the resolution lost one vote while supporters gained 17 votes.
The Official Press Release GA/9526 of the General Assembly, can be found at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19981204.ga9526.html or the European mirror site: http://www.cornnet.nl/~akmalten/news.html, and the press release document is at http://www.cornnet.nl/~akmalten/19981204_ga9526.html
The First Committee vote on this draft (L.48/Rev. 1) was 97 in favor, 19 opposed and 32 abstaining. Most of the nations who were absent for the First Committee but attended the GA voted in favor. None of the delegations who voted in favor in the Committee switched votes in the plenary.
Armenia was the nation that switched from "no" to "abstention." Therefore the 18 negative votes were: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary, India, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Monaco, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Turkey, UK and US.
The net gain of 17 new "yes" votes was due to 18 nations not present in the First Committee who voted "yes" in the plenary, minus the Democratic Republic of Congo, which voted "yes" in the First Committee but did not attend the plenary. The 18 are: Afghanistan, Belize, Comoros, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Rwanda, St. Lucia, St. Vincent-Grenadines, Trinidad-Tobago, Uganda, Vanuatu, and Zimbabwe.
The increase in abstentions from 32 to 38 is due to Armenia and five nations that were not present in the First Committee but abstained in the plenary: Albania, Honduras, Mauritius, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
The resolution's official designation is now 53/77/Y.
There were no explanations of vote after the vote on the New Agenda resolution.
The Assembly also adopted the resolution on the ICJ advisory opinion by a vote of 123 in favor, 25 opposed and with 25 abstentions. In the First Committee, this resolution (L.45) was adopted 100 to 25, with 23 abstentions. The Non-Aligned resolution on nuclear disarmament was adopted 110-41-18; the First Committee vote on L.47 was 89-40-15. The Japanese draft on nuclear disarmament "with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons" was adopted 160-0-11; the First Committee vote on L.42/Rev. 1 was 132-0-11.
VOTE ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT RESOLUTION L47
First Committee 20 Press Release GA/DIS/3128 23rd Meeting (AM) 4 November 1998
ANNEX IV
The draft resolution on nuclear disarmament (document A/C.1/53/L.47) was approved by a recorded vote of 87 in favour to 40 against, with 15 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Against: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Federated States of Micronesia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
Abstain: Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Chile, Cyprus, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malta, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, San Marino, South Africa, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
Absent: Afghanistan, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Bhutan, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Ctte d'Ivoire, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Tajikistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Vanuatu.
Nuclear Disarmament
U.N. General Assembly, First Committee - draft resolution
Co-sponsors: Algeria, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Gtiatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, VietNam, Zambia and Zimbabwe
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 49/75 E of 15 December 1994 on a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat aid its resolutions 50/70 P of 12 December 1995, 51/45 0 of 10 December 1996 and 52/38 L of9 December 1997 on nuclear disarmament,
Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world,
Bearing in mind that the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention have already established legal regimes on the complete prohibition of biological and chemical weapons, respectively, and determined to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention on the prohibition of the development, testing, production, stockpiling, loan, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, and to conclude such an international Convention at an early date,
Recognizing that there now exist conditions for the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons,
Bearing in mind paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, calling for the urgent negotiations of agreements for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, and for a comprehensive and phased programme with agreed time-frames, wherever feasible, for the progressive and balanced reductions of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time,
Reiterating the highest priority accorded to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and by the international community,
Recognizing that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and any proposed treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices must constitute disarmament measures, and not only non-proliferation measures, and that these measures, together with an international legal instrument on the joint undertaking of no first use of nuclear weapons by the Nulear Weapon States and on adequate security assurances of non-use and non-threat of use of these weapons for non-nuclear-weapon States, respectively, and an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, should be integral measures in a programme leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time,
Welcoming the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, to which Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America are States parties,
Welcoming also the conclusion of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms by the Russian Federation and the United States of America and the ratification of that Treaty by the United States of America, and looking forward to the full implementation of the START I and START II Treaties by the State parties, and to further concrete steps for nuclear disarmament by all the Nuclear Weapon States,
Noting with appreciation the unilateral measures by the nuclear-weapon States for nuclear arms limitation, and encouraging them to undertake further such measures,
Recognizing the complementarity of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and that bilatera1 negotiating can never replace multilateral negotiations in this respect,
Noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the multilateral efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to reach agreement on such an international convention at an early date,
Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996, and welcoming the unanimous reaffirmation by all Judges of the Court that there exists an obligation for all States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,
Mindful of paragraph 114 and other relevant recommendations in the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee to commence negotiations in I998 on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time,
Bearing in mind the proposal of twenty-eight delegations to the Conference on Disarmament that are members of the Group of 21 for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and expressing its conviction that this proposal will be an important input and will contribute to negotiations on this question in the Conference,
Commending the initiative by twenty-six delegations to the Conference on Disarmament that are members ofthe Group of 2I proposing a comprehensive mandate for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, which includes negotiations for, as a first step, a universal and legally binding multilateral agreement committing all States to the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, an agreement on further steps required in a phased programme with time-frames leading to the total elimination of these weapons and a convention on the prohihition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices taking into account the report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views relating to the scope of the treaty,
Taking note of the Declaration issued on 9 June 1998 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, entitled "Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons: the Need for a New Agenda", supported and responded to by a number of States including some members of the Non-Aligned Movement,
1. Recognizes that, in view of recent political developments, the time is now opportune for all the Nuclear Weapon States to undertake effective disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons with a specified framework of time;
2. Recognizes also that there is a genuine need to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons and to review and revise nuclear doctrines accordingly;
3. Urges the Nuclear Weapon States to stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems;
4. Urges also the Nuclear Weapon States, as an interim measure, to immediately de-alert and de-activate their nuclear weapons;
5. Calls for the coiclusion, as a first step, of a universal and legally binding multilateral agreement comnutting all States to the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons;
6. Reiterates its call upon the Nuclear Weapon States to undertake the step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons with a specified framework of time;
7. Calls upon the Nuclear Weapon States, pending the achievement of a total ban on nuclear weapons through a Nuclear Weapons Convention, to agree on an internationally and legally binding instrument of the joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; and calls upon all States to conclude an internationally and legally binding instrument on security assurances of non-use and threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States;
8. Welcomes the establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and other Nuclear Explosive Devices, and urges for a speedy conclusion of a universal and non-discriminatory convention thereon; and also welcomes the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons; and urges to pursue efforts in this regard as a matter of priority:
9. Expresses its concern at the continuing opposition by some Nuclear Weapon States to the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Dsarmament, as called for in General Assembly resolution 52/38 L;
10. Reiterates its call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations early in 1999 on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time through a Nuclear Weapons Convention;
11. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to take into account in this regard the proposal of the twenty-eight delegations for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons, as well as the mandate for the ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, proposed by the twenty-six delegations;
12. Calls for the convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament at an early date with the objective of arriving at an agreement on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time through a Nuclear Weapons Convention;
13. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;
14. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled "Nuclear disarmament".
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
RESOLUTION ON THE NEW AGENDA COALITION ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
`The European Parliament,
- having regard to its previous resolutions on nuclear disarmament, testing and non-proliferation,
A. welcoming the joint statement of 9 June 1998 by the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, entitled, `Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the needs for a new agenda', a group also known as the New Agenda Coalition (NAC),
B. welcoming the broad diversity of this coalition of countries, crossing as it does traditional lines of co-operation, and also welcoming the eight countries' initiating a multilateral debate at the highest level of government on such an important and urgent issue,
C. noting that the United Nations' First Committee passed the NAC resolution on 13 November 1998, with 97 votes in favour, 19 against and 32 abstentions,
D. concerned by both the continued retention of nuclear weapons by a few and the nuclear aspirations of others, and reasserting its call for a nuclear-weapon-free world,
E. noting that this timely initiative, which includes two EU Member States and one associate member, reflects the post-Cold War redefined security environment and sets a path towards constructive engagement discussions on the subject of nuclear disarmament,
F. emphasising that the UN resolution does not propose actions that contradict any existing EU, NATO or national policies, and supports existing policies regarding inter alia the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the US-Russia START process and nuclear-weapon-free zones,
1. Calls upon the EU Member States to support the NAC initiative and to vote in favour of it in the General Assembly in December;
2. Calls on those countries that possess nuclear weapons to fulfil their commitment to disarm by virtue of Article VI of the NPT;
3. Calls also on the non-nuclear weapon members of the NPT to fulfil their treaty commitments i.e. not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
4. Calls on states outside of the NPT to immediately, and unconditionally, accede to the treaty and to place all fissionable materials under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards;
5. Underlines the importance and the necessity of further improving existing verification procedures with a view to ensuring effective compliance by all states concerned, including the allocation of appropriate funding;
6. Requests that those countries opposing the UN resolution make clear their objections by specifically naming the paragraphs in question;
7. Calls upon all Member States of the EU to undertake discussions on the subject of taking nuclear forces off their current high-sensitivity alert procedures, also known as de-alerting, as highlighted in the Canberra Commission report of 1996;
8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Foreign Ministers of the NAC and the United Nations Secretary General.'
Pre-vote reference numbers:
PE 273.845)RC1
PE 273.856)
PE 273.878)
PE 273.882)
PE 273.887)
PE 273.891)
BACKGROUND ON EP RESOLUTION
CESD works with the EP quite a bit, and I must admit to
being skeptical when I first approached parliamentarians
with the idea for this resolution. However, with some work,
good information and growing public concern for this issue,
it managed to come to fruition yesterday. I see it as a
victory for the aims of the NAC, as well as a reflection of
the increasing streamlined efficiency of NGOs working
together around the world.
Throughout the days of the First Committee, CESD was linked
into what was happening in New York, through NGOs and
directly with the delegations themselves. It was that
information and co-ordination that made possible our
effectiveness here in Brussels. I must especially thank
Rebecca Johnson of the Acronym Institute, whose detailed,
timely and exhaustive updates kept us in the flow. In
Europe, many of us were co-ordinating minute-by-minute our
country debates and opportunities for action. In my
experience, this has been the most gratifying co-operative
effort I have been involved in with other NGOs. I learned a
lot this time around, bits of which I'm sharing here.
12 of the 16 NATO countries abstained, with
much agonising in capitals. Blowing another horn, Karel
Koster of AMOK/Working Group Eurobomb did a phenomenal job
in exploiting every opportunity in Holland. I am convinced
that one of the pivotal moments before the dominoes began to
fall within NATO is when Karel convinced the Dutch
Parliament to take up the debate openly. It is there that
the Foreign Minister publicly announced that Holland was
abstaining and who was voting how, opening the way for other
European countries to abstain instead of voting against.
Again, this wouldn't have been possible without considerable
pressure from other arenas, but I wanted to mention this as
a good example of NGO action leading to concrete results.
I know that others were working in their respective
constituencies on this as well. I hear MPI did some things,
as well as LCNP, and others, which I am sure also
contributed to the overall NAC success.
Implications for the future
Although the EP resolution does not cover all topics
exhaustively, the fact that it explicitly states its support
for the NAC statement and the resolution opens up all sorts
of avenues. We had originally drafted language that included
mention of the ICJ opinion, for example, but that was taken
out of the final. However, since it is contained in the UN
resolution, their support is still explicit.
It is significant that this is the first time, according to
my information, that NATO has not voted en bloc on an
important nuclear resolution. This obviously reflects a
difference of opinion within NATO and could very well impact
the discussion currently underway on the Alliance's
Strategic Concept review. With the German and Canadians
governments now pushing for change on No First Use, and
armed with the votes in First Committee and UNGA pressure
could be mounted in NATO capitals to force the hand of
government negotiators to push for change.
In the Conference on Disarmament as well, as a result of the
First Cttee vote, the urgency is increased to create some
type of structure, like an ad hoc group, to discuss aspects
of nuclear disarmament, especially if the South African
formula were used. NATO has been a block there and in other
fora, but the eventual separation of the nuclear aspect of
NATO from its other core tasks could very well be what we
will be seeing in future. This should be exploited now.
There are also implications for the NPT, and its Arts. I &
II. As colleagues have pointed out, and I agree, pushing the
removal of US tactical nuclear warheads from European soil
should be the priority over talks of No First Use. Or so was
my opinion until today, when the Germans are now explicitly
supporting discussions within NATO on NFU. While this is not
a possibility for the new Concept, it does create pressure
that could be exploited to change some aspects of NATO's
nuclear posture.
It is a strategic decision over how to make NATO
non-nuclear. The only way NFU will see the light of day in
NATO is if they renounce deterrence completely. Doing that
in one fell swoop is all but impossible at this point.
However, if tactical nuclear weapons were recalled, that
would lay the groundwork for practical discussions on the
whys and hows of NATO nuclear sharing. We see from the NAC
resolution that not everyone in NATO is in agreement 100% on
nuclear policy, and there is more and more talk behind the
scenes on how one would withdraw tac nukes without causing a
crisis of confidence in the transatlantic link.
Implications for the 1999 NPT PrepCom? It is still a bit
early to tell, but if this NAC resolution reflects a real
shift in political will, or at least a reinforcement of
previous convictions, we could have a more interesting
PrepCom than could have been expected before. We have of
course been seeing the increased isolation of the NWS from
NNWS since PC97, undoubtedly this gap will now increase. The
`coalitions of the willing', like the NAC, that are becoming
more prevalent in every forum will impact the dynamics, and
perhaps the outcome, of this PrepCom_and more importantly
the 2000 Review Conference.
Sharon Riggle
Voting against Nuclear Disarmament has collapsed leaving a handful of hard
core nuclear recidivists and associates.
Many who voted AGAINST have moved in the First Committee voting to
ABSTAINED. Perhaps some of these will now be able to vote FOR nuclear
disarmament in the Final UNGA vote.
The most consistent position has been that of around 36 absent voters who
might now be encouraged to add their votes towards this important
development for all humanity - and indeed for the whole planet.
There is a trend summary at: http://www.pgs.ca/pages/a2/unvndr.htm
Ross Wilcock
The new agenda coalition resolution was passed by the UN First Committee on
Friday, November 13, by 97 votes to 19, with 32 abstentions.
Of NATO countries, which we had prioritised, 12 out of 16 abstained, going
against heavy US-UK-French pressure to vote against. Canada, which we had
hoped would vote in favour if it could find someone to hold its hand,
abstained, as did Japan, where the decision between abstention and 'yes'
went to Prime Ministerial level. It was noteworthy that the three NATO NWS
were joined by Russia, India, Israel and Pakistan (the only nuclear
disarmament resolution to be practical and pushy enough to be hated by both
sets of nuclear addicts). China abstained. Apart from that, the opposition
was almost entirely the NATO and EU wannabees from former Eastern bloc, who
are too vulnerable to risk offending the NATO NWS, and Turkey. The NATO
abstainers were joined unfortunately by Micronesia and Marshall Islands, as
well as poor Slovenia, which had been forced to drop its sponsorship. In EU,
Austria joined Sweden and Ireland in support.
Many of the delegations, especially from the Alliance countries and NAC
proposers credited the turnaround of NATO votes to two things: the
practicality and 'awkward moderation' of the resolution's approach, which
made it difficult to dismiss; and the NGOs in those countries raising the
issue and providing strong, intelligent arguments for supporting the
resolution. Although it is not easy to shift votes between the First
Committee and the UN GA vote (no date yet, but likely mid December), if we
have any energy yet, we should not drop this issue. It will be important to
keep up the pressure for the abstainers to vote yes, for the many absentees
to turn up and vote yes, and even for the no's to shift. What can the
current NATO/EU countries do to mitigate some of the pressure on the former
Eastern bloc applicant states? It will be important in the next months and
years to enable them to develop more courage and independence from the NATO
NWS' whip and prevent nuclear blackmail of the different sort from being
exercised.
Details of debate and vote below.
Note: no statements were formally issued, so this summary is compiled from
my own notes and from any written statements I could get hold of. Quotes
are therefore indicative and may not be exact.
L.48/Rev.1
Introduced by Ireland with over 34 co-sponsors: Benin, Botswana, Brazil,
Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Fiji, Guatemala, Ireland, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico,
New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Samoa, Solomon Islands, South Africa,
Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia.
On 13 November, Darach FacFhionnbair of Ireland recommended adoption of
L.48/Rev.1 on the need for a new agenda by saying that the revised
resolution aimed to offer a realisable and practical agenda, which did not
purport to be the definitive solution, but rather something that could be
developed. He emphasised that it was the product of dialogue and
constructive consultation between the co-sponsors and a large number of
other delegations. Recommending the resolution as 'a call to action',
FacFhionnbair noted that the interest generated by this resolution in
capitals and in the First Committee demonstrated that now is the time to
move forward together towards nuclear disarmament.
Separate votes were requested on OP8, calling for full adherence to the NPT,
and OP17, which advocated a legally binding international instrument
providing security assurances to NPT parties. France called the resolution
'nefarious' and joined Russia and the United States in refusing to
participate in the paragraph votes.
OP8 on NPT: 132:3:4
OP17 on legally binding security assurances to NPT parties: 130:1:6
Before the vote on the whole resolution, France explained its vote against,
saying that the resolution was unrealistic and inappropriate because it
disregarded the progress already made or underway and cast doubt on the NPT
regime. It also called into question the principle of nuclear deterrence,
which underpinned NATO doctrine and was fundamental to French security. U S
ambassador Robert Grey spoke at length of its reasons for opposition, saying
the L.48/Rev.1 called deterrence, which a fundamental doctrine of the
defence of the USA and its allies, into question; and it would not advance
nuclear disarmament. Argentina said that it could not support the
resolution because it appeared to recognise a new category of States with
nuclear weapon capabilities, which could create further problems. The US
appeared to equate its deterrence posture with Article 51 of the UN Charter
(the right to self defence), accusing the NAC proposers of pushing the NWS,
undermining the CD, NPT and even SSODIV (which the US opposes) and of
failing to mention the South Asian tests, saying that this would 'hardly
encourage ratification of START II'. Mounir Akram later picked up the
article 51 reference and threw it back at the US, arguing that Pakistan had
exercised only this right to self defence when it conducted its nuclear
tests in May. Pakistan's appreciated the motives of the resolution but
opposed the resolution because of its references to the NPT and the fact
that "we are obliged to rely on our deterrence capability... like France...
deterrence remains a fundamental concept of our security and defence."
The UK said it was "ready to support any measure that will make a practical
contribution to advancing nuclear disarmament" but would vote against
L.48/Rev.1 because "this resolution does not". Ambassador Ian Soutar
repeated Britain's commitment to nuclear disarmament and its obligations
under Article VI of the NPT, "given practical expression" by the measures
undertaken in the Strategic Defence Review. However, the resolution
advocated measures the UK had examined in its SDR and "which we concluded
are, at the present time, inconsistent with the maintenance of a credible
minimum deterrent". Like the US, Britain criticised the resolution for not
mentioning the Indian-Pakistan tests, although that was not the subject:
there was a hard fought nuclear testing resolution which many NAC proposers
had co-sponsored and supported, as a consequence of which other
disarmament-related resolutions (including one proposed by the US) also did
not include the tests. But when has consistency got in the way of a good
accusation?!
Vote on the whole resolution: 97:19:32
19 Against: Armenia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary,
India, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Monaco, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russian
Federation, Slovakia, Turkey, UK, US
32 Abstentions: Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bhutan,
Canada, China, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands,
Micronesia, Myanmar, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Moldova,
Slovenia, Spain, Fyro Macedonia, Ukraine.
Guinea and Nicaragua would have voted in favour it they had not been
temporarily out of the room.
Explanations after the vote
Italy gave a similar explanation, saying that it had abstained "in order to
avoid any misunderstanding with regard to our commitment to nuclear
disarmament, but also to voice our concern as to the means envisaged by a
resolution whose goals we share." Ambassador Balboni had wanted the text
better to reflect what had already been achieved and, underlining Italy's
commitment to the cause of nuclear disarmament, said that this would not be
advanced by a resolution which "proposes concepts not consistent with the
NPT and considers strategies which might undermine the effectiveness and
credibility of that Treaty."
Turkey listed the arguments against the resolution as they had been
circulated for the previous weeks by the US, UK and France: alarmist,
against the NPT, against NATO and deterrence, impractical, didn't mention
nuclear testing, and so on.
Ambassador Mark Moher said Canada endorsed the NAC premise that the
NPT-based non-proliferation regime was "under severe strain". He said that
the resolution was a "timely and pointed reminder of the urgent need for
more progress" on nuclear disarmament. Canada's abstention was explained in
terms of not wanting to prejudge the study the Canadian Parliament has
undertaken into Canada's non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament policy,
due to report in a few weeks. However, in face of the "pressing and potent
challenges", Canada expected to continue to push these issues with its
friends and allies and looked forward to the resolution being reviewed next
year.
Norway supported the reasoning behind L.48/Rev.1, but was not convinced that
the resolution in its present form would be "conducive to progress", due to
5 "problematic aspects":
Amb Gunther Seibert of Germany welcomed the commitment to the disarmament of
nuclear weapons with the goal of ultimately eliminating those weapons, but
considers that this can best be achieved through speedy continuation of the
present step by step process.
Ambassador John Campbell of Australia said it was not able to support the
resolution because "we believe that the path the co-sponsors are advocating
towards an ideal which we share - a world free of nuclear weapons - is not
practical or realistic." Australia considered there were no short cuts re
balanced, verified draw-down of nuclear weapons were concerned, and rejected
the implied premise that the NPT regime has failed or is in "dire need of
reanimation". Rather, it is in "impressively good shape". Also opposes the
call for a new international conference on nuclear disarmament, with "an
ill-defined agenda", which would "distract attention and energies away from
the priority tasks" eg CTBT, fissban, successful 2000 NPT review conference
and so on. He said that "Australia remains committed to the twin goals of
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as enshrined in the NPT, and will
remain active in the pursuit of practical and realistic steps to ensure the
Treaty's full implementation."
Japan noted that there were a number of common ingredients in L.48/Rev.1 and
Japan's own resolution, L42./Rev.1 and said its delegation's decision to
abstain has not been easy. Japan abstained because L48/Rev.1 "went just a
little too far and contained some elements that are a little premature."
These included references to the prospect of the indefinite possession of
nuclear weapons and criticism of the NWS for not speedily and totally
fulfilling their commitment: Japan considers that the NWS have committed
themselves to the elimination of nuclear weapons and have made significant
reductions already. Japan was especially concerned about OP14 (the call for
an international conference on nuclear disarmament) and OP19 (which affirms
that a nuclear weapon free world would ultimately require the underpinnings
of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a
framework of mutually reinforcing instruments, which is regarded by many as
code for advocating a nuclear weapon convention). Japan wanted to nurture a
new consensus involving the NWS, to make steady step-by-step progress
towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.
South Korea, abstained, could support elements but L48/Rev.1 contained
"unrealistic and drastic elements" and went too far.
Algeria abstained because the resolution appeared to put forward new
definitions, and in any case it was not really a new agenda (there may have
been translation problems as my notes refer to this as a confused statement).
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia essentially repeated the NATO-NWS'
objections and called for future consultations to engage in more dialogue
with the NWS.
Amb Savitri Kunadi said that India had positively assessed the June 9 Dublin
Declaration, but that L48/Rev.1 went "far beyond the parameters of the
original declaration". In particular, India rejected the "extraneous
prescriptive parts" and fallacious concepts such as 'those states that have
nuclear weapon capabilities...', which are "analytically hollow and do not
correspond to reality". Criticised the resolution for its lack of mention
of doctrines of nuclear deterrence or refinements of nuclear weapons by the
"self-anointed NWS". Criticised the sponsors for trying to revive core
understandings of the NPT, while being silent on the "multifarious sources
of problems which the NPT has failed to stem". Would have preferred more
references from the Durban document on NAM positions. In conclusion, India
was "unconvinced of the utility of [such] an exercise bound by the flawed NPT".
China reiterated its basic position on nuclear disarmament, saying that the
NWS should intensify their efforts to fulfil Article VI of the NPT and
calling on the largest two NWS to do more to cut their arsenals, abandon the
doctrines of deterrence and halt research and development of outer space
weapons and missile defence systems that undermine the global strategic
balance, saying that such actions would create favourable conditions for the
other NWS to participate in the process of nuclear disarmament. Re
L48/Rev.1, could support specific steps but judging from the enormous
differences between the NWS' nuclear forces, and that they still have
deterrence doctrines based on potential first use, it is premature to ask
all the NWS to take the same measures.
Comment
1. The New Agenda Coalition's resolution, L.48, "Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The
Need for a New Agenda," was voted on
November 13, 1998 in the U.N. First Commitee.
2. The centrepiece of L.48 was Operative Paragraph 1, which:
3. This was correctly perceived by the NWS as challenging the military
doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which remains the cornerstone of their
security policies notwithstanding actual reductions in their nuclear
arsenals. No matter how much sugar was put into the various drafts of
L.48 by the NAC sponsors (e.g. reducing No-First-Use to merely an examination
of "further interim measures"), the core of L.48 was incompatible with
NATO's continuted insistence that nuclear weapons are "essential."
4. The U.S., U.K. and France were not willing merely to dissent from
L.48, they vigorously attacked it and sent demarches around the world to seek
(ask, urge, cajole, intimidate -- depending on the nature of the
country) a no vote. A U.S. spokesman went to NATO headquarters in Brussels to tell
the NATO allies to vote against it. At the U.N. itself, just before the
vote, the U.S. spokesman denounced L.48 because it challenged nuclear
deterrence, which has, under the terms of Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, "kept the peace." The international security climate would have to
improve before elimination could be considered, he said, and L.48 was only "a
feel good" arms control measure that will likely delay the disarmament
process.
Although L.48 does not mention the words "Nuclear Weapons Convention,"
the U.S. spokesman said the U.S. considers the affirmation that a nuclear
world would require (in the words of L.48) "a universal and multilaterally
negotiated legally binding instrument" completely premature. As for the
NAC's de-alerting proposal, that would "lead to instability."
5. The strength of the opposition can be measured in terms of two
countries, Canada and Germany, that are themselves strong. Foreign
Minister Lloyd Axworthy of Canada wanted to vote for L.48. The U.S.
went into the Canadian government at the highest levels, just as they have
three times protested the Canadian Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committee's
review of Canada's nuclear weapons policies. Canada let it be known
that it would vote for L.48 if one more NATO nation would join it. Canada
then sent demarches to nine important countries, most of them in NATO. Mr.
Axworthy met with Foreign Minister Fischer of Germany, who had a problem
of his own. He had just visited Washington and had received viewpoints.
However, the foreign policy of the new German government states:
6. In the end, 12 NATO states abstained: Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain.
7. Other notable votes: Austria voted yes. China abstained. Japan
abstained. Several East European states abstained. Turkey was the only
NNWS in NATO to join the NWS in no. Slovenia, an original member of
NAC, withdrew under NWS pressure and abstained.
8. The no votes had four principal categories:
9. The states that co-sponsored L.48 were: Benin, Botswana, Brazil,
Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Ireland, Lesotho, Liberia, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, New
Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, Samoa, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden,
Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, Venezuela.
10. Maintaining proper perspectives of objectivity and modesty, MPI has
every right to share in the elation of the vote. It was MPI that sent a
high-powered and heavily publicized delegation to Canada on September 29
in support of the NAC resolution. MPI sent a delegation to Germany and the
Netherlands a week before the vote. In both Bonn and the Hague, we were
told the vote would be no and, in the case of Germany, the Explanation
of the No Vote had already been written. In The Hague, leading officials
in the foreign ministry, openly sneared at L.48. MPI, working closely with
NGOs on the ground, alerted parliamentarians in both countries who had
not previously been aware of the implications of L.48. Debates took place
in both countries. The governments of Germany and the Netherlands changed
their votes to abstention.
11. At the U.N. in New York, Jim Wurst, working for MPI under Alyn
Ware's direction, maintained an inter-related set of actions:
12. MPI cannot, and does not, claim credit for the profound shift in the
NATO countries. The ground had been prepared by domestic NGOs. The NAC
leadership worked extremely hard. But it is evident that MPI played a
dynamic and perhaps even a pivotal role in the representations we made
at high political and official levels of the abstaining countries. Nor can
sight be lost of the effect of the MPI's extensive consultations in
Japan in August to break through Japan's regular accession to U.S. nuclear
interests. Just as NAC proved its salt in the first five months of its
existence, so too did MPI in the first eight months of our existence.
That such a deep impact on the NWS and the international system could be made
by those -- both governments and leading organizations of civil society --
in so short a time on so monumental a challenge ought to fill everyone
seeking the abolition of nuclear weapons with a deep sense of encouragement to
persevere against obstacles that no longer seem impervious. The role of
MPI grows.
13. There were 36 countries that, for one reason or another, were not
present to vote in the Disarmament Committee. When L.48 goes to the
U.N. General Assembly in the first week of December for the official U.N.
vote, the potential for swelling the yes vote is considerable, since most of
the absent countries would normally vote for such a resolution. We can
expect the NWS to pressure these countries to vote no. I have therefore
authorized the retention of Jim Wurst for these next three weeks to
maintain the MPI presence at the U.N. in order to inform these
delegations, and indeed all delegations, of the date of the U.N. vote, and to provide
a factual basis of new information for them, such as media accounts of the
meaning of the first L.48 vote, e.g. the front-page article that
appeared in the Globe and Mail, Canada.
(A HREF="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/docs/news/19981114/GlobeFront/UNUKEN.html"
target="_top">http://www.theglobeandmail.com/docs/news/19981114/GlobeFront/UNUKEN.html)
The First Committee of the United Nations today adopted resolution
A/C.1/53/L.48 entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a
new agenda" by a vote of 97 in favour, 19 against and 32 abstaining.
Immediately prior to the vote the Chair announced that Slovenia had withdrawn
its cosponsorship of the resolution.
Those supporting included the remainder of the cosponsors, most non-aligned
states and a few others including Austria, San Marino, Azerbaijan and
Liechenstein.
Despite intense pressure on NATO states to oppose the resolution, a
significant number abstained including Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Canada,
Greece, Spain, Belgium, Luxemburg, Iceland, Portugal, Italy and Denmark. Other
abstentions included China, Finland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia,
Slovenia, Ukraine, Andorra, Australia, Argentina, Bhutan, Marshall Islands,
Federated States of Micronesia, Myanmar, Moldova, Republic of Korea, Croatia,
Macedonia and Algeria.
Opposed to the resolution were Bulgaria, Estonia, Monaco, Lithuania, Latvia,
Poland, Romania, Pakistan, India, Israel, Armenia, Russia, Slovakia, Czech
Republic, Turkey, UK, US, France and Hungary.
Explanations of vote were made by a number of countries including Pakistan,
US, UK, Cuba, Argentina and France.
The resolution will now go to the full plenary of the General Assembly for a
vote in early December.
The resolution "Towards a nuclear weapons free world - the need for a new
agenda" was an attempt by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand,
Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden to create a middle of the road resolution
that clearly expressed international concern about the continuing impasse
on nuclear disarmament and outlined a way to break the impasse and achieve
a world free of nuclear weapons.
Despite several revisions to meet the concerns of Britain and the other
nuclear weapons states the draft still failed to gain their support.
So opposed to the resolution were Britain, France and the United States
that they resorted to bullying smaller nations to vote against or abstain.
Slovenia, for example, was placed under so much pressure that it was
forced to withdraw from co-sponsoring the resolution at the eleventh hour.
The contradiction between the Government's promise to "make a difference
in this area, as in so many areas of Government policy... Our approach...
will not be grudging and it will not be one that plays up the obstacles to
progress in order to leave things as they are. We intend to be a
constructive actor, using our influence to move things forward where we
can....", with their actions at the UN is all too apparent.
One argument used by Britain was that they could not support the
resolution because it "advocates measures which... would be at the present
time inconsistent with the maintenance of a credible minimum nuclear
deterrent."
CND Chair, Dave Knight said, "CND is disgusted by the Government's actions
at the UN. At a time when there is almost universal consensus on the urgent
and desperate need to rid the world of nuclear weapons, with merely
disagreement on how we go about it, the type of destructive diplomacy
employed by Britain and other countries at the UN over the last couple of
weeks virtually destroys any hope of achieving a world free of nuclear
weapons."
"The international nuclear disarmament process is on the verge of collapse
because of the continued opposition by the nuclear weapons states to any
nuclear disarmament proposals. The views expressed and tactics used by
Britain and others to destroy this resolution could be the straw that
breaks the camel's back. Only time will reveal the true extent of the
damage it could, however, prove to be irreparable."
"The Labour Government should stop lying about how committed they are to
achieving a nuclear weapons free world and instead they should stand up and
shout from the rooftops that they have helped to dash any hopes of nuclear
disarmament in the near future. This was either an act with a deliberate
aim - the destruction of the international nuclear disarmament process - or
an act of gross incompetence. They should be disgusted by what they've done."
Notes on the UN Resolution:
By the terms of the draft resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free world: the
need for a new agenda (document A/C.1/53/L.48,R.1), the Assembly would call
upon the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to
the speedy and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and, without
delay, conclude negotiations to that end, thereby fulfilling their
obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT). It would also call upon the United States and the Russian Federation
to bring the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms (START II) into force without delay and to proceed thereafter with
negotiations on START III, and to integrate all five nuclear-weapon States
into the nuclear disarmament process.
The Assembly would also call upon the nuclear-weapon States to vigorously
pursue the reduction of reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons and
negotiations on their elimination as an integral part of their overall
nuclear disarmament activities. It would call upon them, as an interim
measure, to proceed to the de-alerting of their nuclear weapons and, in
turn, to the removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles. Those
States would be urged to examine further interim measures, including
undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.
The Assembly would further call upon those three nuclear-weapon-capable
States that had not yet acceded to the NPT to clearly and urgently reverse
all nuclear weapons development or deployment and to refrain from any
actions which could undermine regional and international peace and security
and the efforts of the international community in that regard. The Assembly
would call upon those States that had not yet done so to adhere
unconditionally and without delay to the NPT and to conclude full-scope
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements. It would
also call upon all States to sign and ratify the CTBT.
By further terms, the Assembly would call upon the Conference on
Disarmament to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear
disarmament. It would also call on the Conference to pursue negotiations on
a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Pending the entry into force of such a treaty, it would urge all States to
observe a moratorium on the production of that material.
It would further call for the conclusion of a legally-binding instrument
to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT against the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons, and stress that nuclear-weapon-free
zones, especially in regions of tension such as the Middle East and South
Asia, would contribute significantly to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free
world.
The draft resolution was sponsored by Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Ireland, Lesotho, Liberia, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Peru, Samoa, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand,
Togo, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Vote details: 97 for; 19 against included Britain, France, Russia, China,
India, Pakistan and Israel; 32 abstentions which included China, Japan,
Germany, Slovenia and the Benelux countries.
Column: 281
Nuclear Disarmament
Mr. Alan Simpson: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on his policy on the
establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament (a) with and
(b) without a negotiating mandate at the Conference on Disarmament; and if
he will make a statement. [59148]
Mr. Tony Lloyd: We believe that the Conference on Disarmament should focus
on negotiating Fissile Material Cut-off, which appears to be the maximum
extent of consensus at present achievable, rather than attempting to
negotiate a convention on nuclear disarmament at this time. We will
nonetheless play a full part in consultations as one of the CD Presidential
Troika to examine further approaches to other aspects of nuclear
disarmament.
Mr. Alan Simpson: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on Britain's position
towards the UN resolution, Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World: the need
for a New Agenda, currently under consideration by the UN First Committee
on Disarmament and International Security.
Mr. Tony Lloyd: We oppose the current draft of this resolution, which we
have considered carefully, since it is inconsistent with maintaining a
credible nuclear deterrent. We remain ready to support measures that will
make a practical contribution to advancing nuclear disarmament.
What follows is how all nations voted last November 10th in the First Committe of the UN on
a disarmament resolution calling for negotiations to start in 1999 for a Convention Banning
Nuclear Weapons.
A second and final vote is scheduled in the General Assembly in the start of December.
It was interesting that:
Follow up to the Advisory Opinion of International Court of Justice on the Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 49/75 K of 15 December 1994, 51/45 M of 10 December 1996,
and 52/38 O of 9 December 1997,
Convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity
and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all life on Earth, and
recognizing that the only defence against a nuclear catastrophe is the total elimination of
nuclear weapons and the certainty that they will never be produced again,
Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination
of nuclear weapons and the creation of a nuclear weapon free world,
Mindful of the solemn obligations of States parties, undertaken in article VI of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particularly to pursue negotiations in good faith
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament,
Recalling the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the objective of determined pursuit
by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear
weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons,
Recalling also the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in its resolution
50/245 of 10 September 1996, and expressing its satisfaction at the increasing number of
States that have signed and ratified the Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga,
Bangkok and Pelindaba are gradually freeing the entire southern hemisphere and adjacent
areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons,
Noting the efforts by the States possessing the largest inventories of nuclear weapons to
reduce their stockpiles of such weapons through bilateral and unilateral agreements or
arrangements, and calling for the intensification of such efforts to accelerate the significant
reduction of nuclear-weapon arsenals,
Recognizing the need for a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding instrument to assure
non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons,
Reaffirming the central role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral
disarmament negotiating forum, and regretting the lack of progress in disarmament
negotiations, particularly nuclear disarmament, in the Conference of Disarmament during its
1998 session,
Emphasizing the need for the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a
phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified
framework of time,
Desiring to achieve the objective of a legally binding prohibition of the development,
production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, threat or use of nuclear weapons and their
destruction under effective international control,
Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996,
Taking note of the relevant portions of the report of Secretary-General (document A/53/298
dated 5 August 1998 and appendum 1 dated 29 October 1998) relating to the objective on
the implementation of resolution 52/38 O;
1. Underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that
there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations
leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international
control;
2. Calls once again upon all States immediately to fulfil that obligation by commencing
multilateral negotiations on various aspects of nuclear disarmament in 1999 leading to an
early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production,
testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for
their elimination;
3. Requests all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they have
taken on the implementation of the present resolution and nuclear disarmament, and
requests the Secretary-General to apprise the General Assembly of that information at its
fifty-fourth session;
4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled
"Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons".
ADOPTED
Agreed:, Algeria, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central Afric. Rep., Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Czech Republic, Dem PR of Korea, Dem Rep of Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Equador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Marocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Salomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrain Ar, Thailand, Togo, Tunesia, Uganda, Ukraine, U A Emirates, U R Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Against: Andorra, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Fed, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Thefyr Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
Abstained: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Iceland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Norway, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Absent: Belize, Bosnia/Herzeg., Cambodia, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Dominica, Equat Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea-Bussau, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius, Micronesia (FS), Palau, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Rwanda, St Kitts-Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, Sao Tome Prince, Seychelles, Somalia, Tajikistan, Trinidad-Tobago, Vanuata, Yugoslavia
Mr Chairman,
1. I wish to introduce the draft resolution contained in the document L 48
entitled: Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World: The Need for a New Agenda on
behalf of the delegations of Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Ireland,
Lesotho, Liberia, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, Samoa,
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo,
Uruguay and Venezuela.
2. The purpose of this draft resolution is to revitalize the way we approach
the nuclear disarmament agenda. Its intention is to galvanize the
international community in common action for the purpose of eradicating these
weapons for once and for all. It is the prerogative and duty of the membership
of the United Nations gathered in the General Assembly to examine and to
express the will of the international community on issues of such importance
to humanity.
3. Enacting the proposals contained in this draft would have far reaching
consequences: for the nuclear weapon states, for those states which have not
joined the international community in relinquishing the option to develop
nuclear weapons, and for the international community as a whole, which has the
responsibility to bring about the multilateral, non-discriminatory and
universal regime for a nuclear-weapons-free world.
4. The draft resolution before this committee proposes an agenda or the
contours of an agenda. It does not presume to supplant other resolutions on
nuclear disarmament before this committee. It offers a way forward that is
contingent on the demonstration of an unequivocal commitment by the Nuclear
Weapon States to approach their responsibilities with regard to nuclear
disarmament from a novel perspective, namely the speedy and total elimination
of their respective nuclear arsenals. This draft resolution calls upon them to
demonstrate such an undertaking. Without it we face the prospect of the
continued existence and indefinite retention of nuclear weapons.
5. This draft resolution charts an agenda which in broad terms can and indeed
must be addressed if the international community is to seriously grapple with
the elimination of nuclear weapons. The agenda focuses on the need to use
existing mechanisms and approaches. It provides the balance between
bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral approaches, each of which in its own
respect can and must contribute to the pursuit and achievement of nuclear
disarmament.
6. The effects of following the approach set out in this resolution would be
decisive. These weapons will rapidly be relegated as anachronisms, which
remain a threat only insofar as the process of their destruction requires
cautious handling in conditions of security to be elaborated between the
nuclear weapons states. The threat of proliferation, which will always remain
a concern in a world of Nuclear Weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States,
will ease as a result.
7. The consequences of ignoring the urgency of speedily and totally
eliminating nuclear weapons was borne in on us earlier this year. Let these
events be the defining catalyst for us all to act together now.
8. This draft resolution provides the outline of a plan of action. Details of
this as of any plan can be changed. Timetables can be set. New and alternative
approaches can be examined. All of these things we can do. Until the Nuclear
Weapon States have demonstrated an unequivocal commitment to the speedy and
total elimination of their nuclear arsenals to be followed by a new level of
engagement in those negotiations which are a first and integral part of the
process leading to nuclear disarmament.
9. In this draft resolution the sponsors attempt - with a reasonable proposal
that builds upon existing legally-binding commitments by the Nuclear Weapon
States - to secure the final push towards the realization of the Article VI
provisions of the NPT, thereby enabling the international community to fulfil
the goals of the Treaty as a whole.
Mr Chairman,
10. I wish to respond to a number of criticisms which have been made on this
draft resolution.
It is claimed that statements made by the sponsors indicate they are not
prepared to consider changes that would make the resolution acceptable.
The sponsors have, who have laboured solidly since the 9 June 1998 Joint
Ministerial Declaration on Nuclear Disarmament (A/53/138) to elaborate a draft
resolution which would have the overwhelming support of the international
community, have engaged all delegations which have been willing to work with
them, and a large number of delegations have engaged in such a dialogue. The
sponsors have accordingly amended many paragraphs in their original text to
accommodate the concerns of delegations. The sponsors of this draft resolution
have invited the five nuclear weapon States to engage in a dialogue on this
text.
It is argued that the text presents dangerous new concepts, such as "nuclear
weapons capable states".
The Ministers in the 9 June 1998 Joint Declaration were specific as to the
states which were covered by this term, namely Israel, India and Pakistan.
However, to further avoid any possible misapprehension, the sponsors have
moved the reference to nuclear weapons capability after the reference to
states, lest there be any suggestion that the sponsors were attempting to
create a new status of nuclear weapons capable states. The text therefore
reads: "States which are nuclear weapons capable, which have not renounced the
nuclear weapons option and which are not Parties to the NPT". There are only
three such non NPT states.
It is argued that the text does particular harm by reformulating agreed
language on FMCT in a way that could prejudge the negotiations
Early drafts of the resolution used a formula for the "Fissile material
treaty" which was generic and which could not be misconstrued as there is
agreement in the CD - a body which proceeds by consensus - on the mandate of
these treaty negotiations. However, as a number of delegations preferred the
text of the full mandate the text of the draft resolution has been amended
accordingly.
It is argued that at a time when the international community has raised its
serious concerns about the Indian and Pakistan nuclear tests, the draft
resolution makes no reference to them, and thereby lends aid and comfort to
India and Pakistan, that it rewards India and Pakistan for testing, and is not
in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1172
There is another draft resolution before this committee specifically dealing
with nuclear testing. The origins are in a Joint Ministerial Declaration which
in preparation well in advance of recent tests. The goals of the draft
resolution are universal. They are forward looking and were as relevant before
as they are after the recent nuclear testing. This is a proposal for a new
agenda, not a response with actions taken by certain states. The sponsors
purpose is to focus on actions that are required now, and the urgency of
immediate action to eliminate nuclear weapons has been heightened by the
recent tests.
It is argued that the draft resolution does not acknowledge the threat posed
by those States Party to the NPT who do not live up to their obligations under
that Treaty.
This draft resolution is a call for an agenda. The draft resolution on the
Report of the IAEA before the plenary of the General Assembly considers
questions of compliance with safeguards agreements concluded on foot of
obligations under Articles II and III of the NPT. The Security Council is also
apprized of questions relating to proliferation.
It is argued that the draft by implicitly rejecting the agenda contained in
the principles and Objectives agreed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference, also tends to undermine the international non-proliferation
regime.
The agenda set by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT
includes (a) the negotiation of the CTBT, since concluded, (b) the fissile
treaty negotiations, about to begin, and (c) negative security assurances,
also under consideration. This draft calls for the signature or ratification
as appropriate of the first ('10), the determined pursuit of the second ('12)
and the conclusion of negotiations on the third ('17). The purposes of this
resolution to re-ignite the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, phrased at all
times in conformity with the principles and objectives of the NPT and with any
decisions or resolutions adopted by the parties to that Treaty. The draft in
operative fifteen underlines the importance both of the agenda and the review
process set out in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The entire
resolution is informed by the sponsors unequivocal commitment to the NPT and
its full implementation.
It is argued that a negative vote is required on this resolution to send a
sufficiently strong signal that initiatives that are likely to undermine the
global non-proliferation regime are unacceptable.
The sponsors of this resolution, delegations representing non-nuclear weapon
states parties to the NPT are acting here to protect the NPT including its
non-proliferation provisions. This agenda is an approach which - if adopted by
all the delegations in this Assembly - would reinforce those provisions.
Finally, Mr Chairman,
11. I would like to re-iterate on behalf of the co-sponsors of this draft
resolution that we are in dialogue with a large number of states and we
invite others to contact us so that consideration can be given to their
concerns.
Explanatory Note on the Draft Resolution
Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World:
I
The agenda set out in the draft resolution before the Committee is divided
into three parts, which, together provide an agenda encompassing all States in
the international community: a first part calls for those actions which must
be undertaken by the Nuclear Weapon States: - and this section is based on
actions, methodologies or approaches which the nuclear weapon states have
chartered for themselves or projections for actions which are currently under
discussion.
Operative one of the draft resolution calls for the resolute pursuit of
nuclear disarmament in the context of an unequivocal commitment to the speedy
and total elimination of their respective nuclear weapons.
Operative two calls for action now on pursuing the START process, which is
that process favoured by the two states with the greatest nuclear arsenals,
but a pursuit predicated on the unequivocal commitment sought in operative
one.
Operative three calls for the incorporation of the other three Nuclear Weapon
States in nuclear reduction negotiations. There States have indicated that
they will join nuclear disarmament negotiations as soon as the United States
and the Russian Federation bring their nuclear weapons levels down to a level
appropriate for such an integration. The draft calls for an early dialogue
between all the nuclear weapon states so that the process leading from START
to negotiations involving all five nuclear weapon States would be well
prepared and begin without delay upon the completion of the first.
Operative four calls for the vigorous pursuit of efforts to reduce reliance on
non-strategic nuclear weapons and negotiations on their elimination as an
integral part of the overall nuclear disarmament process. This is a major
concern of the international community and particularly of those states which
find themselves targeted anew by deployments of these weapons. The reversal of
any such new threat and a particular focus on the elimination of these weapons
at an early stage in the economy of nuclear force reductions requires a strong
call by the international community such as is reflected in this operative
paragraph.
This draft resolution focuses on the elimination of nuclear weapons. It must
also responsibly address security concerns in the interim until such weapons
are eliminated. In operatives five and six the draft resolution addresses
certain interim measures which need to be addressed even when there is
agreement among the nuclear weapon states to proceed with a new impetus to
expeditiously complete the process of eliminating their respective nuclear
arsenals on the basis of their self-chartered steps outlined in the previous
three paragraphs. These are not disarmament measures. They are measures
contributing to international security and measures which could assist in
preventing the accidental or early intentional use of nuclear weapons. In
operative five the draft resolution singles out one such interim step, on the
value of which there is widespread agreement, namely measures which could rein
back the response time leading to the unleashing of nuclear weapons. There are
other interim measures, which would enhance strategic stability, including,
inter alia, Non First Use, which is currently under consideration by the
nuclear weapon states and which needs to be further and purposefully explored.
II
The Second part of the draft resolution calls for action by those states that
remain outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and
which have developed nuclear weapons.
Operative seven firmly calls on those states to reverse the pursuit of all
nuclear weapons development or deployment and any actions which could
undermine regional and international peace and security as well as the efforts
of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention
of nuclear weapons proliferation. The draft resolution does not accept these
states as nuclear weapons states. It calls in operative eight for their
adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The approach of the draft
resolution is forward looking and inclusive. These states have
responsibilities which arise from sovereign actions which they have taken and
the international community must therefore agree to call upon them to become a
part of the process which we outline in this draft resolution.
III
In the third section of the draft resolution, actions required of all states
are set out. For the purposes of achieving nuclear disarmament as distinct
from the need to achieve the elimination of existing nuclear arsenals, the
international community as a whole must proceed together. The world in which
nuclear weapons no longer exist is a world in which a universal non-
discriminatory and multilaterally negotiated regime protects the international
community from the re-emergence of these weapons in any quarter. This is a
process which must be multilateral because its application must be universal.
In operative nine the draft resolution calls for those states which have not
done so to conclude IAEA full scope safeguards and further to conclude the
additional protocols agreed multilaterally in 1997. The international
community must for its part demonstrate a firm commitment to multilaterally
agreed and enhanced measures to assure that there is no diversion for nuclear
weapons purposes. The success of the extension of improved safeguards is
fundamental to the goal we set out here. And further steps will be required as
we approach a world free of nuclear weapons.
In operative ten the draft resolution calls upon all states to sign and or
ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and pending its entry into
force to observe a moratorium.
In operative eleven the draft resolution calls upon all states to adhere to
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The safekeeping
and safe tracking of nuclear material is a fundamental requirement of a world
free of nuclear weapons.
In operative twelve the draft resolution calls for the expeditious pursuit in
the CD of the recently agreed negotiations on a fissionable material treaty
and calls for an interim moratorium on the production of fissile material for
weapons purposes.
In operative thirteen the draft resolution calls for the establishment of an
appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament on foot of the
consultations currently underway, which must, as the draft insists, be pursued
as a matter of priority in order to reach an agreement without further delay.
In operative fourteen the draft resolution proposes that consideration be
given to the holding of an international conference on nuclear disarmament and
nuclear non-proliferation, which would complement efforts being undertaken in
other settings, and which could consolidate a new agenda for a nuclear weapon
free world. This proposal is not intended to cut across any other proposed or
existing proposals. Indeed, convening such a conference would be contingent on
the perspective for the nuclear disarmament process as this unfolds over the
coming period. The purpose of such a conference would be to complement efforts
in other settings, in particular those outlined in the following operative
fifteen of the draft resolution, which underlines the prime importance of
implementing fully the "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty"
Decision of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.
Operative sixteen proposes that in the context of the progress which the
adoption of this draft resolution would signal, the international community
would be entering a new stage in its progress towards nuclear disarmament. It
would therefore be appropriate for the IAEA together with other relevant
international organizations and bodies, to begin the exploration of the
elements of the verification regime required to maintain a world free of
nuclear weapons. The unique resource of the IAEA as the organ which maintains
the existing safeguards required under the NPT is ideally suited to provide an
early indication in this regard. The appropriateness of this call is reflected
in the recent offer by the IAEA to contribute to the verification aspects of
the fissile material treaty in the CD.
Operative paragraph seventeen calls for the conclusion of a legally binding
instrument to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
Operative eighteen underlines the importance of the pursuit, establishment
and extension of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, especially in regions of tension
such as the Middle East and South Asia.
In operative nineteen the draft resolution reaffirms and underlines the role
of the international community in the process leading to a nuclear weapon free
world. A world without nuclear weapons will require a multilateral instrument
or a set of multilaterally negotiated instruments on the basis of which
confidence can be maintained that the risk of proliferation from any quarter
can be prevented. Such an instrument or set of instruments will of necessity
provide for prohibitions on the possession, development, production, transfer
and use of such weapons. The provisions of that instrument or set of
instruments will contain comprehensive mechanisms required to guarantee a
world free of nuclear weapons. It will be extensive and expensive. But it is a
price which the international community must be prepared to pay.
In the paragraphs twenty and twenty one of the draft resolution the Secretary
General is requested to compile a report on the implementation of this
resolution in the perspective of reviewing the implementation of this
resolution in the First Committee a year from now.
Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of:
1. We, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland,
Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden have considered the
continued threat to humanity represented by the perspective of the
indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon states, as
well as by those three nuclear-weapons-capable states that threat of use of
nuclear weapons. The seriousness of this predicament has been further
underscored by the recent nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan.
2. We fully share the conclusion expressed by the commissioners of the
Canberra Commission in their Statement that "the proposition that nuclear
weapons can by retained in perpetuity and never used - accidentally or by
decision - defies credibility. The only complete defence is the
elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be
produced again."
3. We recall that the General Assembly of the United Nations already in
January 1946 - in its very first resolution - unanimously called for a
commission to make proposals for "the elimination from national armaments
of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass
destruction." While we can rejoice at the achievement of the international
community in concluding total and global prohibitions on chemical and
biological weapons by the Conventions of 1972 and 1993, we equally deplore
the fact that the countless resolutions and initiatives which have been
guided by similar objectives in respect of nuclear weapons in the past half
century remain unfulfilled.
4. We can no longer remain complacent at the reluctance of the
nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to take
that fundamental and requisite step, namely a clear commitment to the
speedy, final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear
weapons capability and we urge them to take that step now.
5. The vast majority of the membership of the United Nations has entered
into legally-binding commitments not to receive, manufacture of otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. These
undertakings have been made in the context of the corresponding legally
binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon states to the pursuit of nuclear
disarmament. We are deeply concerned at the persistant reluctance of the
nuclear-weapon states to approach their Treaty obligation as an urgent
commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
6. In this connection we recall the unanimous conclusion of the
International Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory Opinion that there
exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict
and effective international control.
7. The international community must not enter the third millennium with
the prospect that the maintenance of these weapons will be considered
legitimate for the indefinite future, when the present juncture provides a
unique opportunity to eradicate and prohibit them for all time. We
therefore call on the governments of each of the nuclear weapon states and
the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to commit themselves unequivocally
to the elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons
capability and to agree to start work immediately on the practical steps
and negotiations required for its achievement.
8. We agree that the measures resulting from such undertakings leading to
the total elimination of nuclear weapons will begin with those states that
have the a largest arsenals. But we also stress the importance that they
be joined in seamless process by those with lesser arsenals at the
appropriate juncture. The nuclear-weapons states should immediately begin
to consider steps to be taken to this effect.
9. In this connection we welcome both the achievements to date and the
future promise of the START process as an appropriate bilateral, and
subsequently plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon
states, for the practical dismantlement and destruction of nuclear
armaments undertaken in pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons.
10. The actual elimination of nuclear arsenals, and the development of
requisite verification regimes, will of necessity require time. But there
are a number of practical steps that the nuclear-weapons states can, and
should, take immediately. We call on them to abandon present hair-trigger
postures by proceeding to de-alerting and de-activating their weapons.
They should also remove - non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed
sites. Such measures will create beneficial conditions for continued
disarmament efforts and help prevent inadvertent, accidental or
unauthorized launches.
11. In order for the nuclear disarmament process to proceed, the three
nuclear-weapons-capable states must clearly and urgently reverse the
pursuit of their respective nuclear weapons development or deployment and
refrain from any actions which could undermine the efforts of the
international community towards nuclear disarmament. We call upon them,
and all other states that have not yet done so, to adhere to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and take the necessary measures which flow from
adherence to this instrument. We likewise call upon them to sign and
ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty without delay and without
conditions.
12. An international ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Cut-off) would further underpin
the process towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As agreed in
1995 by the States Parties to the NPT, negotiations on such a convention
should commence immediately.
13. Disarmament measures alone will not bring about a world free from
nuclear weapons. Effective international cooperation to prevent the
proliferation of these weapons is vital and must be enhanced through, inter
alia, the extension of controls over all fissile material and other
relevant components of nuclear weapons. The emergence of any new
nuclear-weapons state, as well as any non-state entity in a position to
produce or otherwise acquire such weapons, seriously jeopardises the
process of eliminating nuclear weapons.
14. Other measures must also be taken pending the total elimination of
nuclear arsenals. Legally binding instruments should be developed with
respect to a joint no-first-use undertaking between the nuclear-weapon
states and as regards non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear-weapon states, so called negative security assurances.
15. The conclusion of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and
Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free ones as well as the Antarctic
Treaty have steadily excluded nuclear weapons from entire regions of the
world. The further pursuit, extension and establishment of such zones,
especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia,
represents a significant contribution to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free
world.
16. These measures all constitute essential elements which can and should
be pursued in parallel: by the nuclear-weapon states among themselves; and
by the nuclear-weapon states together with the non-nuclear-weapon states,
thus providing a road map towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.
17. The maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons will require the
underpinnings of universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding
instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of
instruments.
18. We, on our part, will spare no efforts to pursue the objectives
outlined above. We are jointly resolved to achieve the goal of a world
free from nuclear weapons. We firmly hold that the determined and rapid
preparation for the post-nuclear era must start now.
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Hasmy Agam Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the
United Nations New York on the "Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the
Legality of the Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons"
Mr. Chairman,
My delegation has the honour to introduce to the Committee the Draft
Resolution in document A/C.1/53/L.45 dated 26 October 1998 entitled "Follow-up
to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons". We are pleased to announce that
this Draft Resolution is co-sponsored by the following delegations: Algeria,
Bangladesh, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic
Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, San Marino, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, United Arab
Emirates, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe and, of course, my own delegation.
Mr. Chairman,
2. It is clear, from the debate in the current session of the First Committee,
there continues to be serious concern on the part of a large majority of the
members of this Organization at the lack of genuine efforts and the extremely
slow pace in negotiations on nuclear disarmament leading to the ultimate
elimination of nuclear weapons. Recent developments have increased these
concerns and complicated the situation further. It is imperative, therefore,
that the international community intensify efforts in nuclear disarmament with
a view to realizing the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons.
3. This Draft Resolution, being presented, today for the decision of this
Committee, is one of such efforts in that direction. It is based on, and
largely an update of, Resolution 52/38 O, which the General Assembly adopted at its last session,
with a large majority. The rationales contained in last year's resolution remain as valid this year as
they were then.
4. This Draft Resolution underscores, once again, the unanimous Advisory
Opinion of the International Court of Justice that "there exists an obligation
to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control". It is clear from this Opinion that States have a
legal obligation not only to pursue but also bring such negotiations to an
early conclusion. It also reiterates the call made by the General Assembly
through Resolution 52/38 O, for all States to immediately fulfill that
obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations in 1999 leading to an early
conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development,
production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of
nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. This is consistent with
the solemn obligation made by State parties under Article VI of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to pursue in good faith negotiations
on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and of their determined
pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with
the ultimate goal of the elimination of those weapons. The sponsors of this
Draft Resolution consider this unanimous Opinion of the World Court on the
existence of this obligation as a clear basis for follow-up actions by member
States of the United Nations in their determined efforts to rid the world of
nuclear weapons.
5. In tabling this Draft Resolution, at this 53rd. session of the General
Assembly, I would also like to make a number of additional points, partly in
response to the comments made by those delegations which spoke against the
initiation of this resolution on previous occasions. I should like to point
out that while the Draft Resolution seeks to bring about the immediate
commencement of multilateral negotiations, specifically in 1999, leading to a
Nuclear Weapons Convention, its formulation does not exclude, indeed, allows
for and encourages negotiations on other aspects of nuclear disarmament, the
entire process of which should lead to negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons
Convention. The Draft Resolution specifically mentions negotiations "leading"
to a Nuclear Weapons Convention, thereby allowing for the kind of disarmament
steps that the nuclear weapons states themselves are committed to support. It
should be noted, as was noted, last year, by one delegation, to which I am
grateful, that the resolution called for negotiations "leading to" and not
"on" a nuclear weapons convention. The realistic approach taken by the
drafters of this Draft Resolution is therefore not incompatible with the step-
by-step, incremental approaches mooted by others, including the Non-Aligned
Movement, and should therefore, be looked at in a positive and constructive
attitude by the nuclear-weapon-States.
6. My delegation readily admits that the Draft Resolution selects or focuses
on that part of the Opinion of the Court, namely, pertaining to the unanimous
Opinion on the existence of an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to
a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects,
under strict and effective international control. It should be recalled that
the ICJ gave two main conclusions on nuclear weapons, one relating to the
issue of threat and use of nuclear weapons, and the other relating to the
obligation to negotiate disarmament. It is quite appropriate for the General
Assembly to treat these two conclusions separately, as they require different
responses. As the draft resolution is entitled "Follow-up action to the
Court's Advisory Opinion", putting the two opinions together in one resolution
would only be to confuse the issue as delegations may be able to support the
appropriate course of action and not the other.
7. This Draft Resolution, as reflected in its operative paragraph 1, focuses
on the disarmament obligation of States because that conclusion was reached
unanimously by the World Court and that there is little or no controversy over
the meaning of this conclusion, unlike the conclusion on the threat or use of nuclear weapons
which has been subject to a number of interpretations. The implementation of this conclusion is
entirely appropriate for the General Assembly which has a number of mandates to promote
disarmament negotiations.
8. To the point that was made, last year, by a few, that what was needed was
further bilateral negotiations and that multilateral negotiations could
jeopardize the successful conclusion of bilateral negotiations, I can only
repeat what my delegation stated when it presented last year's resolution when
we said that we acknowledged "ongoing efforts and past achievements towards
the reduction of nuclear arms through bilateral negotiations...(but)...that
these bilateral negotiations address only the issue of the reduction in
numbers of these weapons to a certain ceiling and not their total elimination
nor on changing existing policies on the use or threat of use of these
weapons". I should like to stress, once again, the importance and continued
relevance of bilateral negotiations but that this should not detract from the
importance of multilateral negotiations. Indeed, the two tracks could
complement and reinforce each other for, after all, nuclear disarmament is a
matter of concern to all of humanity, not just the nuclear-weapon-States.
9. There was also the contention that the resolution relieves the non-nuclear-
weapon states of any disarmament responsibility. This is, of course, entirely
unfounded and misleading as the resolution calls upon "all" States to fulfill
the obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament; it does not out single out
the nuclear-weapon-states only.
10. One delegation contended that the Draft Resolution removed the Article VI
obligation of the NPT in relation to "general and complete disarmament", to
which I would like to point out that the Draft Resolution before us is on the
implementation of the ICJ's Advisory Opinion, not on the NPT. While the NPT
obligation in Article VI comprised part of international law, which was used
by the Court, it also used other disarmament and customary law to determine
its conclusion. The Court's conclusion that there is an obligation to
negotiate nuclear disarmament made no linkage between such an obligation and
"general and complete disarmament". Nor does the NPT make a direct link; it
merely states that there is an obligation to do both.
11. It was further contended that the resolution was silent on the fact that
the Court concluded that there was not in international law a prohibition
against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. My delegation is grateful to the
observation made by one delegation, last year, with which we entirely agree,
that the Court did conclude that the threat or use of nuclear weapons was
generally illegal, and that it is incorrect to say that it allowed for an
exception. The Court rejected the argument that there would be legal uses of
nuclear weapons, and said that it could not reach a conclusion on the extreme
circumstances.
12. For the above mentioned reasons, Mr. Chairman, my delegation refutes the
allegations, that had been made by those who had opposed the tabling of this
Resolutions in the past that it is selective, tendentious and unrealistic. It
is none of these. The tabling of this Draft Resolution, in its present form,
is merely a matter of practical applicability of the Opinion of the Court in
the context of the work of the First Committee and the General Assembly
relating to disarmament. States which support multilateral negotiations that
will eventually lead to the global elimination of nuclear weapons - as we are
all committed to do - will have no reason to oppose this draft Resolution
which seeks to do just that in the long term.
13. In introducing this Draft Resolution, my delegation expresses its sincere
appreciation to its co-sponsors as well as delegations that will vote in
favour of the Resolution.
NGA 53/98/GA/11 (IC-1)
Statement by HE Ambassador Hasmy Agam Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations at the General Debate of the First Committee of
the 53rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly
Mr. Chairman,
My delegation is pleased to see you preside over the First Committee during
this, 53rd Session of the General Assembly. We are confident that given your
well-known skills and expertise, you will be able to steer the work of the
Committee to a fruitful conclusion. My delegation extends our fullest support
and cooperation towards that end. We thank the Secretary-General for the
important and focussed remarks he made to the Committee, this morning.
2. The situation on the disarmament front in the past year has been a rather
dismal one. This was noted by the Durban Non-Aligned Summit in its Final
Document, which my delegation fully subscribes to and support. Except for an
important breakthrough in the area of conventional disarmament, in the form of
the successful and laudable signing of the Convention on Land mines, there has
been no discernible progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. The nuclear
powers continue to take the attitude that the issue of nuclear disarmament
should best be left to themselves to negotiate. Yet, to date, there has been
no real progress on that front. The START II process continues to be in limbo,
awaiting ratification by the Russian Duma. Until that happens there will be
no further movement in the direction of START III.
3. In the meantime, there has been a further setback, following the series of
nuclear tests that were carried out in South Asia. These tests are a matter of
serious regional and global concern as they carry with them the dangerous
prospects of nuclear proliferation thereby undermining the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). These tests should serve as a wake-up call for
the international community, especially the nuclear power states, to exert
every effort to ensure that proliferation of nuclear weapons will be stopped
at all cost and immediately. A constructive approach on their part would be
for them to cease all activities pertaining to the vertical proliferation of
nuclear weapons, a loophole which they negotiated for themselves in the CTBT.
They cannot hope to fully convince the non nuclear weapon states that their
security is best served by forswearing nuclear weapons when they, the nuclear weapon
states themselves, not only continue to keep them in large numbers but continue to
"improve" the destructive power of these weapons of mass destruction.
4. It is an undeniable fact that whether we like it or not, there are, today,
seven declared nuclear states. There is at least one undeclared nuclear
weapon state and, perhaps, a few others which aspire to join the club, for
reasons of national security, if not prestige. It is, therefore, imperative
for the tests in South Asia to be seen not purely in terms of a regional
dynamic and rationalized as such, but in the overall context of global nuclear
disarmament which should be addressed globally. The nuclear weapon states
have a particular responsibility to respond appropriately to this development.
They must demonstrate in a convincing way their strong and continued
commitment to the goals of nuclear disarmament, as embodied in the NPT, by
embarking on serious negotiations towards the reduction of their nuclear
arsenals leading to their ultimate elimination. Their clear obligations in
this respect, particularly under Article VI of NPT, have been clearly asserted
by the ICJ in its advisory opinion on the legality of the use and threat of
use of nuclear weapons. Unless there is a clear perception, especially by
states aspiring for nuclear capability, that the nuclear weapon states are
serious in their intention to achieve the goals of nuclear disarmament, the
world will, willy-nilly, slide down the path of nuclear proliferation.
5. My delegation would therefore urge the nuclear weapon states to take a more
constructive attitude towards meeting their obligations and responsibilities
under both the NPT and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and demonstrate,
unambiguously, their commitment to achieve all the goals of nuclear
disarmament. It would be helpful if they begin by evincing a more cooperative
approach to nuclear disarmament initiatives taken by the non nuclear weapon
states, rather than dismissing them, as they are wont to do up to now, as
unrealistic and naive efforts on the part of the nuclear haves not.
6. Efforts should therefore be made to forge a cooperative rather than an
adversarial approach in nuclear disarmament. Such an approach would, at least,
ensure a more productive outcome at the next NPT prepcom, which the last one
was regrettably not, thereby paving the way for a successful review process of
the NPT in the year 2000. This is essential in an effort to arrest further
erosion of confidence in the Treaty, which is already beginning to appear in
some quarters. The NPT Review process should address in serious fashion the
quantitative and qualitative aspects of nuclear disarmament, lack of real
progress in nuclear disarmament and accountability of the nuclear weapon
states in respect of both the review process and full implementation of the
NPT. In the wake of recent developments, efforts must be made to further
strengthen this important non-proliferation regime. The alternative is
fraught with unacceptable risks.
7. At the same time, greater efforts should be made to ensure early
ratification of the CTBT so as to pave the way for its entry into force by
the target date. My delegation welcomes the ratification of the Treaty by the
United Kingdom and France. It welcomes, in particular, the willingness of both
India and Pakistan to sign the Treaty within a year and hopes that this
undertaking will be fulfilled. My delegation urges the other parties concerned
to ratify the Treaty without delay. This is imperative if it is to be an
effective instrument in banning nuclear tests for all time. On its part,
Malaysia has signed the Treaty in July this year as a reaffirmation of its
consistent support for nuclear disarmament measures and steps are being taken
for its ratification, in spite its unhappiness with certain aspects of the
Treaty. As part of the international monitoring system of the Treaty, Malaysia
will be hosting a radionuclide monitoring station, with the Malaysian
Institute of Nuclear Technology Research (MINT) acting as the national agency
for overseeing the implementation requirements of the Treaty. As in the case
of the NPT, every effort should also be made towards securing universal
adherence to the CTBT.
Mr. Chairman,
8. In contributing to the nuclear disarmament process, my delegation, through
the resolution it has initiated in the past years, and will again initiate at this
session of the general Assembly, pertaining to the ICJ advisory opinion on the
legality of the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, has called for the
commencement of negotiations on nuclear disarmament that will eventually lead
to the conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In the wake of the
criminalization of all activities relating to chemical and biological weapons
through specific conventions, it is only logical and appropriate that a
comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, the most catastrophic weapons of
mass destruction imaginable, should be aimed at in the long term, in the
interest of ensuring the continued survival of the human species on this
planet. While a model draft convention, prepared by leading international
nuclear disarmament experts, is already in circulation as a basis of
discussion, my delegation is not, however, suggesting the immediate
negotiations on such a convention at this stage. We believe the road towards
the total elimination of nuclear weapons will be a long and arduous one and
would be best travelled through a series of well-defined stages, accompanied
by proper verification and control mechanisms. Such an approach is,
therefore, not incompatible with the step-by-step, incremental approaches
already mooted by others, including by the Non-Aligned Movement, and should,
therefore, be looked at in a positive and constructive attitude by the nuclear
weapon states. My delegation will have more to say on this when it initiates
its draft resolution on the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the legality of the use
and threat of use of nuclear weapons in this Committee.
9. Towards that ultimate goal, Mr. Chairman, there should be stepped-up
negotiations on the various aspects of nuclear disarmament at the Conference
on Disarmament. Regrettably, the CD has remained stalemated on the issue of
establishing an ad-hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. We welcome, however,
its recent decision to establish two ad-hoc committees, one dealing with fissile
material cutoff and the other pertaining to negative security assurances. We earnestly
hope that the two ad-hoc committees will be reestablished every year almost as a
matter of automaticity and that all the parties concerned will negotiate in
good faith in the coming months and years so as to enable early agreement to
be arrived at on these two important aspects of nuclear disarmament. Malaysia
is keen to play an active and constructive role in these negotiations and
looks forward to its early admission as a full member of the CD.
10. My delegation is particularly concerned about the inherent danger of a
thermonuclear war triggered by accident or through terrorism. This should
provide a further incentive for the international community to work
towards the rapid reduction and early elimination of nuclear weapons. In the
meantime, efforts should be made to avoid or eliminate such risks. In this
regard my delegation welcomes the proposal made by the Canberra Commission,
and supported by the recent eight-nation initiative, here in the United
Nations, to de-alert all nuclear forces. We welcome, in particular, what
amounts to a de-alerting measure or posture taken by the United Kingdom in
respect of its submarine-based nuclear forces. It should be lauded as a
positive contribution, especially in the context of reducing the possibility
of nuclear war by accident. At the same time we call on countries possessing
nuclear weapons to enhance the security of their nuclear facilities through
more stringent national physical and technical means and/or international
cooperation.
Mr. Chairman,
11. While the main disarmament focus should remain on nuclear disarmament, the proliferation of small arms, which has grown out of proportion in recent
years, is a matter of serious concern to my delegation, and is one of the
most challenging issues which the international community will have to come to grips with. While they have a role in legitimate national defence, their proliferation destabilizes societies and spawns terrorism. The international community should intensify cooperation in controlling the flow of these weapons through increased efforts at transparency, such as through the UN Register of Conventional Arms, which is participated by more than ninety countries, including my own. My delegation supports efforts at promoting the universal use of the Register. We also support the proposal to increase public awareness on the problem of small arms through the convening of an international conference.
12. Malaysia welcomes the impending entry into force of the Ottawa Treaty
banning antipersonnel land mines with the deposition of the 40th instrument of
ratification at the UN recently. We hail the promptness with which the Treaty
will come into force, less than a year after it was opened for signature,
which is indeed a remarkable achievement, reflecting overwhelming universal
support for the Treaty. Malaysia, which was among the initial signatories of
the Treaty, is effecting steps towards its early ratification.
13. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to pay tribute to
the Department of Disarmament Affairs, under the leadership of Under-
Secretary-General Jayantha Dhanapala. Under his able and dynamic stewardship
the Department has successfully refocused the attention of the Organization on
the important issue of disarmament in a way it has not been able to do so in
recent years. We believe the newly revamped and upgraded Department will make
an important contribution to the Secretary General's efforts to inculcate a
new culture of global peace which he has so eloquently articulated and in
which process the United Nations will play a pivotal role. We wish the
Department every success and extend our fullest support and cooperation in its
various activities.
14. These, Mr. Chairman, are some of my delegation's comments on several
aspects of the issues before us. It is not comprehensive in its coverage as we
intend to make additional specific comments on other aspects the disarmament
issue in the course of our debate.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 49/75 K of 15 December 1994, 51/45 M of 10 December
1996, and 52/38 O of 9 December 1997,
Convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to
all humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all
life on Earth, and recognizing that the only defence against a nuclear
catastrophe is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the certainty that
they will never be produced again,
Mindful of the solemn obligations of States parties, undertaken in article VI
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particularly to
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
Recalling the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular
the objective of determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic
and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate
goal of eliminating those weapons,
Recalling also the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in
its resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996,
Recognizing with satisfaction that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of
Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are gradually freeing the entire
southern hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear
weapons,
Noting the efforts by the States possessing the largest inventories of nuclear
weapons to reduce their stockpiles of such weapons through bilateral and
unilateral agreements or arrangements, and calling for the intensification of
such efforts to accelerate the significant reduction of nuclear-weapon
arsenals,
Recognizing the need for a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding
instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of
nuclear weapons,
Option 1
Reaffirming the central role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single
multilateral disarmament negotiating forum and noting the slow pace of
progress in disarmament negotiations, particularly nuclear disarmament, in the
Conference of Disarmament during its 1998 session inspite of the decision to
establish the ad hoc Committees on Fissile Materials Cut-off and Negative
Security Assurances,
Option 2
Reaffirming the central role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single
multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, and welcoming the decision to
establish the ad hoc Committees on fissile material cut-off and negative
security assurances
Regretting the slow pace of progress in disarmament negotiations, particularly
nuclear disarmament, in the Conference on Disarmament during its 1998 session,
Emphasizing the need for the Conference on Disarmament to commence
negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons within a realistic/ within a practicable/ wherever possible within a
framework of time,
Desiring to achieve the objective of a legally binding prohibition of the
development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, threat or use of
nuclear weapons and their destruction under effective international control,
Expressing concerned at the continued horizontal and vertical proliferation of
nuclear weapons including the testing of nuclear weapons and modernisation of
nuclear arsenal and calling all states to refrain from all forms of nuclear
tests,
Welcoming the New Agenda Coalition's Joint Ministerial Declaration on Nuclear
Disarmament of 9 June 1998 and affirming the need for a new international
agenda to achieve nuclear-weapon-free world,
Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996,
1. Underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court
of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring
to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects
under strict and effective international control;
2. Calls once again upon all States immediately to fulfil that obligation by
commencing multilateral negotiations on various aspects of nuclear disarmament
in 1999 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention
prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling,
transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their
elimination;
3. Noting with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General and expressing
appreciation to those countries that have submitted their report on the
efforts and measures that they have taken on the implementation of
resolution 52/38 O;
4. Requests all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and
measures they have taken on the implementation of the present resolution and
nuclear disarmament, and requests the Secretary-General to apprise the General
Assembly of that information at its fifty-fourth session;
5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session
the item entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons".
I recently went to see Stephen Spielberg's new movie "Saving Private Ryan."
It's a three hour intimately visceral portrayal of the systematic slaughter
that is war: an unrelenting succession of people killing people in horrific
ways one after another after another until one side has inflicted more death
and destruction than the other side can bear, and thereby wins. When I got
home that night I lay down on my bed and wept. I saw the hundreds and
hundreds of mangled bodies lying lifeless on the beaches of Normandy, washed
over by waves turned red from their blood. They were my grandfathers'
brothers and friends. Each one had a name and a mother. I cried too for the
images of war I was not shown: Families bombed in their beds while they
slept; burning cities; gas chambers; mass graves; women being raped;
prisoners-of-war being tortured; refugees walking wearily; poverty and
starvation; the atom bombs exploding on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; a naked
napalmed little girl running, screaming.
The Bloodiest Century
We are coming to the end of the bloodiest and most brutal century in
history. The military industrial complex and the politicians who serve it
are rich and thriving from war and the preparation for war. Meanwhile,
millions and millions of people are dead from war, sick from war, starving
from war, homeless from war, impoverished from war, weary from war.
Continual preparations for war are devouring precious financial and human
resources. The Cold War quest for mastery of the ultimate war-fighting
machine - the nuclear bomb - has caused and continues to cause untold
numbers of fatal cancers and genetic defects from the production, testing,
storage and dismantlement of deadly plutonium warheads. War, especially
preparations for nuclear war, is devastating the environment of our planet.
A New Way of Thinking and Living
It is time for society to call for the abolition of war. We have the
opportunity to define the next century before it begins. None of us has ever
entered a new century. A new century offers us a unique opportunity to
discard the war culture of the past millennia, and launch a new way of
thinking and living. As the people organized and abolished slavery in the
United States, as the people organized and abolished apartheid in South
Africa, as many people have organized to abolish colonialism in their lands,
let the people of the world organize to abolish war in the 21st century.
De-legitimizing War
I urge you to join the 600 plus and growing non-governmental organizations
worldwide who are participating in the Hague Appeal for Peace: a major
end-of-the-century campaign and conference dedicated to the
de-legitimization of war and the creation of a culture of peace. The Hague
Appeal for Peace seeks to refocus our minds on a vision of the world in
which armed conflict in the settlement of disputes is seen as illegitimate
and fundamentally unjust.
The Hague Appeal for Peace Conference will complete the extraordinary
sequence of world conferences held over the last decade on children,
environment, human rights, social development, population, women, and
habitat. But with an important difference: this last major conference of the
century is being convened by civil society, not by governments. The
conference will be held in The Hague, Netherlands, from May 11-15 1999.
Thousands of participants are coming from every continent.
The Hague Appeal for Peace addresses four specific challenges:
Developing an Agenda for Sustainable Peace
The campaign is bringing together an extraordinary range of existing
initiatives, experts, activists, organizations, political leaders and
ordinary people who are developing specific global strategies for the
de-legitimization of war and the creation of a sustainable culture of peace.
The results of this work will become the Hague Appeal for Peace Agenda,
which will be presented and finalized at the 1999 Conference. Preparatory
meetings at the national and regional level are being held, so people from
around the world can contribute to the Agenda. After its launch at the civil
society conference, the Hague Appeal for Peace Agenda will be presented to
the 1999 governmental meetings in The Hague and St. Petersburg, called to
commemorate the Centennial of the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, and to the
1999 international meetings of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. Responding in
large part to the civil society conference, governments plan to introduce a
resolution at the 52nd General Assembly of the United Nations outlining a
program of action dedicated to the commemoration of the Centennial. An
intensive follow-up program is anticipated.
A Strategic Opportunity
The occasion of the Centennial thus presents civil society, governments, and
the International Committee of the Red Cross -- the most important
intergovernmental organization in the field of humanitarian law -- with an
extraordinary strategic opportunity to identify innovative proposals for
strengthening institutions of peace and justice, and to develop an action
plan that we implement in partnership. The people, governments and
intergovernmental organizations are seldom actively engaged in the same
project at the same time, but the occasion of the Centennial brings these
three key global actors together in a historic convergence of great
opportunity. Organized and led by civil society, the creative partnership
strategy of the Hague Appeal for Peace 1999 thus reflects the "new
diplomacy" forged by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.
The Organizers
The Hague Appeal's Organizing Committee comprises 55 NGOs from all sectors
of civil society, and includes Asian Forum for Human Rights, Afronet,
EarthAction International, Friends of the Earth, International Association
of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, International Peace Bureau, International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Pax Christi International,
Third World Network, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, Women's
Environment and Development Organization, Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom, and the World Federalist Movement. Endorsing or
participating organizations now number 550. Individual endorsers include His
Holiness the Dalai Lama, Jose Ramos Horta and Jody Williams. Keynote
speakers include Archbishop Desmond Tutu; Graca Machel, expert on children
in armed conflict; and Federico Mayor, Director General of UNESCO.
Focus on Youth
Young people are actively involved at every level of the Hague Appeal and
they are developing a strong Youth Program. An orientation weekend is being
planned by and for young people, to lead into the Hague Conference, with
social, cultural and fun activities. The Youth Program will bring together
young people from many countries and war zones around the globe, to share
their experiences of, and responses to, armed conflict, and to explore what
can be done about it through international solidarity. A Careers Fair will
expose young people to opportunities that exist worldwide for professional
and volunteer work in the disarmament, humanitarian, human rights, conflict
prevention and resolution and development fields. Peace Child International
will lead theater workshops and stage an original musical, specially created
for the Hague Appeal. Ideas are being developed on peace education,
including organizing an International Day for Peace in schools and colleges
worldwide that would promote the Hague Appeal for Peace Agenda. A youth
video festival at the Hague Conference will feature submissions from people
under 25 depicting their vision of a world without war.
A National Teach-In on the War System & Transformation to a Peace System
In honor of Martin Luther King Jr., the US coordinating committee of the
Hague Appeal for Peace is organizing a National Teach-In on the War System &
Transformation to a Peace System on January 20 1999, in Washington, DC. We
intend this event to catalyze teach-ins across the nation on university
campuses, in unions, schools and religious institutions. For Americans, war
is a central organizing principle of our national government. Our defense
budgets are greater than any ten other nations combined; the US is the
central supplier of weapons to the world and the leading nuclear power.
Obviously, within the US there are many who believe in the present "defense"
and preparation for war system. But as the recent protests and national
disquiet over the planned US bombing of Iraq shows, there is also
considerable support for the non-violent resolution of conflicts. Through
the teach-ins, we will use the Hague Appeal for Peace to start a national
debate.
Yes, We Can End War!
Let us find the moral, spiritual and political will to do what our leaders
know must be done but cannot bring themselves to do. Let us commit to
initiating the final steps for abolishing war, for replacing the law of
force with the force of law. In the words of Desmond Tutu as he launched the
Hague Appeal for Peace in May 1998: "We have the capacity to destroy the
world many times over. We also have the capacity to make this a beautiful
world. We have been able to end slavery. Yes, we can end war."
I hope to see you at teach-ins around the country and in The Hague in May 1999!
For details about the Hague Appeal for Peace, the National Teach-In, and
information on discount travel to The Hague Appeal Conference, please contact:
Karina Wood
Acting Director
Centre for European Security and Disarmament (CESD)
115 rue St,vin
1000 Brussels
Belgium
Tel: +32-2-230.07.32
Fax: +32-2-230.24.67
TRENDS FOR UN VOTING
The figures and trends for UN voting on nuclear disarmament has become very
encouraging.
NEW AGENDA COALITION VOTE AND DEBATE
By Rebecca from The Acronym Institute
24, Colvestone Crescent, London E8 2LH, England.
telephone (UK +44) (0) 171 503 8857
fax (0) 171 503 9153
website: http://www.gn.apc.org/acronym
Towards a nuclear weapon free world: the need for a new agenda
India, Pakistan and Israel voted against. Bhutan, Cuba, Congo and Slovenia
abstained. Britain joined the majority in favour.
Britain voted against. Cuba, India, Israel, South Korea, Pakistan and
Slovenia abstained. Pakistan explained its abstention, saying it supported
unconditional security assurances, and that that any effort to restrict such
assurances to NPT parties would be discriminatory and unacceptable.
On behalf of the Benelux countries and Denmark, Spain, Finland, Iceland and
Portugal, Col AssShe Millim said that those countries abstained with regret.
There were a number of positive elements to which they could subscribe, but
also three principal imperfections: firstly, the resolution was alarmist in
tone, implying disappointment in the present non-proliferation regime, which
they could not share. He listed measures undertaken and said that the
present agenda was working well, and that they had not lost confidence in
its future. They also accused the resolution of 'passing in silence' over
the nuclear tests this year and of introducing an 'ambiguity' in the
definitions of states with a nuclear capability: for NPT members, Millim
said, there were only two categories of States: NWS and NNWS.
i) its language was too confrontational with regard to the NWS and would not be conducive
to constructive dialogue with them;
ii) it did not duly recognise the significant steps already undertaken;
iii) lack of balance, because too critical of the NWS and not addressing the South Asian
nuclear tests; doesn't like the international conference idea,
regard it as redundant, and having the potential to derail the NPT review
process; and the envisaged possible role for the CD is too ambiguous --
Norway did not believe the CD could be mandated to pursue nuclear
disarmament negotiations, but hoped that the CD could serve as a forum for
information exchange etc on this issue.
The NAC resolution L48/Rev.1 was the only nuclear disarmament resolution to
unite the NWS and nuclear possessors in defending their interests against
pragmatic pressure for further and specific action to reduce nuclear
weapons. It was also remarkable in being accused by both sides of going too
far. It was accused of basing itself too much on the NPT regime and of
undermining the regime; of threatening deterrence doctrine and of ignoring
deterrence doctrines; of conferring new status on the de facto nuclear
weapon possessors and of ignoring reality; of proposing too much too
prematurely, and of being too vague. There were also remarkable
similarities in the criticisms and explanations by NATO countries, which is
unsurprising since may of them churned out the arguments in the memo used by
the NATO NWS in their demarches against this resolution, which I sent some
of you last week.
REFLECTIONS ON THE NEW AGENDA COALITION VOTE AT THE
UN
by Senator Douglas Roche, O.C., Chairman, Middle Powers
Initiative
The vote was 97 in favour, 19 opposed and 32 abstentions. Since 12 NATO nations
abstained, the
vote was a significant defeat of the Western Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), who campaigned
hard around
the world and especially in the NATO states against L.48.
The vote firmly established NAC as a formidable governmental instrument challenging the
NWS hold on nuclear weapons. This action gives immense encouragement to those who have
been working for the elimination of nuclear weapons.
"Calls upons the Nuclear Weapons States to demonstrate an unequivocal
commitment to the speedy and total elimination of their respective
nuclear weapons and without delay to pursue in good faith and bring to a
conclusion negotiations leading to the elimination of these weapons, thereby
fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)."
"The new Federal Government sticks to its goal of complete disarmament of all
weapons of mass destruction and will take part in initiatives, together
with Germany's partners and allies, to achieve this end."
How could Germany vote against L.48 and thus be seen around the world as
repudiating its own -- new -- policy? The joint abstention strategy decided on by
Axworthy and Fischer doubtless swayed other NATO states that had, until
the last moment, been stating they would vote no. While MPI wished them to
vote yes, the fact that the majority of NATO NNWS moved en bloc has
shifted NATO from its previously unassailable hard-line retention of nuclear
weapons.
Their abstention told the U.S, U.K., and France that negotiations toward
nuclear disarmament would have to be taken seriously by NATO and that
the current review of NATO's Strategic Concept would not necessarily lead to
a foregone conclusion that NATO's possession of nuclear weapons is permanent.
a) the NWS: U.S., U.K., France, Russia;
b) the states soon to join NATO: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland;
c) the states hoping to join NATO: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania;
d) the new nuclear: India, Pakistan, Israel; others: Armenia, Bulgaria, Monaco, Romania,
Slovakia.
a) co-operating with national NGOs in key European countries to inform
their governments about the resolution and encourage them to vote yes.
b) Informing government officials at the U.N. on the NAC resolution.
c) Helping U.N. delegations to ensure that accurate information was sent to their capitals.
d) Keeping delegations informed as to when the vote on L.48 would be held so that the
maximum number of states would actually be present in the
hall (in fact, the 148 nations that voted on L.48 were the most that voted at
any meeting this session).
NEW AGENDA RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY UN
BRITAIN WRECKS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT HOPES AT
UN
Britain showed how opposed to nuclear disarmament it really was by
voting with the other countries that possess nuclear weapons against a key nuclear
disarmament resolution at the United Nations today.
PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION ON NEW AGENDA
From Hansard:
ILLEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS RESOLUTION L45 - HOW THEY VOTED
UN General Assembly
First Committee
RESOLUTION A/C.1/53/L.45
NOVEMBER 10 1998
YES 100
NO 25
ABSTAIN 23
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT RESOLUTION - TOWARDS A NUCLEAR
WEAPON FREE WORLD:
THE NEED FOR A NEW AGENDA
Introductory Statement on behalf of the Co-sponsors of the draft
resolution contained in L.48
The Need for a New Agenda
NEW AGENDA COALITION: JOINT DECLARATION
Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT RESOLUTION L45 - THE ILLEGALITY
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
UN SPEECH ON DISARMAMENT BY MALAYSIA
DRAFT RESOLUTION L45 - THE WORLD COURT OPINION AND
NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONVENTION
TIME TO ABOLISH WAR AND BUILD A CULTURE OF PEACE: THE HAGUE APPEAL FOR PEACE
U.S. Outreach Coordinator,
Hague Appeal for Peace 1999
43 Nisbet St, 3rd Fl.
Providence, RI 02906
Tel: 401 751-8172
Fax: 401 751-1476
Email: kwood@igc.apc.org
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