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by Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers
(http://www.clw.org/coalition/dkctbto0400.htm)
Though it is highly unlikely that the Senate will formally reconsider the CTBT in 2000, the debate over U.S. nuclear testing policy and the CTBT is far from over. The October 13, 1999 failure of the Senate to approve the CTBT is a severe blow that sets back-but does not kill-efforts to secure U.S. ratification and the other ratifications necessary for global entry into force of the treaty. As Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) wrote in a press release immediately following the vote: "Treaties never die, even when defeated and returned to the Executive Calendar of the Senate. Therefore, we will have another chance to debate the CTBT." I expect and hope that the next chance for the CTBT will be in 2001.
In the meantime, the Senate will continue to examine and "debate" the CTBT and related policies in an indirect fashion. The president and the Congress will have to continue to deal with test ban-related issues: test ban monitoring, nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship, the future of the U.S. nuclear test moratorium and international non-proliferation challenges. In doing so, it will shape the context in which the treaty will be considered in the future.
Staunch CTBT opponents can be expected to try to compound the effect of rejecting CTBT ratification in a number of ways: by attempting to eliminate U.S. funding for the CTBT's international monitoring system; by disputing the legal basis of the United States' commitment as a signatory to the CTBT not to conduct nuclear test explosions; and by building their case for the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing. If such attacks on the test ban regime go unchecked, the chances for U.S. ratification and global entry into force will become more remote.
The record of the CTBT in the Senate from 1997 to October 1999 suggests that the October 13 vote was not simply "about the substance of the treaty," as Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) claimed in a press conference afterward. It was much more. The "no" vote was the consequence of the political miscalculations of treaty proponents; the failure of many senators to understand core issues; the deep, partisan divisions in the nation's capital; and the president's failure to organize a strong, focused and sustained campaign for what he called "the longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in nuclear arms control."
If the CTBT is to enter into force within the next few years, the president and treaty proponents must carefully examine the course of events leading to the 1999 Senate vote and adjust their approach, actively engage senators in an ongoing exchange of views on the CTBT, and reinforce the existing international norm against testing.
Whether it might have been possible to win this Senate's approval for the CTBT with greater presidential leadership, a more collegial Senate culture and more energetic and effective Presidential leadership, and a more intelligent presentation of the case for the treaty will never be known. It is clear, however, that the future of the CTBT may well be determined by the lessons that decision-makers and the public draw from the 1997-1999 period and by the course of events in coming year.
Support for the Treaty in the U.S.
Why am I cautiously optimistic about the prospects for U.S. ratification? The primary reason is because there is overwhelming public support for the Treaty and solid support from key military and scientific officials. And, of course, because there is no requirement for further nuclear testing.
The last national public opinion survey conducted prior to the October 1999 vote found that an overwhelming 82% of Americans support Senate approval of CTBT (79% of self-identified "conservative Republicans"), while only 14% oppose (The Mellman Group/Wirthlin Worldwide, June 1999 for the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers).
Unfortunately, the widespread popular support for the Treaty was not felt directly by Senators. Due to the short, two week period before the final vote concerned citizens delivered thousands of pro-CTBT messages very late in the process, by which time all but a few Senators had decided how they would vote.
In the aftermath of the October 13 vote, polls continue to show that large majority of the American public still supports the CTBT, though most of the public is not aware that the Senate rejected the Treaty, and nuclear weapons - and foreign policy - will not likely be a pivotal campaign issue.
Support for the CTBT also comes from a growing list of leading military and scientific experts who are now on record in support of Senate approval of the Treaty. Among the CTBT's many supporters are:
The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Eugene Habiger, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command; the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton, and former JCS Chairmen, Generals John Shalikashvili, Colin Powell, David Jones and Admiral William Crowe all endorse the Treaty. These military leaders served under Presidents Clinton, Bush, Reagan and Carter.
Former Military and Diplomatic Leaders: Dozens of other former U.S. military commanders and defense experts also support the CTBT. The list includes: Paul Nitze, former arms control negotiator for President Reagan; Admiral Stansfield Turner, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., former Chief of Naval Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Charles Horner, Commander of Coalition Air Forces, Operation Desert Storm; and General Andrew Goodpaster, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.
Nuclear Weapons Scientists: The directors of the three national nuclear weapons laboratories - Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia - as well as leading nuclear weapons scientists, have determined that the nuclear arsenal can be maintained without nuclear testing. In a June 11, 1999 statement, Dr. John Browne, Dr. Bruce Tarter, and Dr. Paul Robinson said: "We remain confident that the U.S. stockpile stewardship program as conceived and as being executed, is able to perform [the task of certifying the performance of U.S. nuclear weapons without test explosions] under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its safeguards."
Independent scientists strongly support the CTBT, including: Dozens of Noble Laureates, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the Seismological Society of America and the American Geophysical Union, as well as influential former nuclear weapons scientists including, Dr. Hans Bethe, Head of the Manhattan Project's theoretical division; Sidney Drell, chair of a congressionally-mandated study on nuclear weapons safety during the Bush Administration.
Opponents of the CTBT also have their own formidable expert supporters, and CTBT supporters in the United States will have to continue to organize expert endorsements for the Treaty.
General Shalikashvili and the CTBT Task Force
In November, Secretary Albright took the important, albeit long-overdue step of deciding to form a high-level task force to organize the Administration's effort on the CTBT. On January 28 of this year, she named former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President Clinton, General John Shalikashvili, to be the de facto head of the task force. Shalikashvili'a job will be to engage with the executive branch and Senate CTBT supporters and skeptics alike to work together to reinforce the existing non-testing regime and to lay the groundwork necessary to convince the Senate to reconsider and approve the treaty.
Shalikashvili met with the CTBT Task Force for the first time on March 13 and followed up with four days of meetings with cabinet officials, several Senators, a small group of NGOs, and an address to the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Conference. He has a small but very capable staff, including Ambassador James Goodby, based at the State Department. He is due to return to Washington this month to continue his preliminary consultations.
The Task Force and General Shalikashvili will likely get some help from some quarters on the Hill. Several senators, like Hagel of Nebraska and Lieberman of Connecticut, have expressed disappointment about the vote and have indicated that they will revisit the unfinished question of CTBT ratification. However, some powerful CTBT opponents in the Senate can be expected to try to undermine Shalikashvili's efforts in subtle, but potentially disruptive ways. In addition, the level of support for the Task Force from the White House will diminish as the year wears on and the matter of NMD, the ABM Treaty and START occupy the attention of key policy-makers.
Shalikashvili and the Task Force's first task toward repairing the damage from the October 1999 debate and building consensus on the CTBT will be to foster a more thorough and substantive exchange of views between the executive branch and the Congress on core issues and facts concerning the treaty. These include:
In addition to addressing Senate skeptics' concerns, the administration and other CTBT proponents must more effectively communicate the overall benefits of U.S. leadership and ratification of the treaty. The CTBT can impede the development of advanced, new types of two-stage nuclear warheads, which are more easily deliverable by ballistic missiles, and will strengthen international support for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.S. leadership abroad.
General Shalikashvili will also have to dispel the notions of some Senators and commentators that the Treaty can be renegotiated to make it finite in duration and to allow for low-yield nuclear explosions. Such changes would undercut the core purposes of the treaty. Furthermore, it is impractical and naive to expect that the international community would agree to reopen talks on a treaty that was negotiated by 61 states and has been signed by over 150 nations.
Late this year, the Shalikashvili effort might be able to produce a better understanding of what understandings and safeguards might be negotiated with a sufficient number of skeptical Senators to secure the 67 votes needed for approval of CTBT ratification. This will only be possible if the executive branch, in cooperation with Senate CTBT supporters and skeptics alike, work together to reinforce the existing non-testing regime and to lay the groundwork necessary to convince the Senate to reconsider and approve the treaty.
Supporting the CTBTO and IMS
Another, equally important post-vote task for the United States will be to mitigate damage from further attacks on the existing CTBT regime. Even without ratification of the CTBT in the near conduct nuclear test explosions, and it is in both the national and the international interest to detect and deter other nuclear capable states from conducting nuclear explosions. Under these conditions, the United States must communicate that the Senate vote does not represent a shift in U.S. non-proliferation policy, which could prompt other states to respond in ways that lead to vertical or horizontal proliferation.
In this regard, the United States must also continue to work to improve national and international nuclear test monitoring capabilities, specifically, the Clinton Administration must work with the Senate to maintain support for the annual U.S. contribution to the CTBTO. Efforts were made in 1998 and 1999 to cut CTBTO funding. I expect that anti-test ban Senators, hoping to further damage the CTBT, will attempt to reduce or eliminate the FY 2001 budget request for Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), including a request for $21.5 million for the CTBT Preparatory Commission to pay the U.S. share of costs for the Provisional Technical Secretariat.
In addition, the United States and Russia should continue efforts to establish greater transparency and confidence building measures related to subcritical experiments and related activities at the respective test sites of the two nations to dispel concerns that either nation is surreptitiously conducting low-yield nuclear explosions.
The Role of the International Community
The United States is now a CTBT hold-out state. Just a year ago it was assumed that U.S. ratification would be necessary to reach the difficult goal of securing all 44 ratifications needed for CTBT entry into force. Today, it will likely require that nearly all 44 states must ratify to help encourage the U.S. to ratify. Unless other states take the initiative and sign and/or ratify, particularly the other nuclear weapons states, as well as India, Pakistan and Israel, the United States may not be compelled to reconsider the CTBT.
It is important to note that the first Article 14 conference on entry into force held here last October helped increase the number of ratifications. Likewise, the upcoming NPT Review Conference is likely to encourage a few more states to ratify. To maintain this modest momentum, it would be useful to convene a second Article 14 conference, no later than March 2000.
The Next President and Election 2000
Of course, the policy of future presidents on the CTBT may be different, and future elections may dislodge the current, pro-testing Republican Senate leadership from power. This will be the most important factor in determining when - and perhaps if the U.S. will ratify the CTBT in the near future. Vice President Gore has said he would return the CTBT to the Senate for its consideration and approval and would continue the U.S. test moratorium. George W. Bush, on the other hand, backs the current testing moratorium, but "doesn't support the [comprehensive test ban] treaty." Some Bush campaign officials lean in favor of testing. Former Reagan appointee Richard Perle, who is now a Bush advisor, told test ban opponents in October that he endorses nuclear testing, saying, "low-yield testing that carries no negative environmental effects should not be regarded as an evil."
The CTBT will likely become a campaign issue in the presidential race and in some hotly-contested Senate races involving Republicans who voted against the Treaty. Now that the party nominating process is for all intents and purposes over, candidates Bush and Gore can be expected to direct their attention to one another and the differences in their positions on the issues. Early signs indicate that the CTBT may become one of the issues that the candidates highlight, although it is not likely to become a pivotal issue in the race. Last week, George W. Bush showed that he is factually challenged by attacking Gore's credibility because, as the Gov. put it in a March 23 Washington Post interview: "This is a man [Gore] who said he is constantly against the test ban treaty and was for it up to 1992." A Bush aide tried to correct the obvious misstatement but twisted the truth by saying that "Gore says he long favored the treaty but opposed it as recently as 1992." In fact Gore supported a test moratorium and a phased approach towards the CTBT.
Regardless of who is elected, the next president will likely have to address the issue of nuclear testing in his first months in office. A "top-to-bottom" nuclear testing policy review is likely. Obviously, it will be important that the review conclude that current U.S. testing and test ban policy is in an awkward state of limbo - disallowing U.S. test explosions for whatever purpose, while undermining U.S. credibility in the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation arena.
Conclusion
Repairing the damage caused by the Senate vote on the CTBT and averting other imprudent nuclear weapons policy decisions will require a much more balanced debate of core issues and key facts surrounding U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear testing policy: the role and purpose of nuclear weapons test explosions; what constitutes an effective stockpile stewardship program; and whether other states can gain militarily significant advantages relative to the United States under the CTBT regime. As these issues are addressed, policymakers should consider that defending the United States against nuclear attack no longer depends on maintaining an overwhelming arsenal of nuclear weapons for delivery against Soviet targets. Further, it is important to consider how, in the absence of the CTBT, the United States will effectively be able to prevent nuclear testing and the emergence of new nuclear security dangers.
In order to create the conditions for a more balanced, less politicized debate on the CTBT and other vital nuclear security issues, there must be new leadership from the executive branch, as well as internationalist "moderates" in Congress. The administration and the Senate must avoid becoming engaged in post-vote reviews of the CTBT that primarily serve partisan political purposes and focus on how CTBT-related questions and concerns can be addressed so that the United States can be a party to the treaty and play a constructive role in curbing nuclear proliferation worldwide.
The Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers is a non-partisan alliance of 17 nuclear non-proliferation organizations based in Washington, D.C. *The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of every member organization of the Coalition. For more information on the CTBT, see http://www.clw.org/coalition/ctbindex.htm.
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