28th July 1999
Y2K and the Threat of Global Nuclear Catastrophe

Briefing Paper by Hannah Middleton.

  • Year 2000 (Y2K) problems are likely to affect the computer systems that co-ordinate strategic nuclear weapons systems. Many respected experts are warning that due to Y2K problems these systems, both in the US and Russia, pose an unacceptable risk of accidental nuclear war.

  • The Y2K problem is buried in millions of lines of software code that use two digits to represent four-digit years. That will lead some software around the world to read "00" not as 2000, but 1900, and possibly cause computers to crash or issue false data. No one knows for sure what will happen.

  • The biggest fear is that a cascading effect will occur. In the worst-case scenario, even systems that have been tested as Y2K compliant will be infected with the Y2K bug as a result of their connection to non-compliant systems through the Internet or other networks. They, in turn, will contaminate others.

  • The result could be a digital snow-ball that wipes out whole sectors of the infrastructure on which modern societies have been built, from major communications and transportation nodes to entire power grids.

  • The greatest concern is that Y2K could cause a malfunction in the nuclear early warning network and command-and-control systems of the nuclear weapon states, leading to an accidental or mistaken launch command.

  • The US nuclear command and control system will be affected by any malfunctions in its bases in Australia: especially the ballistic missile launch detection and other satellite intelligence collection systems at Pine Gap, and Trident submarine communications transmitter site at North West Cape.

  • Even if the risk is very small, it is not a risk the planet and humanity should be subjected to.

  • The risk can be eliminated or minimised by taking nuclear weapons off hairtrigger alert.

  • There should therefore be a "safety first" approach to Y2K and nuclear arsenals.

  • The only responsible solution is for them all to be taken off alert status, preferably with the decoupling of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles. All strategic and tactical nuclear weapons should be placed in a status in which at least hours and preferably days would be required to launch them.

  • The immediate stakes are so high, and the potential for global catastrophe so clear, that mutually verified de-alerting in the face of the Y2K computer problem must take precedence over all other considerations of politics and national security.

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