On 8 July 1996 the International Court of Justice (ICJ), or World Court, gave its Advisory Opinion on what international law said about the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Its main findings were:

1. The threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally contrary to international humanitarian law. (Opinion, para 105D) There are no international agreements banning them specifically as nuclear weapons. However, the Court confirmed unanimously that their threat or use, just like other weapons, must comply with international humanitarian law and be judged according to their effects and the circumstances of their use. (Opinion, para 86, 105, 2D). Weapons which could not distinguish between civilian and military targets, would be unlawful. The Court said that "the use of such weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with respect for such requirements". (Opinion para 95)

2. To threaten anything illegal is itself illegal. (Opinion, para 47)

3. The Court could not decide whether threat or use of nuclear weapons by a state would be lawful if its "very survival would be at stake" (Opinion para 97) because it did not have sufficient detailed information about nuclear weapons (Opinion par 95) but: according to the President of the Court, this "cannot in any way be interpreted as a half-open door to the recognition of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons". (Judge Bedjaoui, Separate Statement, para 11)

   the Court could find no circumstance for the legal use of nuclear weapons (Opinion, para 94)

4. The Court unanimously decided that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control". (Opinion, para 105 F).

The ICJ is the United Nations Court. It can give Advisory Opinions on questions from a UN agency, such as the General Assembly. The Court cannot force compliance with its Opinions; but it does confirm what international law actually is with the highest possible authority.

Advisory Opinions are only given after careful consideration by the Court's 15 judges. In this case, 43 states, a record number (including all the Nuclear-Weapon States except China) made written statements and 22 made oral statements.

HUMANITARIAN LAW

• Avoiding and, in any case, minimising civilian deaths in war (Declaration of St Petersburg 1868)
• Not causing unnecessary suffering
• Fully respecting neutral states
• Using only weapons which can discriminate between military targets and the civilian population
• Applying the law to new weapons (De Martens Clause & Hague Conventions 1907)
• Personal responsibility of individuals (even heads of state) for crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (Nuremberg Principles 1946)
• Prohibition of genocide (Genocide Convention 1948)
• Right to life and health (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948)
• Protection of the wounded, sick and infirm, pregnant women, civilian hospitals and health workers (Geneva Conventions 1949)
• Non-nuclear states which have signed must not be attacked with nuclear weapons (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1968)
• Prohibition of widespread long-term and severe damage to the environment
• Armed forces must obey international law (1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions 1978)

TRIDENT AND THE LAW

Britain is one of the five states with nuclear weapon systems. It currently has just one way of delivering nuclear weapons - TRIDENT. The UK has 4 Trident nuclear-powered submarines. One submarine can carry 16 Trident II D-5 missiles, each with eight warheads. Normally, only one submarine is deployed at sea with its missiles. Since the July 1998 Strategic Defence Review the single deployed submarine carries 16 missiles with three warheads of 100 kilotons each - eight times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb. However, the missiles have been de-targeted and are now on several days notice to fire Trident has replaced the Polaris system. There were four Polaris submarines each with 32 warheads. Trident warheads are less powerful but much more accurate. Also, because each warhead can be aimed at different targets a Trident submarine with 48 warheads can strike one third more targets more destructively than a Polaris submarine could.

The whole Trident fleet has the destructive power of 1200 Hiroshimas.

One submarine could destroy every capital in the world.

There are two ways in which Trident could be used:

Strategic Trident.
This means the use of a submarine's full load of 100 kiloton warheads in a strike on the centres of power and/or population in an enemy country. With a population density of 5,000 per square kilometre, a realistic figure for most cities, the number of immediate deaths for each warhead would be 127,500 with 472,000 injuries.

Sub-Strategic or "Tactical" Trident.
The Strategic Defence Review states: "The credibility of deterrence also depends on retaining an option for a limited strike that would not automatically lead to a full scale nuclear exchange". This means the use of a single Trident missile carrying one lower yield warhead "to send an aggressor a political message of the Alliance's (NATO's) resolve to defend itself" (Ministry of Defence Letter 27 October 1998). The US, UK and France have plans to threaten to use low-yield nuclear weapons against even non-nuclear "rogue" regimes in reprisal for attacks using chemical or biological weapons against their "vital interests" anywhere in the world.

MATCHING TRIDENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW

A Foreign Office letter dated 29 May 1997 said: "... the Government is confident that the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons does not require a change in the United Kingdom's or NATO'S nuclear deterrence policy. We would only ever consider the use of nuclear weapons in self defence, which includes the defence of our NATO allies, and in extreme circumstances."

Another letter dated 18 May 1999 said: " ... the actual use of nuclear weapons is extremely unlikely. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces is political: to preserve peace and to prevent coercion by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression".