IN A a longer historical retrospect, the U.S. Senate non- ratification of the CTBT (unless this is rectified by the next President and administration) might well turn out to be the crucial point after which the post-Cold War ``window of opportunity'' in the pursuit of progressive nuclear restraint and disarmament was finally closed. The CTBT may continue for some time as a political-moral norm but will be subject to the real likelihood of a future collapse, if for example, a Republican regime in the U.S. or some other nuclear power decides to resume testing. Since the CTBT has not entered into force, the first- ever genuinely multilateral and independent monitoring and verification system over a vital form of nuclear behaviour cannot (and may not ever) be fully and properly put in place.

The Republican criticism of the CTBT's verification regime for its ineffectiveness because it is not intrusive enough is as much a motivated red herring as the Indian anti-CTBT argument that it is too intrusive. What the U.S. right-wing bitterly opposes is the surrendering of any `sovereign' power and right as would be embodied in the very setting up of an independent and multilateral regime that will not and cannot be under U.S. control. The negative effects of non-ratification of the CTBT on the existing course of disarmament and restraint activities will be very great. It will cast a deep shadow over the prospects of the Fissile Materials Treaty (FMT), not simply on the production cut-off issue but also on the efforts to reduce and eliminate stockpiles of fissile materials held by actual and potential nuclear weapon states and to institutionalise an Ad Hoc Committee on Global Disarmament via the give-and-take of FMT negotiations.

The ratification by the State Duma, Lower House of the Russian Parliament, of START-II has been made even more difficult, as indeed is the progress towards START-III. The ongoing efforts - not just to weaken the 1972 ABM Treaty by reducing some of its constraints but to scupper it completely - will become stronger . Mr. Clinton wants the first and the most hardline Republicans want the second. The incentive for China to acquire more and better nuclear weapons and delivery systems has become stronger. In short, arms racing of a kind between the `defensive' capacities of the U.S. and the `offensive' capacities of China and Russia is more likely than before to commence for the foreseeable future. China understands this full well and is deeply disturbed by the emergence of an altogether more dangerous overall political dynamic. That is why it has openly regretted the Senate non-ratification. But trust some of our home-grown anti-CTBT proponents to concoct other interpretations of Chinese attitudes and behaviour. Since the CTBT was, they claim, primarily aimed at restraining the Chinese efforts at weapons advancement, Beijing as a whole (not just its extreme nuclear hawks) must be secretly happy that the CTBT looks like collapsing and therefore its public displays of deep disappointment are really hogwash to fool everybody, but the brilliantly insightful Indians who alone, outside the five nuclear powers, understood the true meaning and purpose of the CTBT!

There were two dominant reactions in India to the Senate non- ratification. The first was a sense of relief that diplomatic pressure from the U.S. Government on India would now ease and possibly be eliminated. India can sign but not ratify the CTBT. Or better, it can stall matters for a year and if in November next there is a Republican President in the White House, the CTBT as an Indian foreign policy issue will finally be dead. The other common reaction has been a sense of self-righteous, almost gloating, vindication. See, the U.S. doesn't want or believe in it itself, so we were right all along not wanting the CTBT! How this is a vindication is beyond comprehension. Few and far between are the Indian voices which have expressed dismay and concern over the fact that the non-ratification will now seriously weaken the international regime of not just arms control but the whole post-Cold War momentum of nuclear restraint and disarmament.

But then, how could Indian reactions in the main be otherwise? The outcome of the post-1994 CTBT debate in the country represented simply the most shameful, deceitful and dishonestly- arrived at elite consensus on almost any single issue since Independence. The CTBT was continuously attacked not merely because it was against ``national interests'' but because it was portrayed as, in reality, an anti-restraint and anti-disarmament measure. Thus India was also defending the honour of the ``genuine'' global process of disarmament and restraint! The CTBT was portrayed as a deep, calculated machiavellian ploy by the U.S. to consolidate its ``nuclear hegemony'' or ``nuclear imperialism.'' That the extreme pro-nuclear elements in the defence laboratories, the armed forces and in the political set- up as represented by the Republican party were always bitterly opposed to the CTBT was either ignored or dismissed by the Indian opponents of the CTBT in their determination to paint a picture of a monolithic U.S. out to ``trap'' and ``fool'' the rest of the world. And while the rest of the world, including some of the most bitterly anti-American and strongly anti-imperialist non- nuclear weapon states (NNWSs) like Iran and Vietnam, was prepared to be so fooled, India virtually alone stood defiant and was fully perceptive of the ``danger'' of the CTBT! The great irony revealing the falsehood of this argument - that it has taken the most gung-ho nationalists and ultra-imperialists in the U.S. to scupper this ``terrible pro-imperialist'' measure - even today continues to escape the large majority of the Indian opponents of the CTBT.

Those favouring the CTBT in the U.S. wanted some measure of arms moderation and reduction in the post-Cold War era rather than uncontrolled arms racing, and also because it promoted non- proliferation. The Republicans shared the second motive not the first, and disputed the Democratic contention that the CTBT was the best route to achieve this because the treaty carried a major price tag - despite allowing sub-criticals, computer simulation and research into direct fusion weapons, a ban on explosive testing will seriously restrain the U.S. ability to develop ever more advanced nuclear weaponry. This fact is understood by everyone from the Chinese and Russian Governments to outstanding physicists in the worldwide anti-nuclear movement, to the most technically sophisticated and extreme militarists backing the Republican rejection. The exceptions, of course, are the Indian opponents who repeatedly claimed that the restraining effects of the CTBT on the U.S. are insignificant or worthless.

Both the Democrats and the Republicans united in promoting the indefinite extension of the NPT but were divided over the CTBT because the latter is not a simple corollary of the former. The Republicans were simply not prepared to pay the price of restraint demanded. The NNWSs have realised that what is most important is not the mix of motives of various parties to a multilateral treaty but its objective impact. One of the silliest arguments against the CTBT is that it would have locked in the U.S. nuclear technological advantages over the rest of the world. That advantage was not caused by the CTBT, but preceded it. Does anyone in his right mind think that a world now freer than before to resume testing and arms racing will be one in which the technological advantage of the U.S. will somehow be reduced?

If the non-ratification of the CTBT represents the triumph of the most degenerate form of American right-wing conservatism, what does the dominant reaction to the Senate rejection of the treaty say about India?