Thus, according to the NAM group:

"The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty remain alarmed by the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons. They are convinced that disarmament and arms control, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of dangers of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security, as well as for the economic and social advancement of all peoples."

And:

"28. The States parties reaffirm that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. Halting and reversing the nuclear arms race in all its aspects is essential in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the task of achieving nuclear disarmament, all States parties bear responsibility, in particular those nuclear-weapon States possessing the most important nuclear arsenals. The States parties remain alarmed by the threat posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of dangers of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security, as well as for the economic and social advancement of all peoples."

The Algerians, identifying themselves with the NAM group, stated that: "La prolifération est une menace à la paix et à la sécurité internationales. En revanche, la possession d'armes de destruction massive est une menace réelle et permanente pour l'existence même de l'humanité." (Proliferation is a threat to peace and international security. The proliferation of weapons off mass destruction is a real and permanent danger to the very existence of humanity).

While the Philippines noted that: "All these developments and challenges contribute to the erosion of the effectiveness and credibility of the treaty and could change the destiny of humanity"

According to Nigeria:

"2. The Conference notes with regret that weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, continue to pose the greatest danger to mankind and the survival of human civilization, more than 15 years after the end of Cold War. The need to implement nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures, therefore, continues to be a major challenge in the maintenance of international peace and security."

The Holy See noted that: "Nuclear weapons assault life on the planet, they assault the planet itself, and in so doing they assault the process of the continuing development of the planet. The preservation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty demands an unequivocal commitment to genuine nuclear disarmament."

The final declaration of the Conference of Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones, held in Tlatelolco Mexico immediately prior to the NOT Review, and representing some 110 nations,  stated in its opening paragraphs, submitted to the NPT Review Conference as a 'Note Verbale': "Convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to the survival of humanity and that the only real guarantee against their use or threat of use is their total elimination as a way to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world;S"

The Nuclear Weapons Free Zones conference final declatation continued:

"1. We reaffirm that the continued existence of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to all humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for life on Earth. Therefore, we believe in the need to move toward the priority objective of nuclear disarmament and to achieve the total elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons.

2. We are convinced that reaching the objective of permanently eliminating and prohibiting nuclear weapons requires firm political will from all States, particularly those States that possess nuclear weapons."

A declaration signed by 110 governments doesn't get much more blunt than this, completely unreported in Australian media.

According to Iran: "Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization".

And:

"Today our world remains more than ever alarmed by the threat posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and is convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of the dangers of nuclear war."   (Are these the statements of a country that is in fact about to acquire nuclear weapons?)

The sense of urgency  even made it as far as the draft report of the Chairman of  Subsidiary Body 1, which stated that: "The conference remains alarmed by the continued threat to humanity posed by the existence of nuclear weapons , reaffirms the need to make every effort  to avert the danger to all mankind of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism  and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples"

Some Progress? - What Progress?

It is true that some progress has been made from the insane heights of overkill possessed by the US and Russia back in the 1980s, when each side had roughly 30,000 warheads each, (currently there is just under 30,000 warheads total) . An accidental launch such as nearly took place in Russia in September 1983 would have lobbed 15,000 land- based ICBM warheads at the US and its allies, roughly 30 times the megatonage required to destroy every significant US and NATO city. The SALT and START agreements of the 1980s have chipped away at that monstrous capacity, so that now each of the two largest nuclear powers have just about 2000 warheads on LoW status, and under the Moscow Treaty, the plan is to go down to just 2,200-1700 'operational' warheads by midnight, Dec 31, 2012.  However, there is no obligation to destroy warheads under the Moscow Treaty, no verification mechanism, and the treaty itself ceases to exist at midnight 2012. As the detailed START framework is already being phased out, as of a second past midnight 2012, there will be NO framework limiting US and Russian nuclear warheads.

In addition, both Russia and the US are making it clear in various ways that they do in fact intend to go on relying on nuclear weapons as an important component in their security policies for the foreseeable future. Though the US Congress has thankfully nixed funding for the proposed 'bunker buster' warhead, US nuclear policies continue to foresee continued warhead development, and continued upgrades for existing warheads, and are clear that there is a continuing role for strategic warheads, even at reduced numbers. Russia has embarked on a program to develop manoeuvrable hypersonic warhead delivery systems and is deploying the relatively new Topol-m missile in both silo-based and mobile truck-mounted modes. In addition, Russia has developed since 1993, the 'perimeter' or 'dead- hand' 'doomsday machine', a mechanism to ensure the incineration of the US (or any other potential enemy), should the Kremlin be destroyed.

In this context, as well as that of the rejection by the US of both the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, (CTBT) which would forbid further nuclear weapons testing, and its rejection also of a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), which would forbid the creation of weapons material, the signs coming out of the nuclear weapons states are equivalent to a parent with a fag in its mouth waving a pack of cigarettes and lecturing about the evils of smoking - even if it has gone from ten packs a day to five.

The Year 2000 Review

The Year 2000 NPT review produced a final declaration, (though it nearly failed - still it did manage to do so) - that contained a 'roadmap' to the elimination of nuclear weapons known as the '13 points'.

Without listing them in their entirety, these included:

• The importance and urgency of signatures and ratification's for the CTBT
• A verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT)
• An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapons states to accomplish the elimination of their nuclear arsenals
• Further reductions in the arsenals of the NWS
• Reductions in the operating status of nuclear weapons
• Diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.

It cannot be overemphasised just how important the passage of this final document was seen as, by the nations and peoples of the world. Here was a sensible, rational, blueprint for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Here was a way forward which, if truly implemented, would lead the world away from the possibility of an accidental (or otherwise) apocalypse.

That is not the way it has turned out.

The US, at the two preparatory conferences leading up to the May2-27 NPT review conference, made it quite clear that it wanted in effect, to repudiate the entire final declaration of the Year 2000 review conference.

In that sense, one can almost say that the year 2005 review conference may have been 'doomed' from the start.  Still, flexibility and a cooperative approach by all concerned might possibly have allowed a conclusion to be arrived at.

There were in fact a number of possibilities open when the NPT review conference opened in 2 May 2005, with the speech from secretary - general Kofi Annan that made it very clear just how urgent, and how potentially catastrophic the situation was and is, with a graphic 'what if' of a terrorist attack on a single city.

Significantly, Annan urged that nuclear weapons operating status be lowered, the single action that would do most to protect the world from an accidental apocalypse, and a prominent recommendation of the High-Level Panel on Challenges and Change, as well as the centre of a global appeal signed by 44 Nobel prize-winners, and endorsed by the Australian Senate  and coordinated by this author.

However in spite of Annans (and El Baradei's ) warnings at the outset of the conference, and in spite of a number of excellent presentations from the New Zealand government, members of the New Agenda Coalition, and Malaysia on behalf of the Non-Aligned movement, the NPT review failed even to agree on an agenda for the first fifteen days that it sat.

While desperate negotiations took place behind the scenes over the matter of the agenda, country after country got up and made a statement to the 'general debate' Some of these statements were soporific, some apocalyptic and some were helpful.

What is notable to someone who has gone through all of these statements is that - notwithstanding the ritualistic aspect of so many of these statements - most of them exhibited a high degree of goodwill, a strong wish that the conference be successful, a sense of urgency, and often, excellent ideas for a way forward that if implemented, would indeed have led to a nuclear free world.

There were a number of approaches put by nations and groups of nations that were helpful, thoughtful, detailed, and deserved to succeed.

Of these, the main ones were the approach of the New Agenda Coalition, as expressed in the working papers of New Zealand especially to Main Committee 1, that of the Non- Aligned movement, (marred in my view by its insistence on the 'peaceful l use' of nuclear energy and by a perhaps little too one- sided obsession with Israel) (Certainly an issue to be sure), and the approach of Australia and Japan, expressed in the Joint Australia-Japan working paper and in the 21 points put by Japan in its opening statement.

Helpful contributions were also made by the EU,  Sweden, South Africa, Canada, Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as by some of the francophone countries.

The Australian ministerial statement, as it had been in previous preparatory and review conferences, was, in the soporific category. Its good points were placed in such a manner as to attract the minimum of attention.

While Australia's contributions to the main committees further on in the conference were significant, and Australia the joint Australia/Japan working paper was certainly in the 'helpful' category, the Downer speech did not give the call for leadership and for helpfulness on the part of the US, that the hour called for. Australia needs to be  much more forthright with its great and powerful allies when those great and powerful allies behaviour is less helpful to the rest of the world than it should be.

Significant points of the Australia/Japan paper were:

• Universalisation of the NPT, including a plea  to states not to take actions that would defeat the aims and objects of the treaty.  
• "In accordance with article VI of the Treaty and pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives" and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Conference agrees that all States parties should take further practical measures towards the goal of nuclear disarmament."  
• Transparent and irreversible reductions in nuclear armaments by the NWS  
• Reductions in operating status of nuclear weapons systems  
• A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies  
• Early entry into force of the CTBT  
• Negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty. (FMCT)

Australia's and Japans insistence on the CTBT, and on real measures to proceed toward the elimination of nuclear weapons even if in an unspectacular way clearly differentiated it from the US in spite of Downers and the departments efforts to make it look as if there were not a gap, and to blame the Iranians.

Recent statements by Australian UN representative Peter Tesch that the UN nuclear disarmament agenda is overly emphasising nuclear disarmament have in my view, undermined the constructive approach  of the Australia/Japan working paper. A balanced approach that prioritises both disarmament and non-proliferation is essential. The NAC and NAM also offered productive ways forward.

NAM

The NAM offering made by Malaysia, in fact had much in common with NAC and with the Australia/Japan approach. Much would be gained if the three main 'helpful' parties (Australia/Japan, NAC and NAM) plus the EU, had managed to cooperate more closely with each other instead of, as has happened time after time, not supporting each others often highly complimentary and not at all mutually exclusive approaches to this utterly vital problem.

That said, I must repeat the caveat that in my view, the NAM approach is far too friendly to the failed and dangerous technology of nuclear energy.

Helpful aspects of the NAM approach included:

• Universalisation  and early ratification of the CTBT
• The need for the nuclear weapons states to fully comply with their article VI obligations including the 13 practical steps as agreed in 2000 and 1995
• Full implementation of the Year 2000 NPT review conference decision to accomplish the total and unequivocal elimination of nuclear arsenals
• Compliance with the 1996 ICJ advisory decision on the legality of nuclear weapons
• A fissile material cut-off treaty (Not named as such)
• Establishment of nuclear weapons free zones throughout the world
• Universalisation of the NPT
• Resolution of all issues relating to the withdrawal of the DPRK from the NPT.

In addition to all this, much prominence was given to the issue of Israel. While there is no doubt that the existence of the Israeli nuclear arsenal is a real issue, and that in making so much of the purported Iranian nuclear arsenal while ignoring that of Israel, of whose existence there is really no doubt, and whose size is somewhere between 100 and 300 warheads - as large as that of the UK and larger than some estimates of the Chinese arsenal - the US is displaying a monstrous double standard. Still, the NAM focus on Israel (the Israel material takes roughly 30% of the NAM paper, but Israel has less than 1% of the worlds nuclear weapons) - seems as disproportionate as the US protection of that country. Neither obsession is helpful or healthy.

Nonetheless, NAMs  advocacy of the universalisation of both CTBT and NPT, of progress and implementation of the 13 points, and of an FMCT give it much common ground with Australia/Japan, NAC, and the EU.

The other very helpful working paper submitted by NAM (Malaysia, Timor-Leste, Yemen, Costa-Rica, Bolivia and Nicaragua), was entitled

"Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: Legal, technical and political elements required for the establishment and maintenance of a nuclear weapon-free world"

This paper, written in a more discursive style, was of a much wider appeal than the NAM paper itself, seeming to bridge the NAM/NAC divide. It was as its title suggested, a follow-up to the 1996 ICJ advisory decision, that again, reiterated the 13 steps and set out a path to a nuclear - free future via a nuclear weapons convention.

NAC

The New Agenda approach again, in many ways overlapped with the AST/Japan, and NAM approaches.

Significant elements were:

• India, Pakistan and Israel to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.
• Early entry into force of the CTBT
• Reactivation of the CD (Conference on Disarmament) in Geneva.
• Removal of the role of nuclear weapons in military and security
  doctrines in the NWS.
• Concrete agreed measures to reduce the operational status of
  nuclear weapons systems.
• Reductions on nuclear weapons systems (EG under the Moscow Treaty) to be irreversible, transparent, and verifiable (which the Moscow Treaty does not provide for).
• Elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

The New Agenda paper, which in previous years has been detailed and comprehensive, was surprisingly spare in comparison with the detailed NAM paper, suggesting that a much more 'minimalist' approach had been adopted, an approach that it had in common with the Australia/Japan approach.  It was noteworthy to see the renewed attention given in the NAC paper however, to nuclear weapons operating status.

The EU

To some extent, the role previously taken by the NAC has been taken by the EU, though the consensus position of the EU is much less clearly defined than that of either NAC, NAM, or for that matter Aust/Japan.

The EU approach included:

• That the NPT is an 'irreplaceable multilateral instrument' for
  maintaining and reinforcing peace, stability and security.
• Nothing should endanger the integrity of the NPT.
• The EU attaches the utmost importance to the universal application of the NPT.
• The EU notes with concern that 106 nations still have not put into force the additional protocol to the NPT.
• The EU notes with appreciation the confidence - building measures between India and Pakistan.
• The EU notes the recommendation of the UN High Level Panel on nuclear weapons operating status and urges practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.
• The EU encourages all states to participate in the proliferation
  security initiative.
• The EU 'welcomes' the entry into force of the Moscow treaty, (But notes that irreversibility, transparency and verifiability - none of which describe the Moscow Treaty -  are vital).
• The EU remains committed to the 1995 review conferences decision on the middle east.
• The EU attaches the utmost importance to the entry into force of the CTBT at the earliest possible date.
• The negotiation through the CD, of a fissile material cutoff treaty.

China:

Of the nuclear weapons states, China may perhaps be viewed as the most helpful, or perhaps the least unhelpful, though whether Chinas presentations can any more be taken at face value than say, those of Iran - is perhaps open to question by some.

I would argue that - as in the case of Iran - the official statements together with the 'body language' of countries and governments DO count for something.  Surely it is not entirely a smokescreen when China alone of the NWS, tries to set out a path - not a dissimilar path from that pointed to by Australia and the EU in fact - for achieving the elimination of nuclear arsenals.

The US by contrast, unlike China and unlike Iran, (not to mention NAM, NAC the EU, Australia and Canada)  has made NO contribution to a 'path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.'

China's ambassador Zhang Wan expressed Chinas attitude to nuclear weapons thus:

"To take effective measures to promote nuclear disarmament is one of the goals set by NPT. China has always advocated that all
nuclear-weapon states should explicitly commit themselves to destroying nuclear weapons in a complete and  thorough manner; lowering the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy. The two countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should earnestly implement the treaty they have concluded to reduce their nuclear weapons and further reduce their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable and irreversible manner, thus creating a favorable condition for the ultimate, complete and thorough nuclear disarmament."

In its working paper for main committee 1 China  said that:

"5. The goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons should be achieved at an early date and an international legal instrument for this purpose should be concluded, thus realising a world free of nuclear weapons." (A nuclear weapons Convention?)

Familiar elements in the Chinese nuke weapons elimination formula included:

• The early entry into force and ratification of the CTBT. (However, China itself has signed but not yet ratified the CTBT)
• The negotiation of an FMCT in the committee on Disarmament in Geneva
• Resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue via the six - party talks
• Verifiable, irreversible, and legally binding reductions (none of these are satisfied by the Moscow Treaty) - in the nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia.
• Prevention of the weaponisation of, and of an arms race in, outer space.
• Abandonment of the policy of nuclear deterrence.
• Abandonment of the targeting of specific countries in the US Nuclear Posture review
• Abandonment of the development of 'low-yield' nuclear weapons
• Universality of the NPT.

China was understandably critical of many US policies, including the deployment of a 'Star-Wars'  ABM system, and above all of the 'double standard' that the US seemed to hold in asking others to forgo nuclear weapons while  actively resisting having the elimination of its own nuclear arsenal up for discussion, and refusing even to acknowledge commitments in this area that it had already made.

China noted that:

"6. Double standards on nuclear non-proliferation must be discarded. It is essential to ensure the fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory nature of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime."

The NAC, NAM, EU, Chinese, and Aust/Japan approaches have in common the following vital aspects:

• A clear commitment to the total and unequivocal elimination of nuclear arsenals as per Year 2000 and 1995 NPT review conferences.
• The reduction in the operating status of nuclear weapons systems
• Reduction in  the role played by nuclear weapons in security policies
• Universalisation of the NPT
• Universalisation, and early entry into force, of the CTBT
• Negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty.

The United States has agreed to a non-verifiable FMCT, stresses the Proliferation Security Initiative (also prioritized by the EU and Australia but not at all by NAM), and rejected even mention of previous conference commitments, and in particular any reference to the total and unequivocal elimination of its nuclear arsenal or to
the CTBT.

This impasse took the first ten days of the review conference.

The Agenda Deadlock

What constituted the stumbling - block, and held up proceedings for about 10 days,  was  the referencing of the final declarations of the Year 2000 review, and the one country that absolutely refused to countenance that referencing was the United States. And what finally happened was a face-saving compromise and a bit of a backdown by the US, faced, really with opposition from quite literally every other government in the world.

The compromise was provided, as happens in this kind of situation, by an asterisk in the agenda that led to a statement by the conference chairperson Brasilian ambassador Duarte, in which he said that the current conference would take place in the light of decisions arrived at by previous conferences.

That statement read:

Statement by the President in connection with the adoption of the
agenda (item 16) "It is understood that the review will be conducted in the light of the decisions and the resolutions of previous Conferences, and allow for discussion of any issue raised by States Parties."

This statement from President Duarte was immediately supplemented by a statement from Malaysia as spokesperson for the nonaligned movement that read:

"1. The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT welcome the adoption of the Agenda of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. The agenda establishes the framework for conducting the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3 of the Treaty, the decisions and the resolution of previous Conferences, in particular the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the decision of the 2000 Review Conference to adopt by consensus its  Final Document.

2. The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitment to Implement - in good faith - their obligations under the Treaty as well as all the Commitments agreed upon by consensus in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT urge all States Parties to implement their obligations and commitments in the same spirit.

3. The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT also reaffirm their commitment to ensure the successful outcome of this Review Conference.

4. The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT request that this present statement be circulated as an official document of this Review Conference."

In making this statement, Malaysia and the Non Aligned movement had, I believe, expressed the will of the entire conference and indeed of the world as a whole.

There is, I believe an all but universal consensus that for the US (or any other nuclear weapon state) to refuse to abide by, and to turn its back on, agreements arrived at by previous conferences and signed on to by the whole world, is unacceptable. Australia's own attitude was certainly that the hard -won agreements of 1995 and year 2000 were not to be set aside, and that policy was expressed repeatedly in pre - NPT forums, and was I believe, kept to, at the conference itself.

Australia's foreign minister put Australia's stand perhaps a little more gently than he should have, but  he did nonetheless put it, saying that:

"Australia believes that progress on nuclear disarmament is a core NPT obligation, vital to the treaty's political strength and vitality. We acknowledge progress in reducing nuclear arsenals but expect further steps by the nuclear weapon states."

While according to Australia's ambassador Mike Smith in our paper to Main Committee-1

"We expect the nuclear weapons states to pursue NPT nuclear disarmament commitments vigorously and with determination",

However, Downer continued by saying that Australia did not accept that progress on Non-proliferation should be contingent on progress in disarmament by the nuclear weapon states, or that movement on disarmament should be a precondition for improvements to the NPT regime, a stand that is all well and good,  but which needs to recognise the other side of the coin namely that progress on Non-proliferation is going to be difficult or even impossible in the absence of progress on disarmament.

It is often said that there were three nations that 'wrecked' the year 2005 NPT review conference, but really, the supposed 'wrecking' activities of Iran and Egypt, were inconsequential compared to those of the US.

It was the US that consistently opposed any effort to do the one thing necessary to proceed toward nuclear disarmament, namely to implement the decisions of previous NPT review conferences. And without the role of the US, Egypt's insistence on paying attention to the nuclear arsenal of Israel would not have caused a problem, as the asked - for attention would have BEEN paid as it should have been.

Similarly, while Iran may or may not have been duplicitous in its approach to the conference, Iran's bloody-mindedness would not have been able to wreck the conference without US intransigence.

Iran's working papers and statements to the NPT review are not what one might expect from a country about to equip itself with nuclear weapons.

Whereas the DPRK, who clearly are embarked on the nuclear weapons path and whose capabilities have in my view been underplayed, were notable by their absence, and while the contributions of the US were characterised by defensiveness and truculence, Iran made a large number of contributions along lines very similar to those made by the NAM, with whom it wished to be associated. The Iranian statements and papers to be sure, were strongly defensive of Iran's 'peaceful nuclear fuel cycle, something with which I believe most anti nuclear activists would have a distinct problem. However, this was something that Iran, regrettably, shared with both the NAC and NAM groupings.

Still, I cannot help wondering if this passionate denunciation of nuclear weapons is 'protesting too much', and thus a smokescreen, or, possibly, exactly what it seems to be - a denunciation of nuclear weapons:

"4. The Islamic Republic of Iran has fulfilled its obligations under all provisions of the Treaty. Iran's position to denounce the nuclear option, as a matter of principle, and place its peaceful nuclear facilities under the full scope-safeguards agreement is a clear manifestation of our commitment to a strong Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Iran considers the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, illegal and against its very basic principles. They have no place in Iran's
defence doctrine, not only because of our commitment to our contractual obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but in fact because of a sober strategic calculation. They do not add to Iran's security nor do they help rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction, which is in Iran's supreme interests."

While Iran spent much time and space in its presentation denouncing the US (who in turn spent much time and space denouncing Iran), it has to be said that many of Iran's criticisms of the US were basically true, and would have been shared by many at that conference.

At the same time, the Iranian suggestions for a way forward to a nuclear - free world could, coming from any other country, be viewed as helpful and constructive.

Why, in that case, might they not be viewed as helpful and constructive coming from Iran?

US statements and working papers at the conference and in Main Committee1 consistently emphasise the sins of countries other than the US (especially Iran) (Mirroring in this way the contributions of Iran), while denying that there are any real Article VI issues, a denial that did much to compound the determination of other nations not to allow those very issues to be stricken from the record.

The result was that, while the conference was finally able to proceed to a committee stage, in which it broke into three 'main committees', which in turn were supposed to bring recommendations to a drafting committee which was to produce a final declaration, progress in each of the committees came to a full stop, stopped dead by first of all, the refusal of the US to agree to any reference to either the 13 points, to a commitment to the total and unequivocal elimination of nuclear arsenals, or to the CTBT or to a verifiable FMCT.

In spite of this fact, a number of draft papers produced by the chairs of Main Committee-1, and Subsidiary Body one nonetheless contained measures that, were they ever to be implemented, would have resulted in a nuclear-weapons-free world.

So was it a complete disaster?

It could have been worse. Far worse than the complete failure to agree on anything would have been an actual agreement to a final declaration that would have gone backwards on the existing final declarations of 1995 and 2000.

This did not happen.

Those final declarations still stand, and the nations of the world continue to be committed to the total and unequivocal elimination of the worlds nuclear arsenals.  A final declaration that did NOT have that prominently referenced would be worse than no final declaration at all.

Could we have hoped for better?

Yes we could, but commonsense has not prevailed. But a better outcome would, again, have depended on a more cooperative and less bloody-minded attitude on the part of the US. It was said (by a US newspaper) that, while John Bolton was never there at the UN, his spirit in fact, pervaded the entire US performance.  We could possibly, have arrived at an agreement that in return for backing US counter proliferation goals - goals that are after all shared by most nations - we got Article VI progress, maybe on, say, operating status. It did not happen.

Finally, a vast number of working papers, by nations and groups of nations, were created for the NPT review conference. Some were clearly written months prior to the conference, some on the spot. Many of these including the New Agenda paper, the Non Aligned movement paper from Malaysia and Timor Leste, and the Japan-Australia working paper, were thoughtful and genuinely helpful contributions to a way forward to a nuclear - weapons- free world.

Operating status of nuclear weapons was mentioned more prominently than previously  as an issue, and lowered operating status was an important priority in presentations from the Secretary - General, Australia, New Zealand (on behalf of New Agenda)  Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Sweden, and made it into the draft of the paper from subsidiary body 1 on article VI.

It was also strongly supported from outside the NPT review in a declaration signed by 44 Nobel prize-winners and a large number of parliamentarians and NGOs, and endorsed by the European Parliament and the Australian Senate, and in press - conferences held apropos of the review by Ted Turner, Gorbachev, and Mc Namara.

What might have been a good outcome?

The Arms Control Association and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, together with a group of retired ambassadors and high officials including Madeleine Albright, Alexei Arbatov, Senator Doug Roche, and Robert Macnamara, produced a statement immediately before the review conference in which they set out criteria for a successful conference.

These criteria included:

"1.Agree to establish more effective controls on technologies that can be used to produce materials for nuclear weapons.

2.Expand the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect and monitor compliance with non-proliferation rules and standards through existing authority and the Additional Protocol, to which all states should adhere.

3.Conduct vigorous diplomacy to halt uranium-enrichment and other
sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities in Iran and dismantle North Korea's  nuclear weapons Capacity, as well as diplomacy designed to address the underlying regional security problems in Northeast Asia, South Asia, and  the Middle East, which would facilitate non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in those regions.

4.Accelerate implementation of the nuclear-weapon states' disarmament obligations and commitments, including further reducing the alert status and size of their nuclear stockpiles, permanently barring nuclear test explosions and the production of fissile materials for weapons, refraining from development of new nuclear weapons, and reaffirming existing assurances to NPT non-nuclear-weapon states that they will not be subjected to nuclear attack. These steps would reduce the risk of nuclear war and the allure of nuclear weapons.

5.Secure all nuclear-weapons-usable material to the highest standards to prevent access by terrorists or other states by expanding programs to secure and eliminate these materials, halting the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian reactors, and strengthening national and international export controls and material security measures as required by UN Resolution 1540.

6.Clarify that no state may withdraw from the treaty and escape responsibility for prior violations of the treaty or retain access to controlled materials and equipment acquired for "peaceful purposes."

".....The success of the conference should be judged by the ability of the parties to agree on specific, additional steps that will strengthen the treaty regime. The security of the international community demands no less."

Had the conference agreed to do these things, or even to do some of these things, it would have achieved a real advance on the 13 points of 2005 and truly fulfilled its mandate as a review conference. This would have, truly, been success or at least progress. None of this happened.

Strangely, a mysterious paper that was circulated in NGO and diplomatic circles and reported by Rebecca Johnston, also may have been an attempt at a way forward that would have been productive.

This mysterious draft final declaration managed to contain in itself
passages such as:

"1.3 recall the commitments to pursue effective measures and make systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI including the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals."

and:

2.2 building upon the decisions taken at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, urge further progress by the nuclear-weapon States in reducing and eliminating their non-strategic and strategic nuclear
arsenals"

and even:

"2.1 recognise the importance of the Moscow Treaty and seek sustained efforts to implement it; The Conference welcomes the adoption by the General Assembly and subsequent opening for signature of the CTBT in New York in September of 1996 and notes that 175 states have signed it and 121 of them have ratified including 33 of the 44 whose ratification are necessary for entry into force have deposited their instruments of ratification. The Conference calls on all states to ratify the treaty, and particularly on those 11 states whose ratifications are necessary for entry into force of the CTBT and to spare no effort to ensure its swift entry into force. The Conference underlines the existing moratorium on nuclear weapons test explosions and any other nuclear explosions must be maintained pending the treaty's entry into force. The Conference stresses that such moratoria cannot serve as a substitute for CTBT ratification."

Could this have been a way forward? its insistence on the ratification of the CTBT, and on the adherence to the total and unequivocal elimination of nuclear arsenals as per the Year 2000 13 points, while highly praiseworthy, would have run up against the rock of US intransigence and thereby lies the rub:

Yes, progress could have been made at this conference.

Progress would have, by definition, consisted of an advance or at bare minimum a reaffirmation, of the program contained in the 13 points.

Less than that is by definition regress not progress.

In the absence of any agreement at this NPT review, at least the 13 points and the decisions of the 1995 and 2000 review conferences still stand.

Yet it was precisely the attempt by the US to overturn those agreements, and the refusal of the rest of the world to accept that overturn, that led the conference into impasse, an impasse that is still preferable to capitulation to demands to go back on the agreements so painfully arrived at in 2000.

Statements made in Closing

As the NPT review conference closed without a result, a large number of delegations made statements including that of Iran, Canada, Japan, Malaysia,   and NZ.

Iran's closing statement blamed the US for the failure of the conference, and was not responded to by the US.

The New Zealand one read in part:

Mr President

My delegation is particularly minded at this moment of the words of the United Nations Secretary-General when he addressed us on the opening day of this Conference four very long weeks ago.  Mr Annan said, and I quote: "I firmly believe that our generation can build a world of ever-expanding development, security and human rights. But I am equally aware that such a world could be put irrevocably beyond our reach by a nuclear catastrophe in one of our great cities"

In the circumstances in which this Conference finds itself, that ambition and that dire prospect require our reflection and urgent
collective attention. The disappointment in this hall that the Review Conference has been beset from the outset by unresolved procedural decisions, by issues over the status of agreed outcomes of previous Conferences, and by inefficiencies in the Preparatory process, is palpable.  That our rules of procedure are not being harnessed fully for facilitating our work also needs urgent examination.

Let me turn now briefly to several matters of substance.

Mr President, we are frustrated that no practical and concrete means of addressing our profound proliferation concerns have been developed and agreed by this Conference.

We are frustrated too that our efforts to build on the practical steps on nuclear disarmament agreed by consensus in 2000, and to accelerate their implementation, have reaped comparatively limited return.

In addition, we would have wished to have more to show for addressing our deep concerns about the implications for and consequences of withdrawal from the Treaty.

Mr President, the outcome of this Review Conference needs to be viewed in the context of the broader malaise and paralysis that abounds in multilateral disarmament diplomacy under its various current configurations.  Our Treaty will be undermined unless these circumstances are addressed and rectified.  And civil society must be afforded a greater role.

What we have experienced in the current review process should serve as an urgent wake-up call of the kind to which the UN Secretary-General has drawn our attention.  It must be channelled in particular into re-energising our efforts to get down to work in the Conference on Disarmament."

The Canadians also expressed themselves at the conferences dying gasp:

"Mr President,

Four weeks ago, at the beginning of this Review Conference, Secretary General Kofi Annan reminded us of the historical reality and the still present danger of a nuclear weapon explosion. He recalled the great security benefits that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has bestowed over 35 years, but warned us against complacency in underlining the great stress the Treaty was currently under. I fear that this Review Conference has not risen to the Secretary General's call.

We have let the pursuit of short-term, parochial interests override the collective long-term interest in sustaining this Treaty's authority and integrity. We have seen precious time that might have been devoted to exchanges on substance and the development of common ground squandered by procedural brinkmanship. We have witnessed intransigence from more than one state on pressing issues of the day, coupled with the hubris that demands the priorities of the many be subordinated to the preferences of the few. Our community is weakened by the refusal of the delinquent to be held to account by its peers and by the defection from that community of a state without suffering any sanction. We have been hampered, frankly, by a lack of imagination and will to break with the status quo and adopt new ways of conducting our business.

Despite the scenes these rooms have witnessed over this month, the Review Conference must not be reduced to a theatre where we play at nuclear non-proliferation or disarmament. We cannot afford merely "to suspend disbelief" in enacting the NPT review process or the curtain is soon likely to come down on our production.

If there is a silver lining in the otherwise dark cloud of this Review Conference, it lies in the hope that our leaders and citizens will be so concerned by its failure that they mobilise behind prompt remedial action. In that regard, it is important to realise that what happened here reflects a larger reality. The world is confronting many of the same disarmament and non-proliferation challenges in other fora as well. If we want this Treaty's authority to be sustained, we need to tackle, on an urgent basis, some of these core challenges and resolve them in ways that generate real-world benefits for states and their citizens.

To begin with, the NPT States Parties have to demonstrate support for, and implementation of, political commitments they have undertaken as part of this Treaty's process. To deny or denigrate the agreements of the past is to undermine all the political commitments made in implementation of the Treaty and to cast doubt upon the credibility of engagements entered into by governments. If governments simply ignore or discard commitments whenever they prove inconvenient, we will never be able to build an edifice of international cooperation and confidence in the security realm.

In the field of nuclear disarmament, Canada believes that the re-activation of multilateral activity is a key priority. The impasse at the Conference on Disarmament needs to be overcome in short order, so that crucial NPT-related issues, such as the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, can be advanced. If this proves impossible, we will need to consider taking forward some of its work through other multilateral institutions. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty's entry into force, the top priority of successive Review Conferences, cannot be denied to the international community indefinitely. We will be consulting with other concerned states in preparation for this September's entry-into-force conference to ensure that this powerful instrument to counter horizontal and vertical proliferation is fully activated.

In the realm of nuclear non-proliferation, we will consistently promote the adoption of the IAEA's Comprehensive Safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol as the safeguards standard under the NPT and as a condition of supply. We will lend practical support to strengthening national export controls, especially on proliferation-sensitive technologies, and to international cooperation on ensuring their effectiveness. This will yield an environment conducive to encouraging legitimate nuclear trade among States and putting an end to clandestine supply networks. We will support the development of new multilateral nuclear fuel cycle initiatives that address non-proliferation concerns, while reinforcing the benefits to all states of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Both nationally and as a member of such groupings as the G8, the IAEA and the CD, Canada will endeavour to work with like-minded partners from all regions to come to grips with and overcome the real-world problems and crises that confront the NPT. It is our hope that other States Parties will be similarly motivated by the disappointing showing of this Conference and will join in a collective effort to ensure that we can continue to avoid the apocalyptic fate that the Secretary General reminded us is ever latent in the nuclear threat.

We believe this is a Treaty worth fighting for and we are not prepared to stand idly by while its crucial supports are undermined. To this end, it remains our belief that the health and implementation of the Treaty deserve to be the focus of an authoritative meeting for at least one week each year, empowering States Parties to discuss and decide on matters more frequently than allowed by the current five year cycle.

The issues that have divided us here will need to be addressed by our respective political leaders. One good opportunity to do so collectively will be provided by the UN Summit to be held in the fall. In this respect, it is important to realise that solutions to the problems of disarmament and non-proliferation already exist. What is needed is simply a matter of working harder on concerting the political will to implement them. Rather than looking back on where we have fallen short, we must look ahead to what we can and must accomplish."

The Japanese expressed 'regret' that the conference had not been productive, and said there was more need than ever to strive to strengthen the NPT, foreshadowing their annual UNGA resolution 'A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons', jointly with Australia, and wishing for 'a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons'.

Malaysia also gave a final address on behalf of the NAM group, in which it stated that while questions might be raised over the future of the NPT, the NAM group remained strongly committed to it. However, 'The lack of balance in implementing the provisions of the NPT threatens to unravel the NPT regime. We further maintain the need to universalise the NPT. We continue to believe in the indispensable need to preserve the decisions and resolutions of the 1995 review and extension conference and the final document of the 2000 review conferences..'

What will Happen now?

In the absence of agreements to the contrary at the conference, the positions arrived at in 1995 and 2000 review conferences still stand.

What would have been even more of a catastrophe than the non-result that actually transpired would have been a capitulation to demands to remove or ignore or negate or marginalise the Year 2000 commitments.

In the short term, many of the issues taken up abortively at the NPT review will come up again at the end of the year in UNGA first
committee and in the M+5 summit in September. Perhaps progress can be made on at least some of them, again such as de-alerting/operational status, or FMCT.  Such progress, however modest, would be helpful.

Whether it will be possible to negotiate further strengthening of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and whether it will be possible to achieve anything better than lopsided non-proliferation/counter proliferation only measures that do not help ultimately to progress the world toward the total and unequivocal elimination of nuclear weapons, at  upcoming diplomatic gatherings such as the M+5 summit in September is hard to predict. It is worth trying. My guess is that unless the United States comes with more flexibility than it did  at the NPT review, we will just get a re-run of what took place there with the US essentially thumbing its nose at the world, or we will succeed to agree only agreements that are unbalanced and that do not advance the agenda of elimination of nuclear arsenals so essential for the safety of the world.  A new found cooperativeness by the US would prove me wrong, and I would prefer to be wrong.

In the longer run, absent progress on Article VI issues by the established nuclear powers, it is going to be difficult to persuade countries that they should not proceed down a nuclear path, or at least keep a nuclear option open.

In the event of a DPRK test, or merely the obvious acquisition by the DPRK of an expanded nuclear arsenal (as is happening now), it will be more difficult to persuade the governments of Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan, a 'screwdrivers turn' away from a nuclear capability of their own, that they should not turn that screwdriver.

Ultimately, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a larger group of nations, whether it be the DPRK, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Japan, Taiwan, the RoK, combined with the maintenance of existing arsenals in the US, Russia, China, France, Israel, India and Pakistan - will multiply the probability in any given year, by accident, madness, or malice, a nuclear weapon may actually be used.

And that is terrible news for the entire planet.

If only in order not to end this missive on a completely negative note, I  can only echo the words of former Canadian Senator Doug
Roche and Kofi Annan: 'The approaching summit of the 60th anniversary of the U.N. offers a new opportunity to the 170 world leaders who will attend. If they fail to act, Annan warned after the Conference ended, "their peoples will ask how, in today's world, they could not find common ground in the cause of diminishing the existential threat of nuclear weapons."