31 December 2000
EUROARMY: A THREAT TO WHOM?
by Jacek Boboli, Economist (Lic. State University of Liège - Belgium)

http://web.wanadoo.be/le.hussard.aile/euroarmy.htm

Reading articles published in the USA, I often get the impression that many newspaper writers, even the most serious ones, who are documented and even have an extensive C.V. of residence in Europe, don't really feel for the history of this continent. Is this because they were not taught it at school, or is it simply because they cannot get rid of their American viewpoint when analyzing the European socio-historical situation?

Similarly, there are many Europeans, writers or otherwise, who consider Americans to be just big children who only care about money, which, obviously, is also a great misunderstanding. It is not just because US history is shorter in time that all Americans have to be considered as immature with a "new money" mentality.

After this preamble, it is easier to understand the reason for Alex and myself expressing our respective points of view on the same subjects.

Just a very little (compared to a university book) about recent European history

After the end of the universally disastrous WW-II, a French politician, Robert SCHUMANN, understood the necessity of preventing the repetition of any such experiences.

In the same way as the Americans - with Mr. Marshall at their head - understood it on interventionist socio-economic grounds, so SCHUMANN added a political dimension.

On both sides of the Atlantic Ocean it was understood that the 1919 Versailles Treaty experience following WW I could not be repeated, at least if people didn't want to renew the WW II one, on the way to a WW III. The Versailles Treaty proved to have disastrous consequences on the German economy; consequences that were worsened, more than in any other western country, by the 1929 world-wide crisis. In fact the German economy was now as completely stuck as before. This was the ideal seed and environment for the later Hitler coup, with all of its consequences.

After WW II, it was understood on both sides of the Atlantic that to avoid repeating such a disaster, the prime target had to be the reconstruction of the German economy, and more widely the European one, while avoiding the major social problems linked with unemployment and calming desires for revenge by German ultra sectors by the mean of economic welfare.

The MARSHALL plan was the US contribution to that goal. It was a good incentive for both the US and the European economies, bringing about developments which later come to be known as the Golden Sixties. Both sides of the Atlantic Ocean enjoyed the benefits of that US initiative even if, for humanitarian considerations, it was more urgently needed by Europe, and especially Germany.

The real European merit due to Mr. Robert SCHUMANN is that he went further and deeper into the socio-historical reasons and cures for the eternal European wars; many having lasted for centuries. This was not because he was necessarily cleverer that US politicians, but simply because as a European citizen he was nearer to German feelings, also due to his personal ties, even if he was always a totally fair and honest French citizen - I mean not a traitor at all -, he had that problem as a "gut" feeling.

While the MARSHALL Plan was strictly financial, the ideas of Robert SCHUMANN were more structural from both economic and sociological points of view. He set his mind to the personal aspects of trade: he figured that by suppressing the trade barriers between European states the inter/intra-European trade would be markedly enhanced, and, as a consequence, there would be an acceleration of personal contacts and ties and interdependence between persons of different cultures.

While it might appear to a US citizen that European culture is just one, the reality is that, even today, it definitely is not. For a Belgian citizen it is very easy to tell a Spanish one from a Dutch one, not just because of their respective languages, but, in particular, because of their respective social behavior. This still occurs more than forty years after the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1956, uniting the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, France, Luxembourg and Belgium in a customs union; the first step towards linking the 15 countries forming today's European Union. It should thus be easier, once one has grasped that, to understand how far apart from each other those attitudes and habits were at that time, just after WW II. With the atrocities and hate that had ended just a couple of years earlier still fresh in their memory; when the nations that have now started a common life in the new union were still just bloody enemies.

Nevertheless, Robert Schumann's view went even further. His European dream was not just to create a free exchange zone but also to have common structural policies, from which arose the coal, steel and civilian nuclear policies.

The political aspect of his dream would come later, when he had already been in retirement for a long time.

Nevertheless, he also addressed the strictly military aspects of what a peaceful Union should be. His ideas were that if Europe had a common army, that would also create ties among military establishments thus weakening their aggression towards one another. This would thus provide Europe with greater security from the U.S.S.R. and independence from the U.S.A.

It shouldn't be forgotten that when the U.S.A., following Pearl Harbor, joined the Allies against Hitler, the whole of Europe had been suffering from the war for three full years. If Japan had not attacked the U.S.A. it is very uncertain as to if, and when, the U.S.A. would have intervened.

Suspicions over the total reliability of the U.S.A. in the event of a new conflict were not totally unfounded.

Nevertheless, the 1956 S.E.D. (Société Européenne de Défense - European Society for Defense) was stillborn. Strangely, the country from where the idea started - France - was also responsible for its failure. General De Gaulle, President of France, had taken France out of the NATO Common Command and as a result the headquarters of NATO moved from France to Belgium. Curiously, the General's idea was to promote the greatness and independence of Europe, but more specifically through the greatness of France.

It should be remembered that the core of the Yalta agreements was adopted without France's participation despite the real effort made by the exiled French government and the French resistance/guerilla during the war, without which the war would probably have been much more difficult to win, - indeed, if won at all -, hence De Gaulle's suspicion as to US and English behavior in the event of any crisis.

It should also be remembered that during the period when De Gaulle was in London at the head of France Libre, Churchill tried to eliminate him politically, urging Roosevelt to help him in achieving this goal. Roosevelt was definitely not against the idea and it was the existing military establishment which stopped that movement. Precisely because of the fact that if De Gaulle was eliminated as a political influence, the French maquis (resistance/guerilla) would turn towards Russia and the communists to find support. This was confirmed very recently following the declassification of WW II documents held secret until now, which include correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt.

De Gaulle was definitely not an idiot. These plots, in addition to the bombing and sinking of the French Fleet at Mars-El-Kebir in 1940, while escaping from France to Algiers to be able to go on fighting after the France campaign debacle, - in an outrageous demonstration of Anglo-Saxon defiance towards an Allied Command that had escaped from Petain's collaborationist sphere of influence, or maybe with the simple hope of weakening the French influence among the Allies -, and the closed doors policy against him at the Yalta Conference, could only but fully justify his suspicion of an Anglo-Saxon transatlantic front.

Nevertheless, the English were not members of the European Community at the time: De Gaulle himself had vetoed their entry by then. Why then did he torpedo the S.E.D.? His defiance, at military level might seem exaggerated. It should be remembered that he was the creator of the "war of movement" concept, well before the Germans or the Israelis, and was the only military head during the 1940 France campaign who dared successfully to force the German Armies to retreat even if the troops under his command were not sufficient to change the situation of the whole front.

It might be thought that if De Gaulle hadn't blocked the S.E.D., Europe might have gained its real independence a long time ago, at all levels. Obviously, as with all theories, one cannot change history -, this is only a "maybe".

Nevertheless, De Gaulle's special sensitivity and suspicion of the dominant Anglo-Saxon influence in NATO persuaded him not to confide too much in another form of military alliance where members such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy were fully committed to NATO and which had by then forged very close ties with the Anglo-Saxon front, although not subordinated as was the case of Germany which was partially occupied by the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom -,.

Whether it was positive or not is, in the end, a question that still remains to be solved. From another point of view, we should do him justice and recognize that without his somewhat narrow vision there would be, today, no European aerospace industry, - let us not forget that ARIANE ESPACE is the world's leading aerospace company as far as satellite launch orders are concerned -, practically no European aircraft industry; have we forgotten the first French Caravelle's or the curiously Anglo French Concorde or ignored the fact that last year Airbus Industry signed more firm orders than Boeing. Who has forgotten about the successful use of Mirage fighters by the Israelis and others, or the French anti-ship missiles the Argentinean Air Force successfully used in the Malvinas/Falklands war against the British ? who has forgotten the pioneering French TGV high speed civilian trains? - ,.....and this list is in no way exhaustive, but is indeed the result of De Gaulle's own long-term policy.

Now the fact remains: De Gaulle prevented the S.E.D. from becoming a reality well into the late sixties.

Later, much later, in the nineties, a handful of European countries created a small Eurocorp, including France, Belgium, Germany and a couple of others. Nevertheless its effectiveness was mainly restricted to joint exercises rather than being a real corps intended to carry out common political decisions. The U.K. is not a member of this Eurocorp.

The recently-elected British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, meanwhile represents a strange and new contradictory dual attitude. While maintaining strong UK-USA ties, he seems discretely to be trying to bring his compatriots round to a more European position. Meanwhile, after the Kosovo war, he immediately adopted the Germano-French Euroarmy initiative within the European Union.

This body has, of course, technically, to be independent from NATO, despite the impression to the contrary that some politicians are trying to create, since European Union member countries like Sweden, Finland, Ireland and Austria are quite simply neutral and certainly not members of NATO. Politicians from countries such as Sweden or Austria could hardly win a referendum vote that aimed to renounce their neutrality.

Hence the fact that the only solution in order that they might have real international and acceptable influence, as far as domestic politics are concerned, and not be just a toy in the hands of major powers, is through participation in a wider but strictly European institution. Hence the fact that the Euroarmy could hardly be integrated into NATO, although this doesn't mean that it could not collaborate with NATO.

Here comes the title again: an independent Euroarmy, why not? A threat to whom?

The Russian position

Even if it might seem to many that the Russian Army might be seeking moral revenge for what today seems a reality, - the ineffectiveness of their Army -, it should be obvious to foreign observers that the current everyday prime concern of almost all Russians is just food and living for the next day.

Hence, even if the hard-line elements of the Army could hope for a military enforcement of civil solutions, they would get no support outside the Russian borders, and support from the Russian people would only be limited to the destruction of the mafias that make economic and welfare progress impossible, - the Russian economy (Gross National Product) today, is well below the level it was at when the communist system broke down. Once the mafias have been physically destroyed, - and today one can hardly envisage any non-violent solution to that huge and ultra-violent problem that is far worse than was experienced in the U.S.A. and Italy, at least in the short term -, the Russian army just would not get any further backing from the Russian people.

There exists the feeling in Russia today that the mafias were backed by the U.S.A. themselves in order to prevent Russia from becoming a superpower.

Hence the fact that military action anywhere, when successful, - like in Pristina -, gets the support of the Russian people if it can also make the U.S.A. look ridiculous (there is no doubt that for almost all Russian citizens, NATO and USA are the same word) or demonstrate their powerlessness as in Chechnya,. In fact, it is not so much the support for their army that is important, but the fact that their army provides a lesson for the Americans; those hated Americans who in their eyes after having been their heroes and ideal when communism broke down, are now just villains because of their dominant attitude at international level. A dominant attitude that they are now able to impose worldwide thanks to the submission of Russian society to the mafias which, even if it would never be recognized officially, at the very beginning were probably backed by the American secret services of all kinds, just as occurred with the American Sicilian mafia during WW II prior to landing in Sicily.

It is obvious that no national industry in the world can afford to have 40-60% under the control of the mafia. In any country of the world this would cause bankruptcy of the economy, the society and the state. Hence, once the welfare problems of Russian society have been resolved, - even if they only return to communist-era levels of welfare -, there would be absolutely no support for any authoritarian and/or military action.

If we understand that position, it then becomes evident that a Euroarmy, independent from the NATO, - and hence from the USA -, would certainly not present any problem in the eyes of the Russian people: it would be fully welcomed as proof that Russia is no longer alone in resisting, morally at least, the Nº 1 superpower.

The Russian Army itself would have even less concern over a Euroarmy since it would, strategically, represent much less danger than an American NATO, as is now the case. One could hardly envisage a European military advance into the former Soviet Republics, while the American NATO is everything but discrete on that point.

With an independent partner in Europe, the Russian generals could confide in the possibility of a dialogue that was not in the form of pseudo-diplomatic and unilateral NATO decisions as is now the case and the results of which could never be questioned by the USA, since it is obvious that the European countries have absolute legitimacy to decide their own future.

On the other hand, it would be inconceivable economically speaking, and for a long time to come, that the Russian army would harbor expansionist projects with regard to Western Europe. Without a strong economy this would simply be a ridiculous project. Nor would Russian troops have any motivation to embark upon any such wars since any Russian today, military or civilian, looks to Western Europe as the friendly future and a way to progress.

During the last decade, Western Europe has never been a hero for Russia and hence it is not likely that in the reasonable future it would become a villain to them.

The next target being the restoration of a reasonable welfare system in Russia, once that goal has been achieved, it would be even less likely that relatively well-off Russians would have any inclination to go to war, even less so an aggressive war.

It should be remembered in this respect that communism failed mainly, - apart from corruption due to the capitalist attraction -, through their own best achievement: education. In the long term, it is very hard to impose a dictatorship over educated people.

The end of communism, brought about by the communist educational system, is something I predicted previously in my discussions with persons involved in Polish anticommunist emigration some 15 years ago.

The U.S.A.'s position, as seen from Europe

Here we come to the heart of the problem, as seen in Continental Europe. The problem with a European army is neither with the Russians, nor the Chinese, nor the Senegalese, nor, of course, with most Europeans who see it as the only chance for a truly independent Europe. The only problem regarding the Euroarmy is with the U.S.A.

The generally not so anti-American but rather unconfident and irritated feeling is held more against the USA than against their citizens. It has to be clear that events such as the Kosovo war really don't improve that feeling: the great majority of the citizens of continental NATO members was against the intervention and that majority was neither more nor less than in the non-NATO continental European countries.

It was enough for that initiative to be American to provoke that unpleasant majority opinion against the White House: hence the attitude of that European continental majority was motivated more by anti-American government feeling than by sympathy for the Serbs and antipathy for the Albanians, even if that attitude, objectively, put them on the Serbs' side. Nor does this mean that public opinion would have been favorable to the Albanians, just that it would surely have been quite different.

Ex-President Carter as well as former vice Dan Quayle were two of those Americans that could understand the long-term consequences of US superiority in the minds, not only of the non-friendly nations, but also among the neutral nations, and worst of all, among the population of the supposed allied nations.

It cannot be forgotten, for example, that in the regional elections in Germany held after the Kosovo war that war was responsible for the ecologists losing a lot of votes that went to the ex-communist party.

It must then be clear that for most continental Europeans, the attitude of the US-government towards the Euroarmy appears fundamentally negative. It seems to us Europeans that if the US is not threatening us with sanctions or openly preventing it from being a success, it is just because they fear that that way it would become impossible for most of the "puppet" European politicians (in this case to be understood as puppets in the hands of the US government) to maintain complete integration of their countries in the full structure and command of NATO, or even simply within NATO, with the result that their current aggressive and superior attitude could no longer be maintained to cover the White House originated "right of intervention and intervention itself".

Instead of that, the continental Europeans feel that the US pushed the U.K. into integrating themselves in the new European structure as a form of Trojan horse (of course, de Gaulle would have vetoed any such a participation).

This attitude of the US-government will surely have a boomerang effect sometime in the future: such an attitude cannot be maintained for very long against the will of any population, European or otherwise.

Most of continental Europe's position, front to the USA, front to the U.K. and front to the Euroarmy itself (Poland, Check Republic and Hungary excepted).

It is thus evident that the European continental feeling clearly has to be separated from what our governments say regarding the subject. We therefore have to look at the opinion polls, not at the declarations made by the professional politicians. Just such an example is Javier SOLANA who, before the Spanish Labor party won their first victory at a poll, was demonstrating against NATO, and once he became a minister, ran a campaign in favor of saying "yes" to NATO at a referendum on the subject. The referendum was set up with the conditions that Spain would NEITHER join the Common Command NOR intervene outside the NATO borders,........ the referendum was won with 51% of the votes.

Obviously, then, a Euroarmy cannot but win the favors of the continental European citizens. Their attitude is something like the Russian one: most of them feel humiliated - even if they will never admit to it. The Europeans know their welfare and health systems are better than the US equivalents and that their economy is everything but ridiculous. They also understand that their world influence has nothing to do with the economic level they have attained and this can only generate a feeling of rejection against politicians of all kinds. For example, if we consider the Israeli Arab process, it is clear that, economically, Europe is perfectly able to completely crush the Israeli economy in one week and push Israel into bankruptcy while the USA couldn't do that. Nevertheless, Europe has no part in that process. The fact that for a long time Europe was favorable to a fair solution with the Palestinians was just never taken into account. That option only became a reality when US governments showed their own interest in promoting the same solution.

The Euroarmy, then, in our mentalities represents the possibility of obtaining a true independent personality, - provided it is not blocked by the U.K.-.

Obviously, that alternative makes NATO redundant in its current form (as well as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE). An alternative to it would be a full equal partnership that would be welcomed by most of the Europeans to deal with scenarios outside Europe, but only outside Europe (Russia is not seen as a danger any more, for the reasons mentioned above).

The Euroarmy is hence the basis for real European worldwide recognition politically as it has now achieved economically; and is welcomed as such.

It could mean that European youth starts showing an interest again in military careers, an interest that is declining at the moment, - politicians say it is for reasons of salary, but is it not due to disagreement as to the aims and for whose benefit our armies are used, ... ? Just writing this is an example of the real schism between the nations and their politicians as far as the existing NATO setup is concerned.

Concerning this last point, the declaration by the Spanish Defense Minister, Eduardo SERRA, during the Kosovo war was a good example of what many European politicians understand as democracy: "the Spanish people are crazy when they say that they want NATO to be defeated, this attitude of non-support for what their own army is doing there is totally inadmissible!".

A global view on mankind and universal rights.

The opinion amongst European continental citizens is not that the globalization of the human rights of the mankind should be limited geographically. The polls would never show any desire to limit human rights geographically; and most people think that, of course, Pinochet has to be judged and that his health has absolutely nothing to do with it (did he care for the health of his victims ?). Naturally, this does not mean that the Spanish courts are morally entitled to judge him: maybe, first of all, they should try to win over the support of the Spanish people. For years they have been placed as tenth and last among the Spanish institutions; in their own opinion due to their poor quality, the general friendship preference corruption (as opposed to the financial one), etc,...

Nevertheless the White House's policy at international level ensures that the most generous feelings are just forgotten when the USA are intervening. While a coordinated Kosovo strategy, if presented in a non-dominating way and within the framework of international legality, would surely have been backed by a large majority of continental Europeans, - and probably would never have generated ethnic cleansing and counter-ethnic-cleansing, the way the USA handled it generated a marked increase in continental European anti-US feeling and aligned most of the continental European citizens, militarily speaking, with the Serb army against NATO; even allowing them to forget that they had their own soldiers over there. (That's the boomerang effect within Europe itself). In clear contrast to that, a strong and efficient Euroarmy would allow the anti-USA feeling to disappear and, hence real collaboration between the USA and Europe to develop on an equal basis, with approval from the continental European population itself.

It would thus ensure greater world stability, more globalization of human rights, additional difficulties for dictatorships to remain in power, and finally, more stability and justice worldwide with the inherent consequence that the economies of even the third world countries could be driven more efficiently towards reasonable progress and welfare for the whole of mankind.

The Euroarmy, a real and independent Euroarmy, - independent from NATO and the USA -, is thus the first step to be taken towards such a better future. Only the first step, but an important one.

Further steps should be the integration of many other nations as equal partners once they achieve the global moral aims of respect of individual rights, democracy (a real one, like the Swiss one, where the people really decide and say "no" to their politicians when THEY, the people, decide it and compel them to do what the people want, not what the politicians wish) and minimum standards of welfare, REGARDLESS of the type of socio-economical system those people vote for .... and, finally, once the steps have been completed worldwide, the dream of no army being necessary at all becomes a reality....

Any way you look at it, in the medium or long term every solution other than the Euroarmy will have a boomerang effect against European professional politicians and against the US-government.

Errata

Sorry, the Euroarmy is not the miracle solution to the happiness, liberty and welfare of the world's people. Therefore, maybe we should also resist the limitations to the access of newcomers to the existing markets thru ISO-9000 or other requirements of that sort, and trends in everyday life whereby judges put themselves above a nation's laws thru their own interpretation of these laws and even their creation of "by-laws", etc...

Is this now the start of further discussions? ........


Yorkshire CND