MOSCOW, (Reuters) - Russia's Defence Ministry called off cooperation with the United States on the so-called millennium computer bug on Friday in response to NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia, Interfax news agency said.
Interfax said a ministry representative had made the announcement at a meeting of a government committee trying to tackle the computer glitch, which results from old programmes that may not distinguish between the years 1900 and 2000.
Officials could not be immediately reached for comment.
The U.S. Defence Department sent specialists to Russia last month to discuss the problem, especially insofar as it may threaten the functioning of the trigger to Russia's nuclear missile arsenal.
Russian and American experts both say it is virtually impossible for the bug to spark an accidental nuclear launch, but have suggested that both sides take extra precautions to prevent a computer foul-up from causing a false alarm.
The American proposal, which U.S. officials had said was favourably received in Moscow, would have placed Russian and U.S. technicians side-by-side in a joint nuclear command centre during the months before and after January 1, 2000.
But Interfax said the Defence Ministry representative specifically ruled out such a move on Friday.
Russia has been deeply outraged by NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia, which President Boris Yeltsin called "naked aggression." Russia has suspended all cooperation with the Western military alliance.
WASHINGTON (AP) -- The Pentagon will let Russian officials monitor U.S. missile launch warning data from mid-December to mid-January to bolster their confidence that America is not attacking, even if the Year 2000 computer bug creates glitches or gaps that prompt their own radars to indicate otherwise.
Information that would be made available to the Russians would be based on both satellite and land-based sensors but would not divulge secrets about American ballistic missile systems, said Edward Warner, assistant secretary of defense for strategy.
"The single thing it will show is whether we launch or not," he said Thursday.
Warner made the proposal to Russian defense officials last week. He said they did not accept but agreed to come to the United States next month to discuss it in more detail, including whether the arrangement would be reciprocated to give U.S. officials data from Russia's early warning radars.
Last September, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and President Clinton agreed to pursue the development of a joint early warning center in Russia to enable both nations to continuously share data on ballistic missile launches. That is not likely to come to fruition before year's end, Warner said, and therefore it was decided to invite Russian early-warning specialists to Colorado Springs, Colo., for the Year 2000 transition.
"Our proposal would give them extensive coverage, including coverage of potential U.S. launches," Warner said. "We have no intention to make any launches, but it would give them coverage of those areas."
The idea is to boost Russia's confidence that it will have adequate early warning of potential long-range missile launches from the United States at the start of the New Year, when some fear the "millennium bug" will strike and disrupt computer systems that have not been altered to compensate for possible Y2K problems.
Warner said the Russians were invited to a "specially setup facility" in Colorado Springs, but he was not more specific. Aides later said they did not know exactly where the facility would be established. Colorado Springs is home to the North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Space Command.
The Pentagon has said it is certain its early warning system will not be disrupted by the Year 2000 "bug." Some U.S. officials have expressed concern that the Russians are late in working out Y2K bugs.
Warner said that in his talks in Moscow last week, the Russians did not ask for U.S. financial help to speed their rehabilitation of Russian computer systems to make them handle the Year 2000 change smoothly. He said they seem "highly motivated" to make necessary preparations for the turn of the millennium, but "We did not get enough detailed information to understand the status of where they are now."
As for the computers used to control Russia's own nuclear missiles, Warner said, "Their assertion is they have looked into those systems, and they are actively working on them, and that they were coping with whatever problems they were confronting."
MOSCOW (Reuters--February 21, 1999) - The United States has offered to set up a missile early-warning center with Russia from December 1999 to reduce the risk of accidental war stemming from the millennium bug, a senior U.S. defense official said Sunday.
Edward Warner, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, outlined the suggestion in two days of military talks that ended Friday on how the millennium computer bug might affect Russia's nuclear arsenal.
Experts have expressed fear that the millennium bug, or Y2K problem, caused by outdated computer software that may mistake the year 2000 for 1900 could cause Russian radars to believe mistakenly that an attack was under way.
"One of the possibilities that we are discussing and will discuss further is the possibility of a jointly manned center with early-warning information available to provide an additional buffer against that problem," Warner told Reuters.
"One of the components of our proposal is the specific area of some sharing of early-warning data at the time of the transition, that is, the time of late December moving onto January of the year 2000."
Warner led a U.S. delegation of the Defense Consultative Group of U.S. and Russian military officials. The Y2K problem was one of several issues considered in the talks.
Russia has begun to acknowledge that its military may be affected by the millennium bug, but it is unclear where the cash-strapped country would get the funds it would need to tackle it, or how it could do so in only 10 months' time.
"There is a problem and we are dealing with it," said a spokesman for Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces.
Warner said U.S. and Russian military officials had agreed to meet again in March to come up with a detailed program to combat the millennium bug. But he downplayed the threat of accidental nuclear war from Y2K woes.
"I'm not of the opinion either on a day-to-day routine basis today or even at the time of Y2K that there is a high danger of the launch-on-false-warning kind of problem," Warner, an expert on the Russian military, said in the interview.
"Their system has long had multiple layers of command and control and authorization. It would still have all those areas, making the probability of accidental and unauthorized launch (low)," he said.
"Nevertheless we certainly want to encourage them to look with particular care at systems in that area, because one wants both sides to continue to have effective systems they have confidence in."
The defense official said the United States would like to set up a joint early-warning system with Russia on a permanent basis, but was ready to set up a temporary facility if no permanent agreement was reached before the end of the year.
Warner will also take part in talks on a wide range of defense and arms-control themes Monday and Tuesday led by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.
One of the most controversial topics is a growing U.S. interest in altering the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which limits Russia and the United States to a single ABM site against nuclear attack. Warner said the U.S. would not decide whether to deploy a new ABM system until June 2000 at earliest.
Sergei Rogov, head of Russia's independent USA and Canada Institute think tank, suggests in the latest edition of a Russian military newspaper that Russia should be prepared to renegotiate the ABM treaty and to go beyond it with a far broader deal that covers all areas of strategic stability.
MOSCOW (AP) -- Russia conceded today it needs up to $3 billion to tackle the Year 2000 computer glitch - six times the original estimate - and appealed to the United States to help fix computers that control stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Overwhelmed with debt, the government has long played down the cost and urgency of confronting the "millennium bug," which could destabilize computer systems that control Russia's nuclear arsenal, the world's second largest. The cost is staggering for a country so broke that its draft budget this year foresees just $21 billion in revenues.
The Russian announcement coincided with a report today that China also is behind in its work on what's known as the Y2K problem. More than half of China's most crucial enterprises haven't don't even know how to detect the glitch, the official Beijing Morning Post reported today. In Russia, officials previously estimated they would need $500 million to make sure older computers do not recognize the new double-zero date as 1900 rather than 2000. But that was before they had thoroughly review the problem, said Alexander Krupnov, chairman of Russia's Central Telecommunications Commission, which is coordinating the country's work on the Y2K bug.
After the first extensive study of government agencies facing potential computer failures-those that control military bases, oil pipelines and airports-Krupnov raised the estimate today to $2 billion or $3 billion. With just 330 days to go before the changeover, Krupnov said each agency was responsible for finding funds to solve the problem.
"These agencies have already done half their jobs. They've counted out how much" money they'll need, he told a news conference. "Now they're seeking their own sources of financing."
He made no suggestions about where the cash might come from, but he did appeal to NATO and the U.S. Defense Department to consult with Russia on the problem. Russia wants to "speak the same language" as the U.S. Defense Department and NATO, he said.
Russia has already agreed to allow NATO experts to investigate the potential danger to Russian weapons systems. While an errant missile launch would be highly unlikely, computer clock failure could sabotage related systems, such as radar and telecommunications networks. Krupnov would not say how much money the Defense Ministry needs, but said the energy sector needs a hefty chunk -- $160 million. A key task will be keeping heating systems functioning across this vast, northern country next Jan. 1, he said. He also warned that the widespread use of pirated software in Russia could threaten many computer systems.
Still, many analysts say Russia won't be as badly damaged as countries like the United States, because Russia has far fewer computers and a lower overall level of technology. While Krupnov insisted his commission was doing everything it could, he said, "Who knows if the country will be ready. ... I can't give any guarantees."
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Planes dropping from the sky may not be the worst examples of potential Millennium Bug-related chaos. Simon Davies reports on a more terrifying case of fallout
IT was the sort of revelation that governments dread. On September 25, 1998, a group of high-level officials met at the office of the United States Secretary of Defence at the Pentagon to review the potential impact of the Millennium Bug. Their key concern was the safety of the American nuclear arsenal. According to congressional sources, the Deputy Secretary of Defence, John Hamre, confidently assured the meeting that all "mission critical" nuclear systems - the systems at the core of America's nuclear capability - had been fixed. Naval and air command officials nodded in agreement.
But the sense of relief in the room did not last long. Admiral Richard Mies, Commander-in-Chief of US Strategic Command (Stratcom), bluntly told the meeting that the nuclear defence system was not Millennium-compliant. He warned that 11 crucial Stratcom nuclear systems would not be fixed in time. Mies added that 12 new systems currently in development would also not be compliant. In other words, at least 23 control systems at the heart of the US nuclear arsenal might fall victim to the Millennium Bug. If these computers fail to recognise the rollover from (19)99 to (20)00, they might react in a hundred different, and unpredictable, ways, from creating a false attack alert, to blacking out radar systems. It took less than a month for the admission to leak publicly.
The nuclear threat had been overlooked by observers. Even the current rash of popular books such as Time Bomb 2000, which describe potential effects on everything from public transport to employment, had entirely ignored the potential for nuclear catastrophe.
But for reasons that are only now becoming clear, the nuclear defence system was not the first priority on the defence department's list. Nor, contrary to the media's instinct, does the defence sector have a coherent, co-ordinated approach to the Millennium Bug. Instead, the planning for millennial computer failure has been dogged by secrecy, incompetence and turf wars.
But, according to a recent report by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), a highly regarded, independent research group, the US nuclear defence sector faces even more problems than officials have disclosed. The security of the nuclear system, claims the report, is dependent on the correct functioning of thousands of interlinked control and command systems, not all of which have been exhaustively checked.
"The Bug in the Bomb" report warns that: "The dangers of a Y2K meltdown, even if restricted to a few key systems, are intensified by the Russian and American policy of 'launch on warning'. This policy calls for nuclear retaliation after detection of another country's launch of missiles, but before the impact of the attacker's warheads. If Y2K breakdowns produce inaccurate early-warning data, or if communications and command channels are compromised, the combination of hair-trigger force postures and Y2K failures could be disastrous."
The report concludes: "In some instances, the only prudent course may be to de-alert or even de-activate those nuclear missile systems where date-related malfunctioning in associated command, control and communications systems poses even a remote possibility of accidental launch."
The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has also warned that nations should make preparations for the threat of accidental nuclear war. In a recent report, the FAS advised that "system operators and commanders should accept reductions in alert status and war-fighting readiness pending resolution of Y2K-induced problems, rather than attempting to sustain high alert rates through implementing or improvising contingency plans that could contribute to increasing the risk of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war."
It continued: "These are not priorities that can be chosen by commanders on the scene, particularly when faced with puzzling or alarming system failures possibly induced by Y2K problems."
The FAS noted that current nuclear strike strategies made such a plan essential. Of particular significance in the assessment of accidental war is the long-standing American strategy of treating Russian military bases as if they were poised - as they once were - to invade Western Europe.
This policy has done little to bring down the nuclear temperature. Senator Sam Nunn, former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has written that "from the conservative perspective of the Russian military, the only way to preserve Russia's deterrent credibility is to declare - as Russia recently did - its readiness to 'launch on warning'."
These warnings should have come as no surprise to government officials. In March 1998, the American government's General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that problems encountered in exercises over the past two years "resulted in the simulated downing of friendly aircraft in one exercise and in the nonengagement of hostile systems in another." But the 2000 nuclear problem is not confined to the United States. Senator Bob Smith, of the Armed Services Committee of Congress, described the threat of 2000 failure in other countries as "up there on an eight or nine. Libya, Syria, Iran, China, Russia, North Korea - these countries have the capability to launch missiles. And so if this computer glitch, the Y2K problem, causes anxiety, causes a reaction without knowledge of what really happened - causes a launch - I mean, this is a grave danger."
Paul Strassmann, a former director of defence information in the Pentagon, has advised that the true extent of the 2000 problem for governments around the world is "deeply, deeply buried in a mess of code that nobody understands". He said the key to a successful intergovernmental agreement to prevent nuclear problems in 2000 will be the ability to "move beyond diplomacy".
Moving beyond diplomacy has proved very difficult for the American government. The defence agencies of countries with nuclear capability are naturally reluctant to exchange data relating to the functioning of core systems. Most countries have not even acknowledged the urgency of the problem.
According to the American military, Russia's decaying nuclear systems are in danger of 2000-related failures, and both countries have made moves to share early-warning information (and even exchange key military and civilian personnel) to guard against a purposeful launch based on faulty surveillance data.
Last June, the American defence secretary William Cohen met Russian defence minister Igor Sergeyev to discuss the date problem. Cohen told observers: "Early warning would be important: what happens in the year 2000 with computers if they suddenly shut down, how would they interpret that and how will they react to that?"
Sergeyev provoked a mixture of dismay and hilarity in August when he advised a press conference that "this problem mostly affects sectors where they use conventional computer technologies. There is no such danger [for nuclear weapons], since in the Strategic Missile Forces we use special technologies."
The problem is complex. The nuclear sector is known in defence circles as the "system of systems". As the BASIC report observes, the DoD weapons and communication systems use millions of "embedded systems" in the form of microchips and microprocessors. These semi-independent systems-within-systems are hard to locate and difficult to fix, and the ultimate effects of multiple breakdowns in embedded systems are poorly understood. There is no general theory or methodology for assessing the Millennium-compliance of software, chips or microprocessors on a mass basis; suspected systems must be inspected line by line and chip by chip.
Consider, for example, the international network of Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence systems (CI), which provides the US with the ability to monitor Russia's daily nuclear activities, detect missile launches at sea or on land, observe invasion of airspace by strategic bombers, and track the flight and delivery of warheads. This system is based on a highly interdependent conglomeration of radar arrays, satellites, communications networks and data-processing stations. The emergence of a date glitch in any part of this system could have catastrophic consequences.
A Ministry of Defence (MoD) spokesman was adamant that British nuclear systems were not susceptible to these problems. "We've engaged in a thorough and comprehensive audit to ensure compliance."
But one key question remains unanswered. If Britain and the US are partners in an integrated nuclear defence system, then how will the possible failure of 23 critical American systems affect our own systems?
The MoD declined to comment.
Reuters / Wired News - 3:00 a.m. 8.Dec.98.PST
Almost 90 percent of the British Navy's vital computer systems, including
those that control its nuclear missiles, are still not protected against
the so-called millennium bug, according to a leaked defense ministry review.
Britain's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) said that more than 80 percent of crucial computer systems in the defense ministry headquarters still needed checking to ensure the computers would not malfunction at the turn of the century.
The CND said the admission in the defense ministry review came despite two years of work aimed at meeting an original deadline for fixing the faults of 31 December 1998, which would have allowed for 12 months of tests.
"This information gives me no confidence that nuclear weapons systems will be ready to handle the millennium bug," said CND chairman Dave Knight.
"Unless every single system is fixed, anything could be affected, from the timer on ovens in submarines to early warning systems that raise the alert about incoming nuclear missiles," he said.
The CND called for an immediate statement by the government and said Britain and other nuclear states should remove their nuclear warheads from warships and store them ashore to ensure their safety.
The Sunday Telegraph reported that the review revealed that the ministry did not have enough skilled staff to check its computer systems. No comment was available from the defense ministry.
MSNBC - Dec 6
Perhaps no entity on earth faces a more mammoth Year 2000 challenge than the U.S. Department of Defense, which has some 1.5 million computers, 28,000 systems and 10,000 networks.
Within its purview, no area has prompted more concern than the country's nuclear weapons arsenal, and whether its control and command is safe from the millennial bug.
THE CONCERN LIES with computer systems programmed to use two rather than four digits to describe the year - for example "79" instead of "1979." When the year 2000 arrives, experts predict that some computers may mistake the date for 1900 and shut down or malfunction. They may also feed bad information to other systems with which they are linked.
The Pentagon stands by its Year 2000 (or Y2K) effort, which it says has been under way since 1995 and budgeted at $2.5 billion over five years. But defense officials don't offer guarantees. "None of us knows exactly what is going to happen," says Pentagon spokesperson Susan Hansen.
"We feel cautiously optimistic that what will happen is some nuisances rather than crises ... We feel pretty confident that we will be able to provide for the national security of the United States."
Cautious optimism on the part of the DoD has done little to reassure critics. A recently released report by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) in Washington says Department of Defense efforts to address the Y2K issue have been riddled by "severe and recurring problems." And, BASIC notes, there is even less information available about Moscow's efforts, much less the rest of the world's nuclear weapons infrastructure.
The combination of possible computer glitches and the hair-trigger posture of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces raise the specter of a missile launch based on compromised surveillance data, or a communication breakdown in the event of a real attack, according to the BASIC report. "U.S. decision-makers must take steps now to preclude disaster should the Pentagon fail," says the report's author, Michael Kraig, a Scoville fellow.
RISKS AND MYTHS
Analysts on both sides of the debate are quick to say that missiles are highly unlikely to launch themselves at the stroke of midnight on Jan.1, 2000.
Rather, most concerns about military computer glitches are focused on the vast web of computerized communications systems under STRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command, which controls the country's nuclear arsenal.
Equally worrisome is U.S. Space Command (part of NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense Command), responsible for early-warning radar and surveillance the basis for military decisions.
(For a review, see the Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Forces Guide).
As in other sectors, no one is sure how the military's overall procedures will work if one part of the system fails. What raises the stakes is that both the United States and Russia maintain "launch on warning" postures calling for nuclear retaliation upon detection of the other's launch of missiles.
If date-related problems produce inaccurate early-warning data, or if communications within the military command are compromised, there will be 10 minutes to half an hour to clarify the situation and make the decision to launch or hold back.
Even in normal times misinterpretation of data frequently leads to heightened alert. Signals are sometimes garbled by solar disturbances. In 1979, personnel at NORAD saw the numbers indicating ballistic missile launches suddenly jump from zero to 20. In preparation to retaliate, nuclear bomber crews started their engines, and Minutemen missiles were readied. Ultimately, the data was traced to a faulty embedded chip design.
Who's benefitting from the frenzy? Given all the work required to make U.S. weapons systems Y2K safe, who's getting the contracts and subsequently earning big fees? Well, it's not a windfall for defense giants who traditionally make most of their money from government contracts. In fact, the amount budgeted $2.54 billion spread over five years is companies like defense and aerospace behemoth Lockheed Martin Corp. Lockheed says it has had piecemeal contracts on the overall Y2K effort, but that most of its input came under regular government maintenance contracts. Compare the amount the company is earning on Y2K upgrades to the $80 million the company is spending to make itself internally compliant, and there's little or no benefit. "It's a wash, or less than a wash," says Jim Fetig, a spokesman for Lockheed. "The outgo is bigger than the input." The same message came from Northrop Grumman, which makes military surveillance systems, military electronics and combat aircraft. Despite winning a handful of small information technology contracts, "we've noticed no big upsurge," a spokesman said.
In 1995, Moscow went into a state of high alert when its early warning radar mistook a Norwegian scientific probe for a U.S. trident missile launched from the Baltic.
The response decision was elevated all the way to President Boris Yeltsin, his defense minister and the chief of staff, who decided against action when they determined the "impact" would be outside Russian borders.
There is also a danger that, in the event of data correctly interpreting attack, communication systems used to coordinate a reaction may malfunction. Indeed, the DoD's efforts to prevent this breakdown go only so far, since the military has shifted from largely dedicated communications systems to commercial networks. In testimony before a House subcommittee in June, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre conceded, "If Ma Bell's or Bell Atlantic's system fails on Year 2000, we're going to have mission failure, and I don't have any control over that."
FAULTY CHAIN
Few military analysts suggest that 2000 will bring the Armageddon.
"The most likely thing is that Y2K problems get lost in the noise of flaky computer problems," says John Pike, security analyst for the Federation of American Scientists, a privately funded, non-profit organization in Washington, D.C.
However, Pike believes the greatest risk lies with events that follow component failure. "The thing you worry about is people improvising," he says, causing a relatively innocuous event to escalate, as happened in the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl crises.
Pike paints a scenario: "Most probably, the response is not that a missile will jump out of its silo at midnight, but that the door of the missile silo will get stuck." A technician whose job it is to keep the missile ready for use drops his wrench into the silo, tearing a hole in the fuel tank, causing an explosion. The explosion severs communication with the base, and it goes into a higher state of alert, which raises concern at military bases in Russia.
"If systems behave peculiarly, people will be nervous, overworked, and stop trusting the system," says Pike. "Consequently the man-machine interface starts behaving in unpredictable ways."
HOW MUCH PROGRESS IS ENOUGH
The Department of Defense says the situation is well under control.
It reports that it has identified 2,581 mission-critical systems, of which 53% are now fully Y2K ready.
Another 1,014 are going through the paces and a few hundred are to be retired or replaced before 2000.
The idea is to finish all the fixes by Jan. 1, 1999 ... three months earlier than previously announced, according to spokesperson Hansen.
This will leave ample time for testing, and including Y2K testing in military exercises.
But BASIC, which did extensive documentation of the DoD process, contends that there are serious flaws in the Pentagon's representation ... including ad-hoc funding, lax management and inadequate standards for declaring a system "Y2K compliant."
In short, the fixes won't be finished and tested in time, says BASIC.
"Initial research findings ... have resulted in no confidence that the Pentagon's present program will meet the Year 2000 challenge," according to its report.
Those findings were based in part on the government's own conclusions, which started to set off alarms last spring. The Office of Management and Budget has expressed its concerns that DoD will not meet its goals. The General Accounting Office for the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs warned in a report in April, "Time is running out to correct Department of Defense systems that could malfunction ... the impact of these failures could be widespread, costly and potentially disruptive to military operations worldwide."
An array of audit reports posted by the Inspector General for the DoD suggest many military departments are lagging behind schedule on Y2K efforts, and predict disruptions in command and control, testing and day to day operations.
THE NUCLEAR CLUB
Assuming that the Pentagon meets its goals, however, it seems clear that Russia will not, particularly in light of its severe economic constraints.
Moscow has insisted that the Russian system is different not susceptible to Y2K glitches but the argument has failed to convince.
Defense Deputy Secretary Hamre described Russia's early warning system as "fragile" in Senate testimony.
"Our concern is that Russia and China have only a very rudimentary understanding of the Year 2000 problem, which is why we need to reach out to them to make sure they have custodial confidence in their own systems," he said.
That was in June. As of October, Washington and Moscow were discussing the possibility of exchanging personnel in military sites to usher in the millennium, which spokesperson Hansen says will "... relay information and relieve the anxiety in case of a glitch ... to ensure no one misconstrues Y2K problem for an attack."
Some critics of U.S. nuclear policy, however, say that the fundamental flaw is in the posture of U.S. and Russian forces in the post-Cold War era. BASIC, as well as members of Congress and other non-governmental groups, urge the U.S. and Russia to "stand down or de-alert" missiles that remain on a hair-trigger prior to 2000. Though most agree it is too late to separate missiles from warheads, BASIC's Kraig urges the two sides to otherwise disable missiles.
Others are calling for an independent audit by a non-governmental agency and fuller public disclosure of the results. "We don't know squat about testing at STRATCOM," says Pike of FAS. "We know a lot more about Y2K compliance of parking garages at Washington headquarters than computers that are planning thermonuclear war."
The Defense Department says it's just not a practical solution to bring in outsiders unfamiliar with the multitude of rules and regulations to which they are subject. And as with many of the ideas being bandied about at the cusp of 1999, there's just not enough time. Says Hansen: "By the time [outside auditors] got up to speed it would probably be past the year 2000."
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A recent Defense Department Inspector General's Report has found that the Pentagon office that handles safety and security of U.S. nuclear stockpiles and emergency response in a nuclear accident falsified readiness reports on the Y2K computer problem. The Defense Special Weapons Agency claimed that three of five essential computer systems were fully prepared to face the computer crisis but the necessary testing never took place. The agency neglected to create contingency plans in the event of the failure of these critical systems. The October 30 Inspector General report warns that unless the problem is solved, "The Defense Special Weapons Agency, as a part of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, may be unable to execute its mission without undue disruption."
WASHINGTON - The Pentagon office responsible for safety and security of U.S. nuclear stockpiles and emergency response in a nuclear incident acknowledges falsifying readiness reports on the looming Year 2000 computer problem.
The Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) claimed that three of five so-called "mission critical" computer systems, essential to conducting its most primary duties, were fully prepared to face the computer crisis despite never conducting necessary testing, according to a recent Defense Department Inspector General's Report.
The agency also neglected to develop required "contingency plans" that would take effect if any "mission critical" systems fail.
"We recognize and agree with the findings of the Inspector Generals report," says Capt. Allan Toole, who was recently assigned to correct the Year 2000 (Y2K) problems at the DSWA, which was absorbed into the newly created Defense Threat Reduction Agency on October 1.
He would not discuss the agency's previous false reporting on Y2K.
The Oct. 30 Inspector General report predicts that without corrective action "The Defense Special Weapons Agency, as a part of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, may be unable to execute its mission without undue disruption."
Toole predicts the agency's systems will be "100% in compliance by April" 1999, despite not having established a complete inventory of the work that remains to be done.
"I have a good feeling about Y2K in this agency," he says.
Y2K is a complex computing problem, causing computers to make false calculations or fail entirely because the code or instructions written into those systems are unable to comprehend dates beyond 1999.
Facing increasing pressure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the White House and Capitol Hill to correct the Y2K problem, "people may get a little hasty or mistakenly" report something as ready, says Marvin Langston, the Defense Department official in charge of the computer problem.
"But I think there's very little real mischief going on here," he says.
Langston says he is confident that "a high level of end-to-end re-testing" of all system beginning early next year will root out remaining problems.
But the Pentagon received a D-minus grade this week from the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, which has been issuing Y2K progress grades to federal agencies for the past year.
"I am deeply concerned by this report," says Rep. Steve Horn, R-Calif., the committee chairman. "There is zero tolerance for error when you're dealing with the defense and safety of our nation."
"Does it come as any surprise to you that the Pentagon on occasion fudges on the truth?" says Sen. Robert Bennett, R-Utah, co-chair of a Senate Special Committee on Year 2000. "Look, the Pentagon has the biggest problem simply because they are the biggest agency. I know they are working very hard."
The federal government identifies 6,696 "mission critical" systems, of which 2,581 are in the Defense Department.
As recently as a few weeks ago, Sen. Bennett was fond of noting that officials of government and industry "all lie to us about Y2K" when asked to testify about their level of readiness.
But heading into the Thanksgiving weekend he says one of the things he is thankful for is that "there aren't as many people lying to us as there used to be."
The newly created Defense Threat Reduction Agency, oversees the full spectrum of weapons of mass destruction, including testing and modeling, stockpiling as well as the export or transfer of high technology. It also works with the FBI, CIA and State Department to monitor weapons of mass destruction held by U.S. adversaries.
Campaigners are becoming increasingly concerned at the lack of preparation
within the nuclear industry for 1st January 2000.
The following information reveals shocking levels of work still to be done.
Nuclear safety and security are not options, the risk of a nuclear accident
is real.
Nuclear weapons should be de-alerted and removed from delivery vehicles to avoid an accidental launch.
Nuclear sites should be closed down in case there is a failure which emergency services could not deal with because of other national system failures in the country on January 1st 2000.
There should be an emergency plan implemented for the whole period, and sites should not be allowed to re-open until enough proof is given to the public that there is no risk.
"January 1st 2000 is likely to be chaotic - putting the public at risk of a major nuclear accident and emergency is simply unacceptable.
The public bodies responsible for nuclear safety should be making it clear that sites, companies or military bases unable to be 100% sure that the start of the new millennium will have no effect, will be shut down or immobilised - as is the policy in the US ."
Western intelligence is warning of possible nuclear "meltdown" in the former Soviet bloc as a result of the so-called millennium bug, The Times of London reported on Sunday.
The millennium bug is a glitch in many of the world's computers that is expected to cripple them worldwide at midnight on December 31, 1999.
Intelligence sources say some of the 65 Soviet-made civilian nuclear power plants scattered across Russia and the former Warsaw Pact countries could malfunction as their computers fall victim to the "Y2K" (year 2000) glitch, which makes
them interpret the 00 date as 1900 instead of 2000, The Times reported.
"America, Britain and France have been quick to see the dangers.
But anxieties about Russian nuclear safety, branded on global memory by the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, have not been diminished by Moscow's assurances that the problem is 'under control,'" the paper reported.
An intelligence source was quoted by The Times as saying,
"Russia's nuclear industry is in desperate straits.
Throw in Y2K and you could have a giant Chernobyl on your hands."
It emerged last week that William Daley, the U.S. commerce secretary, is to host an international millennium bug conference this year, indicating the seriousness with which the U.S. White House views the problem, the paper said.
"Nuclear safety is bound to be an important item on the agenda,"
The Times reported, adding, "Al Gore, the [U.S.] vice president, also raised Y2K at a recent meeting with Viktor Chernomyrdin, the former Russian prime minister."
In a recent circular to all American power plants, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission warned that "control room display systems, radiation monitoring and emergency response" are particularly at risk, The Times reported.
"The Y2K problem is urgent because it has a fixed, non-negotiable deadline," that circular concluded.
"This matter requires priority attention because of the limited time remaining to assess the magnitude of the problem."
Even if the Russian government heeds such warnings, it may not have enough computer experts to go round, The Times reported.
Former Soviet bloc countries have 36 Soviet-made civilian nuclear reactors, while Russia itself has 29.
Of Russia's, 11 are models similar to the one that exploded at Chernobyl, in Ukraine, releasing 200 times as much radioactivity as the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The oldest Chernobyl-style nuclear power plant is the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant, or LAES, an accident-prone power station just 80 kilometers west of St. Petersburg.
LAES's reactors were actually the prototype for Chernobyl's.
Russian officials say the LAES reactors have been upgraded since the Chernobyl accident revealed vulnerabilities in them.
LAES has been plagued with problems - ranging from a hunger strike last year by unpaid engineers, who continued to work monitoring the reactor's safety despite dizziness and fainting spells, to an overburdened nuclear waste storage facility.
In 1992, an accident at LAES released radiation outside the plant.
Last week saw conflicting reports that another accident in March had again released a minor amount of radiation outside the plant.
WASHINGTON - Concerned that the Year 2000 computer bug could disrupt
military early-warning systems, the United States is reaching out to the
world's nuclear powers in an unprecedented effort to avoid an accidental
conflict.
Pentagon officials say they are confident that U.S nuclear command and
control systems will be ready for the so-called Y2K problem, but worry
that foreign early warning systems could malfunction and falsely indicate
an attack.
"We're working with all the nuclear powers we can have a relationship
with, to physically share people," says Marvin Langston, who directs
Pentagon Y2K programs. "Their people will sit in our control centers and
our people in their control centers to keep the communications open."
Efforts are also being made through the State Department and intelligence
community to establish "back channel" contacts with nations that deny
having nuclear capability and others hostile toward the United States, he
says.
Although plans are not finalized, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre
says he hopes to have some cooperative efforts in place next year.
"We have agreed we will have a center that will provide resources," says
Hamre, adding, "We'll move as fast as we can with the Russians."
There is general agreement that Y2K - a date-sensitive programming problem
that could disable computers after Dec. 31, 1999 - will not cause missiles
to launch mistakenly, but early-warning systems could malfunction. For
instance, in January 1995, Russian equipment mistook a NASA launch for a
missile attack.
"We have a huge stake in Russia's early warning systems working properly,"
says former senator Sam Nunn, who raised concerns last June.
Russian authorities first focused on Y2K this summer, finding their
space-based tracking equipment was likely to fail.
"Up to 80% of all defense ministry systems could be affected," says Sergey
Rogov, an adviser to the Russian Duma on Year 2000 issues.
An arms control think tank, British American Security Information Council,
issued a report Thursday questioning the Pentagon's ability to secure its
nuclear systems from Y2K distress.
The Government Accounting Office and members of Congress have questioned
the ability of the Pentagon, and other government agencies, to complete
all its Y2K efforts before Jan. 1, 2000.
Rogov says that "maybe the Year 2000 problem provides us with the impetus
to go into the next century with an entirely different relationship of our
two nuclear forces."
The first radio signals from Sputnik 41 years ago helped redefine American
national security, just as the so-called Year 2000 computer bug is
underscoring the latest risks to a nation built on technology.
"The Year 2000 problem could be an event equivalent to the launching of
Sputnik, (which) raised the awareness about the vulnerabilities of the
United States," says Marvin Langston, deputy chief information officer
for the Department of Defense.
The Year 2000 problem, or Y2K as it is commonly known, has riveted
attention on what may happen when computers fail to recognize the year
2000, disrupting internal clocks and causing system shutdowns and crashes.
Governments and corporations here and abroad are allowing unprecedented
access to computers as programmers look to fix the Year 2000 bug. That's
raising concerns about potential security compromises, industrial
espionage, even sabotage. And as in the days following Sputnik, analysts
see a need for more domestic talent to keep U.S. technology on the
cutting edge.
A serious re-evaluation of security issues has been under way since last
year, when a presidential panel warned that the nation's economy and vital
services were vulnerable to hacker-style attacks.
"In the millennium bug, we have developed a technology equivalent to
natural forces. If it is anywhere, it is everywhere," says G.K. Jayaram,
chairman of Transformation Systems of Princeton, N.J. "Nowhere at any time
in human history has there existed such a problem."
Opening 'trap doors'
One of Jayaram's clients is Provident Bank of Cincinnati, which boasts
that it is "among the nation's 100 largest banks, with 72 financial
centers and over $6.7 billion in total assets."
It also has about 8.5 million lines of computer code, which Jayaram's firm
upgraded for Y2K using a staff of 30 people in Cincinnati and 40 in
Chennai, India, linked by satellite.
While Jayram's firm has a solid international reputation, the increasingly
common practice of using overseas workers to handle U.S. computer systems
concerns some people.
"We are looking, as an intelligence priority, very carefully for people
who may present a threat in this area," says Richard Clarke, a senior
National Security Council official.
"When systems are modified to be Y2K-compliant, the question remains: Do
you know what was changed?" says Sam Varnado of Sandia National Labs,
which is working on system security with the federal government and
private industry.
It's a simple matter for a programmer handling computer source code to
install, undetected, a secret entrance, or "trap door," which can be used
to gain access to a system to read sensitive information, copy records,
alter files or transfer money.
"We have seen multiple times where Y2K activity has resulted in trap doors
being placed in commercial systems," says Duane Andrews, executive vice
president with SAIC.
"It's a very serious matter," says John Sarazen, director of SynComm
Group, a technology consulting firm. "An unprecedented amount of code is
being opened up right now as part of Year 2000."
Foreign code-busters
Outside the USA, programmers in India, Pakistan, Ireland and the
Philippines are doing most of the world's Y2K upgrades. And each of those
nations has issues with the United States or a thriving underground of
anti-American terrorist groups.
Given the chilly relations between the United States and India since it
and Pakistan conducted nuclear weapons tests earlier this year, concerns
are heightened by the amount of computer work done in those countries.
"Y2K remediation provides all kinds of opportunities for someone with
hostile intent to understand how your computer network works, how your
business works, what your vulnerabilities are," CIA Director George Tenet
testified before the Senate Special Committee on Year 2000 in June, even
before the nuclear weapons flap. "So we're watching it very, very
carefully."
The Philippines was a base of operations for subordinates of Osama bin
Ladin, the notorious exiled Saudi millionaire charged with masterminding
the bombing of U.S. embassies in East Africa this summer. He reportedly
is highly computer-savvy.
Jayaram dismisses concerns about Indians as a threat.
"We have built in layers of safeguards, and there is an audit team from
the client overseeing every step of the operation," he says. "So even if
there was a programmer who wanted to sabotage something, it would be most
difficult."
While reliable estimates say less than 10% of U.S. commercial source code
is being treated by foreign companies, many top U.S. trading partner are
turning to those countries in a rush to make deadlines.
And, Sarazen cautions, "It's a misperception that only foreign
government's will crack our systems. Domestic, commercial espionage is a
thriving business."
Shortage of expertise
While the USA is the world's primary consumer of computer goods, it is no
longer leading the world in turning out computer scientists.
"We're not cranking out as many technical people as we used to as a
percentage of all graduates," Langston says. "And because we're in a very
technically driven world, we are setting ourselves up nationally for
vulnerability (when) we have to go offshore for technical talent."
India has exploited the U.S. shortfall, turning out more than 50,000
computer scientists in the past year, compared with 26,000 in the USA.
India has become second only to the USA in software production, with
exports of $1.8 billion this year, up from $10 million a decade ago. And
it hopes to capture between 5% and 10% of what will be spent globally on
Y2K.
Computerized security
Many of these problems "are going to be with us for a very long time,"
says Mike Vattis, chief of the National Information Protection Center, a
task force based at the FBI. "People are just now awakening to these
issues."
But questions are growing about how far government can go in trying to
safeguard national security while allowing relatively free access to data.
Civil libertarians warn that some freedoms and rights may be challenged in
the process of redefining national security. A presidential commission
last year proposed a regulation, which it later withdrew, requiring
administrators of private computer systems to pass an FBI background check.
"Even when an agency is charged with observing privacy and other rights,
those interests eventually lose out when that agency has a directive to
protect national security," says Marc Rotenberg of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center.
Says former senator Sam Nunn, chairman of a research panel at the Center
for Strategic & International Studies, "Many of the problems we are
seeing have been with us for a long while, but this (Y2K) problem is
exacerbating the situation."
At the dawn of the new millennium, planes are unlikely to fall from the
sky, satellites will not explode, your bank account will not crumble into
cyberdust and there's no reason your car shouldn't start.
And here's another bit of hope: The Year 2000 computer glitch is unlikely
to hang up the telephone system, say federal auditors who recently
completed tests on the network.
"Even the account and billing system were flawless," said an exuberant
federal computer snoop, who asked to remain anonymous.
But keep in mind that things still are going to go wrong as computers cope
with dates ending in misleading double-zeroes.
"It's going to be a case of massive inconvenience," says John Sarazen,
director of SynComm Group, a technology consulting firm. "The sky isn't
falling, there are just some chunks going to come down."
The truth about some Y2K "urban legends":
Planes will not fall from the sky. What seems more likely is that systems
run by the Federal Aviation Administration and services at smaller airports
may encounter problems, creating a ripple effect that will disrupt
schedules. Automatic teller machines will work. There have been so many
reports of potential failures that banks have made a point of making sure
they will operate. Only 8% of potential computer failures will happen at
the stroke of midnight on Jan. 1, 2000. The rest could occur over the
following two years. Few VCRs care what year it is. Credit cards with
expiration dates in the year 2000 or beyond have created problems, but
those difficulties are being resolved.
CND is horrified by the revelations made in a report released today in
Washington by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC)
concerning the millennium bug and its possible affect on US nuclear weapons.
CND is calling for an immediate Government statement on the matter and an
urgent investigation by the National Audit Office.
The report reveals a US nuclear weapons infrastructure in chaos, running
out of time to fix an endemic problem, that could have unimaginable
consequences in a worst case scenario of total failure of key systems.
Whilst the report concentrates on the problems with US nuclear weapons this
will have a direct impact on the British programme. This is because a large
percentage of the British Trident nuclear weapons systems is reliant upon
US equipment and technology.
Little attention has been focussed on how the year 2000 problem will affect
British nuclear weapons. The MoD have been working on the issue since 1996
and have had talks with the other four main nuclear powers (the US, France,
Russia and China) on this matter.
A letter from Lord Gilbert, the MoD Minister responsible for year 2000
compliance does not instil confidence that the matter is being adequately
dealt with. He said:
"Taking missiles off alert... would not eliminate the residual risk. The
problems might, for example, only materialise when the systems were turned
back on. In a worst case they might arise in early warning and
communication systems leading to decisions to reactivate missiles even if
they had been taken off alert. The way to eliminate these residual risks is
therefore to take action..."
CND Chair, Dave Knight said: "If the year 2000 problem is so insurmountable
for the US military what does that say about the chances of Britain, and
the other five countries who possess nuclear weapons solving the problem on
time."
"There can be no margin for error when you are talking about nuclear
weapons. You have to be one hundred per cent certain that every single one
of the 36,000 nuclear weapons in the world, all of the command and control
systems, all of the design, manufacturing and testing infrastructure are
all fully compliant. If the Government cannot give that reassurance then
everything should be taken off alert and shut down until such an assurance
can be publicly given."
"Time is fast running out and there is an urgent need for an investigation
by the National Audit Office to find out whether British nuclear weapons
will be year 2000 compliant. Only then can the public and parliamentarians
make an accurate assessment of the risk and take the necessary remedial
action", he went on to say.
Alan Simpson, MP for Nottingham South, has tabled a series of parliamentary
questions on the millennium bug and the bomb in an attempt to illicit more
information from the Ministry of Defence.
For a copy of CND's three page prise of the BASIC report or a copy of the
Lord Gilbert letter please contact the CND Press Office on 0171 700 2350.
Notes:
According to the US Department of Defense in their latest report on the
matter, 51% of their systems still needed repairs, the number of
'mission-critical' systems that will not be fixed by their own March 1999
deadline has increased from 34 to 69 and the number of 'mission-critical'
systems that have fallen at least two months behind schedule has risen from
nine to 51.
To solve this hugely complex problem every single chip and every single
line of computer code in every item that forms a part of every system
involved in the design, production, maintenance, testing, deployment and
dismantlement of nuclear weapons must be examined for year 2000 compliance
to be absolutely certain that nothing will go wrong.
Then all of these items in all of these different systems have to be tested
in every conceivable scenario they may encounter to ensure they will
function as they should.
One can easily imagine how time-consuming and labour intensive ensuring
year 2000 compliance has to be in order to be one hundred per cent effective.
One more worrying element in the report is the situation in Russia. As with
Britain very little information is available but one source in the report
stated that about 51,000 of the 96,000 computers in Russia will be
susceptible to disruption at the turn of the century and half of the 50
operating systems and 100 software programmes used by the Russian
Government face serious millennium bug problems.
CND PARLIAMENTARY BRIEFING
The Millennium and the Bomb
My overall impression upon reading and re-reading this report is that the
task at hand - ensuring Y2K compliance for all US nuclear weapons - appears
insurmountable.
This begs the question "If it is so insurmountable for the US military then
what does that say about the chances of Britain, France, Russia and China
fixing the problem?" (Not to forget the smaller nuclear weapons states of
India, Pakistan and Israel.)
Time is running out and yet there is so little detailed information
available. This is clearly a matter that should be investigated by the
National Audit Office and the House of Commons Defence Select Committee.
William Peden, CND Parliamentary Officer
Introduction
The nature of the year 2000 problem is far more complex to solve than just
a simple date change in a computer programme.
Computer scientists and industry pundits estimate that between two and five
per cent of all chips in existence will experience problems. This figure
may seem low but who knows which chips will fail.
The BASIC report states: "In short: to be considered invulnerable, the DoD
(US Department of Defense) has to test nearly every chip and every line of
computer code for systems that are dependent on dates for operations. For
those military items considered "critical to core mission requirements"
every chip may have to undergo examination just to be certain of force
readiness, even when the larger system in question does not overtly utilize
dates."
The year 2000 problem is an incredibly complex problem, with no easy
solution. Yet the consequences of failure to solve it by the middle of next
year are potentially devastating.
There is also not just one date to watch out for and fix:
"The year 2000 also sports a leaps year, so Feb 2, 2000 through March 1,
2000, should be checked, as should 2/29/01, which should be rejected as it
is not a leap year... [other dates include] Oct 10, 2000, the first eight
character date using a two digit month; Dec 31, 2000, the 366th day of the
year, Aug 22, 1999, the first end of an epoch for GPS [Global Positioning
System]... 'overflow' problems in older Unix systems; and March 1, 2101,
the 'terminal date' used to encompass all established rules for calculation
of dates and calendar events." [Hess, June 26, 1998]
To solve this hugely complex problem every single chip and every single
line of code in every item involved in the design, production, maintenance,
testing, deployment and dismantlement of nuclear weapons must be examined
for Y2K compliance to ensure nothing goes wrong.
"The potential seriousness of Y2K-related glitches in this vast 'system of
systems' was demonstrated by a 1993 simulated test by NORAD personnel. Out
of curiosity, the technicians rolled the dates up to Jan 1, 2000. The
result, total system blackout (Kaplan, 1993). Officials have become
increasingly aware of the Y2K glitch since that incident; this is
especially true for the nuclear weapons and C3I community."
Problems in what may appear to be a well ordered Y2K audit
According to the research by BASIC on 5 June 1998 the US Department of
Defense Inspector General's Office published a highly critical audit of the
DOD's methods for solving the Y2K problem.
"The audit uncovered two separate but related problems in DoD
implementation of the Management plan. First, many systems were certified
as compliant when in fact no adequate justification for such assertions
existed; the IG estimated that only 109 of the 430 systems reported as
compliant by November 1997 were in fact adequately validated... Three of
the 22 systems in the sample for which a completed and signed checklist was
provided were not in fact fully certified through testing, even though
renovation probably had been completed. Two of the 22 systems had not even
reached the validation phase. In addition, 14 examples in the 83 point
sample taken by the IG "were inspected without testing (such s a manual
review of the system's software code);" seven of the 83 systems were
considered Y2K compliant based on a statement from another organization;
and 30 systems were labelled compliant without any inspection, testing, or
statement from another source."
What's happening now?
Despite renewed efforts to sort the problem out "there are signs that
severe problems persist in meeting project deadlines... On July 31, 1998,
the DoD predicted that 43 mission critical systems would not be renovated
on time and therefore would suffer from a high risk of failure..."
The most recent report from DoD stated:
"...51 per cent of its mission critical systems still needed Y2K repairs.
The number of mission-critical systems that will not be fixed by a March
1999 deadline set by OMB has increased from a reported 34 in May to 69. The
number of mission-critical systems that have fallen at least two months
behind schedule since the Pentagon's last report has risen from nine to 51..."
Just what are the potential Y2K outcomes?
"Although it is not currently possible to reach a definitive conclusion on
the status of individual nuclear systems, available information on the
DoD's overall remediation does not support the first two 'optimistic'
scenarios. The evidence clearly shows that Y2K-induced failures are likely
to be pervasive, complex, difficult to repair, and potentially damaging.
Given the highly interconnected nature of all systems under the purview of
US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), it is impossible to say with any degree of
certainty that current "fixes" have succeeded. Given the pervasiveness of
imbedded subsystems, in the form of microchips and microprocessors; it is
also impossible to say with any authority that all problem areas have been
properly identified, much less repaired. The only method for attaining this
type of knowledge is through comprehensive, integrated 'mission-level'
testing and verification programs, done well in advance of the Year 2000 in
case difficulties occur that need further renovation."
The report is primarily about US nuclear weapons but there is one
interesting statement made.
"...a recent report by the Russian "State Communications Committee" and
Russian Foreign Ministry stated that possible disruption could happen in
computer systems for Russian defense forces, and that about 51,000 of the
96,000 computers in Russia will be susceptible to disruptions at the turn
of the century... Specifically, the report estimated that half of the 50
operating systems and 100 software programs used by Russian government
structures are facing serious problems due to the millennium bug."
What about Britain?
We know very little and need to find out more. In the only letter from the
MoD CND has seen on the subject Lord Gilbert (the Minister responsible)
stated on 14 June 1998:
"The MoD has had a strategy in place to tackle the year 2000 problem across
all areas of defence activity since 1996. This includes the identification
and assessment of all affected equipment and systems and, when necessary,
their repair or replacement to make them year 2000 compliant.
I can assure you that our procedures for control of our nuclear deterrent
are robust enough to preclude any possibility of an accidental launch of a
Trident missile through equipment malfunction.
We are not, however, complacent about possible risks in this area. We have
been in close contact with the US and France over this issue. The year 2000
problem has also been raised with Russia and China.
Taking missiles off alert... would not eliminate the residual risk. The
problem might, for example, only materialise when the systems were turned
back on. In a worst case they might arise in early warning and
communication systems leading to decisions to reactivate missiles even if
they had been taken off alert.
The way to eliminate these residual risks is therefore to take action, as
we will continue to do, to raise the subject in all relevant international
for a and with various international organisations, including the other
nuclear weapon states."
One should also recall that a large proportion of the essential bits of
Britain's Trident system are purchased from the US. If as the BASIC report
concludes "things are not as good as made out", then what does that say
about British Y2K compliance?
What does BASIC recommend?
BASIC recommends what CND has been recommending for many years - take all
nuclear weapons off alert and remove the warheads to storage ashore.
In addition BASIC want to see more money and more personnel being devoted
to fixing the Y2K problem, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons
systems.
STOCKHOLM -- Swedes may get an unwelcome foretaste of their plan to phase
out nuclear power by 2010 unless computer experts crush the millennium bug.
Sweden's nuclear watchdog is tightening its grip on the power
industry's 2000 preparations after uncovering a fault at an atomic unit which
could have left many Swedes in the cold and the dark.
Nuclear power workers are in for a dull and sober New Year 2000 as
plants plan full staffing in case of problems. And some plants are worried the
millennium bug might even strike at the end of this year.
Maintenance personnel at the three-reactor Forsmark station sounded the
alarm in July when they found that the plant's data system was unable
to recognize the first two digits of the number 2000, resulting in an
automatic shutdown.
"If possible millennium problems are not taken care of well in advance,
people could face a cool and dark New Year's Eve," spokesman Anders
Bjoerle at Sweden's nuclear power inspectorate (SKI) told Reuters.
SKI has said it might order a temporary shutdown on the eve of the
millennium and go over to hydro-power as a back-up if it cannot
guarantee there will be no computer problems.
Bjoerle said SKI's first step was to inspect Sweden's 12 nuclear units,
which produce around 50 percent of the country's total output. Testing
has shown that the millennium bug could prove fatal to nuclear power
production.
Programmers in the 1960s and 1970s saved time and money by skipping the
first two numbers of a four-digit year.
That means computers will read 2000 as 1900, threatening glitches in power supply and raising the urgent need for back-up sources.
Bjoern Lindquist, manager for the millennium project at Vattenfall AB, Sweden's national power producer, said the company was focusing on testing to find ways to avoid shutdowns.
"We do not fear any problems after all the precautions we have taken.
But if a plant shuts down, we will have alternative plants ready and we will take the electricity we need from other places," Lindquist told Reuters.
He said stand-by measures were not yet in place but that plants would be fully staffed on the night.
Vattenfall, the owner and operator of the Forsmark station, has been working on the 2000 bug since 1996.
"We have invested hundreds of millions of crowns in this program," Stig Goethe, manager for Vattenfall's environment and development unit, told Reuters.
But he said the costs involved represented just a fraction of the potential losses the company could face if its data system breaks down when 2000 begins.
Sweden's other major nuclear power owner, Sydkraft AB, says it stepped up its millennium bug efforts after discovering computer problems could arise earlier than expected.
The three-unit Oskarshamn plant, operated by Sydkraft unit OKG AB, uncovered an error which would have disturbed regulation of the reactor's feed water, likely to result in an automatic shutdown when the computer systems switched to 1999.
"We turned the clock forward in our computer system and found the reactor broke down as soon as it was confronted with the figure 1999," plant spokesman Anders Oesterberg said.
Programmers had used 999, or "zero" in computer language, to store
unidentified information which interfered with the plant's operation.
Oesterberg said Oskarshamn has solved--or postponed--the problem by
turning back clocks to make its data system believe that 1999 was 1991.
In 2000, computers will be programmed for 1992, delaying bug problems by eight years.
"That will leave us plenty of time to replace the old computer systems," he said.
SKI's Bjoerle said there was no threat to safety from the millennium bug but merely the problem of keeping Swedes warm.
"There is no connection between the millennium and the safety of the nuclear reactor. The problem is power supply," he said.
Statements are no longer good enough we are running out of time. We demand
that the MoD, BNFL and other licensees prove to the public that there is no
risk of a nuclear accident, or accidental launch of a nuclear weapon at the
beginning of the new millennium.
Y2K: MANY CHERNOBYLS POSSIBLE
2000 Glitch Poses Nuclear Threat
US AIMS TO AVERT Y2K INDUCED WAR
By M.J. Zuckerman, USA TODAY - 13/11/98
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washdc/ncsfri01.htm
MORE THAN COMPUTERS VULNERABLE TO Y2K
By M.J. Zuckerman, USA TODAY - 13/11/98
http://www.usatoday.com/news/ndsfri01.htm
THE TRUTH ABOUT YEAR 2000 MYTHS
By M.J. Zuckerman, USA TODAY - 13/11/98
http://www.usatoday.com/news/ndsfri02.htm
YEAR 2000 TO START WITH A BANG?
Some rough notes from the BASIC report
The most problematic area is that in order to keep costs down the military
have traditionally used 'commercial-off-the-shelf' chips (COTS) that are
generic and may have time and/or date functions imbedded within them rather
than uniquely one-off designs. These chips are so widespread that their
individual identification within a particular system or subsystem takes a
lot of time.
What about Russia?
SWEDEN MAY FACE FROSTY YEAR 2000
By Reuters
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