22 February 2007
US ratchets up ‘psy-ops’ against Tehran
By Mahan Abedin
Information Clearing House

Psychological warfare has been a feature of Iranian-US relations since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Both sides have made extensive use of it, not only to damage the morale of the other, but also as a way of managing the conflict and preventing it from escalating into a shooting war. But never has this psychological war been so intense and potentially dangerous as it is now. Given the unprecedented instability across the Middle East - with opposing factions allied either to Iran or to the US - there is a real danger of misunderstandings spinning out of control.

As always, it is the Americans who have ratcheted up the war of words, with the Iranians trying to come to terms with it.

The best analyses can be found on websites that are ideologically close to Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad. These are often managed by second-generation revolutionaries with loose links to the Islamic Republic's security establishment. A highly illuminating analysis is provided by Dr Hossein Kachouyan, a professor of sociology at Tehran University and an expert on psychological warfare. In an interview with Raja News (www.rajanews.com), a website run by Ahmadinejad loyalists, Kachouyan provides a historical overview of the role of propaganda and psychological warfare in human conflict with a special focus on the Islamic way of war.

Kachouyan concludes, "Given that the Americans are plagued by internal political disputes and international constraints in addition to huge political, economic and military problems associated with their aggressions [against Afghanistan and Iraq], they have no option but to engage in psychological warfare against Iran." He adds: "They are trying to cause splits in the internal [Iranian] front ... and prevent us from pursuing our objectives by creating fear, doubt and division." [1]

As an Ahmadinejad loyalist, Kachouyan is clearly referring to the Rafsanjani camp, which has lately started a widespread misinformation campaign against the Ahmadinejad government, accusing it of radicalism, unnecessary militancy, economic incompetence and disregard for the national interest.

Another strong analysis (albeit a less sophisticated one) is put forward by Raja News' Qasim Ravanbakhsh. Ravanbakhsh identifies "Bush's foot soldiers" in the psychological-warfare campaign against Iran and concludes that the Islamic Republic should hit back with a propaganda campaign of its own and declare to the world that the US "cannot do a damn thing". [2]

This confidence is only partially rooted in the factors outlined by the two authors - in particular Kachouyan - namely that the US lacks the requisite political will to wage war against the Islamic Republic. The main driver behind this conviction is the actual beliefs of Ahmadinejad and his hardcore supporters. With backgrounds in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (the IRGC, the Islamic Republic's large and competent ideological army), Ahmadinejad and his supporters believe the Islamic Republic is unconquerable; with its ability to project power well beyond its actual size and resources rooted in its "undeterrable" nature.

It is very important to understand the origins and intricacies of this mindset. People like Ahmadinejad and Kachouyan developed their political consciousness not on the turbulent streets of the Iranian revolution but in the revolutionary decade of the 1980s, and especially in the front lines of the Iran-Iraq War. The belief that Iran faced much of the Western and Eastern worlds during the war is widely shared in the population, but it is especially intense in the networks linked to the second-generation revolutionaries.

From their perspective, the Islamic Republic ensured its long-term stability by facing much of the world with modest means and with iron will as its only real strategic asset (against an enemy that enjoyed the unqualified support of much of the Arab and Western worlds). They believe that the culture of sacrifice born out of eight years of war, and the unique nationalist-Islamic political heritage it has spawned, will ensure the survival of the Islamic Republic against all odds.

Furthermore, the very distinct features of the Islamic Republic (a political system that effortlessly combines democratic and theocratic ideas and institutions) and the intense loyalty it inspires among a substantial section of the Iranian population (as well as a considerable number of non-Iranians) enables the regime to face its only serious security threat, namely the United States.

This belief in the "undeterrable" nature of the Islamic Republic in turn influences Iranian psychological warfare against the United States.

While Iranian diplomats do their best to ease tension and neutralize US saber-rattling, the IRGC is busy conducting war games in 16 of the country's provinces. These latest military maneuvers follow numerous others during which the IRGC showcases new indigenous weaponry and boasts of its impressive missile capabilities.

Moreover, the Revolutionary Guards have unveiled a new pilotless drone that they claim can be used to crash into US warships in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, the IRGC claims that it recently managed to place its standard (logo) on the side of a US warship in the Gulf. [3]

These activities were reinforced by the latest warning from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Republic's spiritual leader, that in the event of US aggression, Iran would target US interests throughout the world. This is not an empty threat. While the Americans are not overly concerned about Iran's conventional military capabilities (which are modest, IRGC boasting and ceaseless maneuvers notwithstanding), they cannot so easily dismiss the capabilities of the Islamic Republic's intelligence services and special forces, which are widely believed to be among the best in the world.

The Quds Force

But are Ahmadinejad loyalists correct in their assumption that US saber-rattling does not go beyond psychological warfare?

Two developments in particular shed some light on this issue. The first is recent US allegations that elements of the Quds Force (the ultra-secretive special-operations arm of the IRGC) has been providing specialized technology - namely explosively formed penetrators or EFPs - to Shi'ite militias and insurgents in Iraq.

While an exhaustive analysis of the US claims is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to point out that the allegations relating specifically to the technology have been met by widespread skepticism. Even before the allegations were made public, an article in Jane's Intelligence Review last month by Michael Knights, chief of analysis for the Olive Group, a private security-consulting firm, reported that British military intelligence had uncovered an entirely Iraqi network that arranged for the purchase and delivery of imported EFPs. Apparently this network was centered in the heart of the Basra Police, and included members of the Police Intelligence Unit, the Internal Affairs Directorate and the Major Crimes Unit. [4]

Moreover, the central contention of the original US allegations - namely that the highest levels of the Iranian government were complicit in the killing of American soldiers - was so controversial that the US administration had to backtrack immediately, claiming that it was "not sure" if the Tehran government was involved. This position is ludicrous given the status of the Quds Force, a highly disciplined unit within the IRGC, which is in turn tightly controlled by the highest levels of the Islamic regime.

Established in the early 1980s, and known inside the IRGC as the "2nd Quds Corps", the Quds Force is in charge of extraterritorial special operations. It has operated in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sudan. In the early to mid-1990s, the Quds Force was in charge of a large-scale operation supplying arms and training to the Bosnian Muslims. Interestingly, this operation had the tacit approval of US officials who only moved against the Quds Force in Bosnia once the Dayton Peace Agreement had been signed in late November 1995.

In post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, the Quds Force - alongside other Iranian intelligence agencies - is active in widening and deepening Iranian influence, especially inside the new Iraqi security structures. It is highly unlikely that the Quds Force would directly counter US power in Iraq, for this would not only endanger its operations (much of which the Americans have tolerated) but would also violate the core principles of Iranian policy in Iraq, which is to avoid confrontation with the United States.

Seen in this context, the recent US operations against Iranian interests (namely the assault on Abdul Aziz al-Hakim's compound in late December and the raid on the Iranian Consulate in Irbil in early January) reinforce wider US psychological warfare against Iran and are designed to force its leadership to rethink some of its policies in the Middle East and compromise on the nuclear issue.

Saudi Arabia: Old pawn or new kingmaker?

In recent months, Saudi Arabia has shifted from its long-established role as a low-profile, behind-the-scenes regional player to pursue a more active foreign policy. This has been particularly evident in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.

In Lebanon, the Saudis have played a major role in easing tensions between the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and the Saad Hariri camp on one side and the Hezbollah-led opposition on the other. The Saudis have only been successful because of Iranian cooperation. Both sides thrashed out a deal during Ali Larijani's recent visit to Riyadh. Apparently Larijani - the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council (and the country's chief nuclear negotiator) - had submitted a letter to King Abdullah that was signed by both Ahmadinejad and Khamenei. The letter stated Iran's willingness to work with Saudi Arabia to reduce sectarian and political tensions in the Middle East.

In the case of Palestine, the Saudis have almost single-handedly brokered a truce between warring Hamas and Fatah factions and engineered the creation of a national-unity government. While Iran cannot be happy about this Saudi success, apparently the Iranians were confident enough that the Saudis would be unable to displace Iranian influence over Hamas that they did nothing to undermine the deal.

While Iranian-Saudi relations have been steadily improving since the early 1990s, this level of cooperation (especially in the treacherous political landscape of Lebanon - where the two countries pursue very different objectives) is unprecedented. The key question is, why are the Iranians appeasing the House of Saud?

Iranian perceptions about the House of Saud are not very favorable. While the Iranian diplomatic community regards the Saudis as "enablers" of US foreign policy in the Muslim world, the hardline supporters of the Islamic Revolution go much further and regard the historical function of the House of Saud as pawns of the Western powers. They served the British during the heyday of their empire and now serve the Americans, so the argument goes.
These hardliners tend to stay loyal to the late ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's famous statement that "we may reach peace with Saddam but we will never accept peace with al-Saud", even if they have not done much to undermine Iranian-Saudi detente.

It is entirely possible that Iranian cooperation with the Saudis over the political standoff in Lebanon and (to a much lesser extent) the deal that has ended the bloody factional strife between Hamas and Fatah (at least for the time being) is informed by the view that these latest Saudi maneuvers stem not so much from creative Saudi initiatives but pressure from Washington. And this US pressure can only be understood in the wider context of intense US psychological warfare against Iran, so the policymakers in Tehran may argue.

If this is indeed the case, then the Iranians have badly miscalculated. All evidence suggests that the Saudis have decided on a more proactive foreign policy largely because of Iran's growing role in the region. Far from neutralizing US intrigues, by engaging more closely with the Saudis the Iranians are in fact bolstering the position of their only serious regional rival.

The Iranian diplomatic community has long believed in the value of engagement with Saudi Arabia, arguing that the ejection of US forces from the region can only come about as a result of deep and wide-ranging Iranian-Saudi understanding. This view was articulated to the author by Dr Pirouz Mojtahedzadeh in an interview with Saudi Debate. [5] However, the wider Iranian policymaking community (in particular Ahmadinejad loyalists) believe in keeping the Saudis at arm's length hoping that America's weakening position will in turn weaken the Saudis.

It is interesting that Ahmadinejad loyalists have not protested about the recent Iranian overtures to the House of Saud. In this respect they may be taking the psychological-warfare argument too far, thereby neglecting wider regional realities. After all, not every major development in the Middle East revolves around the United States. By drawing too close to the Saudis, Iran may be undermining its traditional allies, in particular Syria, whose president has just paid a visit to Tehran partly because of concerns over the recent Iranian-Saudi "deal", which undercuts Syria's position in Lebanon.

In the final analysis, as the Iranians counter intense US psychological warfare, they run the risk of misinterpreting wider regional developments. These may prove costly in the long term, especially in regards to the balance of Iranian and Saudi influence in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. While the House of Saud enjoys the backing of the United States and has impressive resources, it - unlike the Islamic Republic - suffers from a major legitimacy deficit. Iranian policymakers ought to beware of this and plan their long-term approach to this declining monarchy accordingly.

Notes
1. "Jangeh ravaniye doshman va marooub shodaneh barkhi maghamat" (The psychological warfare of the enemy and the surrender of certain officials), Dr Hossein Kachouyan, Raja News.
2. "Piyadeh nezamhaye janageh ravaniye Bush dar Iran" (Bush's psychological-warfare foot soldiers in Iran), Qasim Ravanbakhsh, Raja News
3. Raja News.
4. "US's smoking gun on Iran misfires", Gareth Porter, Asia Times Online.
5. "Iran-Saudi strengthen ties despite US plot to sow division", Pirouz Mojtahedzadeh, interviewed by Mahan Abedin, Saudi Debate.