http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/05/world/05NUKE.html
Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who conducted a comprehensive
study of the nuclear test ban treaty at the request of President Clinton
has concluded that the United States must ratify it in order to mount an
effective campaign against the spread of nuclear weapons.
The assessment by Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, who was chairman of the Joint
Chiefs from 1993 to 1997, is part of a last-ditch attempt by Mr. Clinton to
build support for the treaty, which Senate Republicans rejected in 1999 and
on which President-elect George W. Bush's own top aides have sharply disagreed.
General Shalikashvili's report outlines measures intended to assuage
critics of the treaty, including increased spending on verification,
greater efforts to maintain the United States nuclear arsenal and a joint
review by the Senate and administration every 10 years to determine whether
the treaty is still in American interests.
President-elect Bush assailed the treaty as unverifiable and unenforceable
during the campaign, but he has also promised to continue the Clinton
administration's moratorium on nuclear testing for the time being. And some
Republican lawmakers have suggested that they might reconsider their votes
against the accord if the treaty was modified or accompanied by new
safeguards and if the new Republican administration supported it.
Mr. Bush's advisers have been deeply divided on the merits of a test ban.
Like most top military men, Gen. Colin L. Powell, the secretary of
state-designate, backed the treaty after he retired as chairman of the
Joint Chiefs in 1993, even urging India to sign the accord during a trip there.
"The treaty is necessary for the safety and reliability of the world
because it will reduce the threat of nuclear weapon attacks," General
Powell said at the time.
But Donald Rumsfeld, the conservative defense secretary-designate, has
heatedly opposed the treaty, saying it would preclude the United States
from developing new generations of nuclear weapons.
"By weakening confidence in existing U.S. weapons designs, and by
inhibiting the development of new designs to respond to a changing world,
the C.T.B.T., in my view, would have begun a slow erosion of U.S. and
allied confidence in our stockpile," Mr. Rumsfeld has said, using the
abbreviation for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, as the
agreement is formally known.
Mr. Bush's aides declined to comment yesterday on General Shalikashvili's
assessment, which is to be presented to Mr. Clinton today.
But it comes at a sensitive juncture in the arms control debate. With Mr.
Bush's vow to develop an antimissile defense and uncertainty over
Washington's position on nuclear testing, there is considerable concern in
allied capitals that the broader framework of arms control may be in
jeopardy. If Mr. Bush proceeds with the antimissile defense, despite the
allies' concerns, he could find himself under pressure to make some
gestures on the testing issue, some arms control supporters say, to ease
that opposition, particularly in Europe.
The nuclear test ban treaty was rejected by the Senate in October 1999 by a
vote of 51 to 48, a decisive setback for the Clinton administration given
the constitutional requirement that treaties be approved by a two-thirds vote.
President Clinton responded by proclaiming the United States' intention to
observe a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing and by asking General
Shalikashvili to meet with Senate critics, nuclear arms designers and other
experts to see if it was possible to work out a way to win eventual
approval by the Senate. The retired general was assisted by James E.
Goodby, a senior arms control official in Republican and Democratic administrations.
The test ban treaty was completed in 1996. By December, it had been signed
by 160 countries and ratified by 69. But the treaty cannot take effect
until it has been approved by the United States and 43 other nations that
have nuclear research or power reactors.
Of these, Britain, France and Russia have signed and ratified the accord.
China has signed the agreement, but has yet to ratify it. India and
Pakistan, which have engaged in a nuclear arms race in South Asia, have not
signed. Nor has North Korea.
General Shalikashvili and other recent military leaders have argued that
the United States' ratification is essential to persuade other nations to
accept the treaty and strengthen other measures to curtail the spread of
nuclear arms, like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty under which
nonnuclear states forgo the right to develop nuclear weapons.
"The view of the chairman and the chiefs has been that while there are
risks with this treaty, as with most treaties, the advantages in helping
the fight against proliferation outweigh the disadvantages," General
Shalikashvili said in a telephone interview.
Given his harsh criticism of the treaty during the campaign and the
passions the treaty has stirred up in Washington, Mr. Bush may be tempted
to let the treaty languish unratified. But General Shalikashvili asserted
in his report that postponing American approval of the accord could be risky.
General Shalikashvili's assessment turns on several key points. The former
military chief argues that the United States has a military stake in
instituting a formal ban on testing to slow the nuclear arms race.
Stopping China from conducting nuclear tests, he said, would prevent
Beijing from fielding a new generation of mobile, multiple warhead
missiles. More generally, he argued, it is in the Pentagon's interest to
discourage other nations from developing tactical nuclear weapons that
could be used as a counterweight to the United States' huge advantage in
nonnuclear arms.
"Any activities that erode the firebreak between nuclear and conventional
weapons or that encourage the use of nuclear weapons for purposes that are
not strategic and deterrent in nature would undermine the advantage that we
derive from overwhelming conventional superiority," he wrote.
Addressing worries about verification, General Shalikashvili argued that
the kind of low-level clandestine nuclear tests that Russia or China might
try to carry out would be of little use in developing militarily decisive
weapons. Further, he argued, it would be easier to detect such testing if
the verification provisions in the accord, including on-site inspections,
were in effect.
In submitting the treaty for approval, the Clinton administration
instituted a number of safeguards, including a $4.5 billion a year program
to maintain the reliability of nuclear weapons through computer
simulations, the disassembly of nuclear weapons and other measures.
While General Shalikashvili said that the program was adequate, he urged
several new measures. The United States should step up intelligence efforts
to monitor test activities, including the use of new satellite-based
sensors, he said in an interview. It should also expand efforts to assure
the reliability of the United States nuclear arsenal. One measure, he said,
would be the construction of a new factory to remanufacture the plutonium
"pits," or triggers, for nuclear bombs.
Some critics of the treaty said it might be more acceptable if it had a
10-year time limit instead of lasting indefinitely.
General Shalikashvili said it was unrealistic to think the accord could be
renegotiated now, but suggested a procedure to address the anxieties of the
treaty's opponents on this point. Ten years after ratification, the Senate
and the executive branch would jointly review compliance with the treaty
and efforts to ensure the viability of the nuclear arsenal. If there were
doubts about the value of the treaty, the United States could withdraw from
the accord.
General Shalikashvili conceded that wining support for the treaty would not
be easy, but said that most of the measures he proposed were needed in any
event.
"These are things we need to do regardless of the treaty," he said.
(Washington, DC) - An alliance of 16 leading nuclear non-proliferation
organizations commended retired General John Shalikashvili's on his report
to the President and Secretary, Findings and Recommendations Concerning the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and urged the President-elect
and the Senate to use it as the starting point for rebuilding a bipartisan
consensus on nuclear testing and non-proliferation.
"General Shalikashvili's report on the CTBT should serve as the basis for a
more balanced, less politicized dialogue on the CTBT and its value to
America's national security," said Daryl G. Kimball, director of the
Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers. "By itself, the CTBT cannot stop
proliferation, but the U.S. cannot effectively fight the spread of nuclear
weapons without it," said Kimball. "The new Senate and the new President
owe it to the nation to work together in a bipartisan fashion to undertake
a more thoughtful and balanced review of the CTBT," he added.
"We are convinced that with careful study and a thorough exchange of
information, broader agreement can be forged on the CTBT so as to allow for
U.S. ratification. General Shalikashvili's report provides an excellent
basis for further deliberation on how to rebuild the bipartisan American
consensus on nuclear arms control and non-proliferation," said Thomas
Graham, Jr., President of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security
In his letter to the President accompanying the report, which was released
today, General Shalikashvili said: "My discussions over the last ten months
have only strengthened my view that the Treaty is a very important part of
global non-proliferation efforts and is compatible with keeping a safe,
reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent."
Shalikashvili found that "[t]he nation's nuclear arsenal is safe, reliable,
and able to meet all stated military requirements. For as far into the
future as we can see, the U.S. nuclear deterrent can remain effective under
the Test Ban Treaty...." He recommends that the next administration review,
prioritize and support the stockpile stewardship program to ensure that the
U.S. nuclear arsenal remains safe and reliable without further test
explosions. He also calls for sustained support for
non-proliferation-related intelligence resources, and an ongoing commitment
to improving national and international test monitoring capabilities, as
well as test site transparency initiatives to further increase confidence.
"General Shalikashvili's report underscores the importance to U.S. security
of early ratification of the CTBT," said Spurgeon Keeny, President of the
Arms Control Association. "By outlawing nuclear tests, the CTBT will
prevent the development of new, more advanced weapons by nuclear states,
and severely constrain the nuclear weapons potential of countries that do
not now have such weapons," he added. "Experts agree that the U.S. does not
need nuclear test explosions to maintain its arsenal. So, it is clearly in
the United States' interest to ratify the Treaty to encourage others to do
so and to implement the Treaty's far-reaching verification provisions," Keeny argued.
General Shalikashvili also said "...I have found broad bipartisan support
for strengthened U.S. leadership of a comprehensive international response
to the dangers posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. ... I hope
that the next Administration and the Senate will re-evaluate the Test Ban
Treaty as part of a bipartisan effort to forge an integrated
non-proliferation strategy for the new century."
"President-elect Bush should recognize that there is broad-based support
for the CTBT," said John Isaacs, President of the Council for a Livable
World. "Many Democrats and Republican moderates agree with the view of
Senators Chuck Hagel (R-NE) and Joe Lieberman (D-CT) who have said '... a
clear majority of the Senate, have not given up hope of finding common
ground in our quest for a sound and secure ban on nuclear testing.'"
"The new President can ill-afford to ignore, let alone renounce, the United
States' decades-long commitment to the comprehensive test ban," noted Isaacs.
General Shalikashvili suggests that uncertainties about the CTBT can be
addressed by strengthening the "safeguards" to accompany the Treaty by
conducting a thorough review of the effect of the CTBT on U.S. security ten
years after ratification. Former Nixon Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, who
opposed the CTBT in 1999, has said in July 2000 that with such measures,
"...my concern over the indefinite ban on testing could largely be met. I
would then agree that being party to a CTBT, by preserving the qualitative
advantage of our nuclear arsenal and constraining the further development
of advanced nuclear weaponry, would be in the best interest of the United States."
In his report, General Shalikashvili also cautions against attempts by the
U.S. to "renegotiate" the CTBT and failure to reconsider the Treaty. He
reports that: "A prolonged [test] moratorium would do less damage to U.S.
non- proliferation objectives ... than a resumption of testing, but most of
the benefits that the Test Ban Treaty can provide would be lessened or lost
without ratification."
President-elect George W. Bush campaigned against ratification of the CTBT,
but he has stated his support for continuation of the U.S. nuclear test
moratorium in place since September 1992. Some of his cabinet appointees,
like General Colin Powell, are on record in support of the CTBT, others
like Secretary Donald Rumsfeld oppose it.
"Putting partisan politics aside, the political ground truth is that
nuclear test explosions are no longer acceptable to the vast majority of
states, including all of America's closest allies," observed Christopher
Paine, a senior researcher with the Natural Resources Defense Council in
Washington, D.C. "The Bush Administration cannot reasonably expect to
resume nuclear testing unless it is also prepared to cripple or destroy the
Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty."
"A hard-headed view of U.S. national security interests recognizes that a
U.S.-led return to nuclear testing would be a colossal security policy
blunder with unpredictable and potentially lethal consequences," Paine
said. "While the technical benefits of nuclear explosions are realistically
no longer available to the new Administration, the benefits from U.S.
ratification and entry into force of the CTBT are within reach. Our own
security interests dictate that President Bush should not allow the
previous Senate's thumb-in-the-eye of the international community to be
America's last word on the CTBT," he added.
The CTBT was negotiated with U.S. leadership and opened for signature in
1996. To date, the Treaty has been signed by 160 states, including 41 of
the 44 states required for entry into force, and ratified by 69, including
30 of the 44 required states. All NATO member states -- except the U.S. --
have ratified the CTBT. In April 2000, the Russian Duma approved
ratification of the Treaty. In May 2000, the 180+ states gathered for the
NPT Review Conference expressed unanimous support for "... signatures and
ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with
constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty."
The Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers is a non-partisan alliance of 16
national nuclear non-proliferation organizations dedicated to the pursuit
of a practical, step-by-step program to address the threat of nuclear
weapons.
For further information on the CTBT, see www.crnd.org
The full report is available on-line from www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ctbtpage/ctbt_report.html
and other documents related to Shalikashvili's work as Special Advisor on the CTBT are available at
www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ctbtpage/advisor_pg.html
In March, the President and the Secretary of State appointed me to conduct a low-key, non-partisan review of issues related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Today, after ten months of consultations with Senators from both sides of the aisle and with experts holding widely disparate views on the Treaty, I submitted my Findings and Recommendations. My report focuses on four principal concerns about the Treaty: its value to the non-proliferation regime; its verifiability; its impact on the U.S. nuclear deterrent; and its indefinite duration.
In my judgment, most of my recommendations would have broad bipartisan support now and should be implemented without awaiting a decision on Test Ban Treaty ratification. My review of the issues, however, has strengthened my conviction that the Treaty is compatible with keeping a safe, reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent and is an important part of global non-proliferation efforts. I urge the next Administration, working with Congress, to revisit the Treaty in light of my recommendations.
Non-Proliferation: An Enduring National Interest
Preventing nuclear proliferation is an enduring American interest pursued by Presidents and Congresses since 1945. The Senate's October 1999 vote against the Test Ban Treaty raised concerns at home and abroad that the United States might be walking away from its traditional leadership of international non-proliferation efforts. I am confident that this was not the intent of the Senate. In my conversations, I have found broad bipartisan support for strengthened U.S. leadership of a comprehensive international campaign against proliferation. I recommend that the next Administration work closely with Congress and U.S. allies to mount a more integrated response to the dangers posed by the spread of nuclear weapons, that it appoint a Deputy National Security Advisor for Non-Proliferation to oversee policy coordination and implementation, and that it revisit the Test Ban Treaty in the context of the direct and indirect contributions it can make to this policy.
Banning nuclear explosions places significant technical constraints on nuclear weapon development, especially of more advanced designs that are higher-yield, more efficient, lighter, and more easily transportable. The Test Ban Treaty is also critical to sustained political support for the non-proliferation regime, particularly because the United States and other nuclear weapon states promised to ban all nuclear tests as part of the bargain that secured the permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995. All of our allies and Russia have ratified the Test Ban Treaty, but by its own terms, the Treaty cannot enter into force without U.S. ratification. Until we take this step, U.S. leadership of international efforts to block nuclear proliferation will be seriously weakened.
Effective Verification
The United States will always need reliable information about any nuclear test activity that could threaten our security. Just as the Test Ban Treaty should be viewed in the larger non-proliferation context, so too should Test Ban Treaty verification. An explosive nuclear test is the culmination of a long process with observable indicators of a would-be proliferator's intentions. Improved non-proliferation intelligence can enhance our ability to track activities leading up to an explosion, enabling monitors to focus greater attention on small signals from specific locations. To further enhance our ability to detect and deter nuclear testing, I recommend increased focus on non-proliferation-related intelligence; improved remote sensing technologies and analytical capabilities; continued work on confidence-building measures and on-site inspection procedures; and additional steps to increase transparency at known nuclear test sites.
The Test Ban Treaty does not add new monitoring requirements. Instead, it adds new sources of information and creates greater political clout for addressing suspected violations. The International Monitoring System being established for the Treaty is already providing valuable data about events that could otherwise be hard to detect. The Treaty will also provide for challenge inspections of suspicious events. The combination of U.S. monitoring capabilities, the full international verification system, and data from thousands of additional multi-use monitoring stations makes evasion much more difficult than some Treaty critics fear. Indeed, the value of the Treaty's verification system extends well past the range where a monitor has high confidence of detecting, identifying, locating, and attributing a violation, and down into the gray area where a potential evader lacks certainty about the likelihood of discovery.
Maintaining a Safe, Reliable Nuclear Stockpile
Stewardship of the nation's nuclear stockpile has changed significantly since the Cold War in ways that decrease the value of nuclear explosive testing. Previous U.S. practice was to develop new nuclear weapons designs, confirm that they worked through various means including explosive testing, and then use newly manufactured weapons to replace weapons of an older design. When the Cold War ended, the United States stopped testing to develop new designs for a very large arsenal and shifted to maintaining a smaller stockpile of well tested, safe, and reliable warhead designs. Today, effective stewardship of the U.S. deterrent does not rely on nuclear explosive testing, but on careful surveillance of stockpiled weapons, deeper scientific understanding of how nuclear weapons work and age, and capabilities to remanufacture warhead components to meet the original specifications.
The U.S. nuclear deterrent is safe, reliable, and effective. Concerns about the future reliability of the stockpile focus far less on the risk of catastrophic failure than on a possible gradual decline in confidence. We can avoid such an erosion in confidence by limiting changes to warheads, remanufacturing aging weapons as needed, improving conditions at the nuclear weapon laboratories and production facilities, setting appropriate budgetary and management priorities, and implementing effective advisory mechanisms. A firm national commitment to stockpile stewardship will help attract and retain outstanding scientists and skilled technicians to keep the U.S nuclear stockpile safe and reliable.
In my judgment, the challenges facing the Stockpile Stewardship Program can continue to be managed and the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent can be maintained indefinitely without nuclear test explosions, as long as future administrations and congresses provide high standards of accountability and sufficient resources. Since the United States could withdraw from the Treaty and conduct a nuclear test if an unanticipated problem made that essential for national security, we can safely gain the security benefits of Test Ban Treaty ratification while strengthening bipartisan support for stockpile stewardship.
Address the Treaty's Duration
Concerns about turning the eight-year-old U.S. testing moratorium into a legally binding ban of indefinite duration stem from uncertainties about future developments related to nuclear proliferation, verification, or stockpile stewardship. Implementing my recommendations would reduce these uncertainties, but they cannot be completely eliminated. As a condition for ratification, I recommend that the Bush Administration consider a joint review by the Administration and the Senate of the Treaty's impact on U.S. national security ten years after ratification. If there are serious problems that cannot be corrected, the President would move to withdraw from the Treaty.
Continue the Test Moratorium
It is important to continue the U.S. nuclear testing moratorium begun in 1992. Other countries will, however, be more likely to sustain their testing moratoriums if the moratoriums are viewed as interim measures pending the Test Ban Treaty's entry into force. Steady progress toward ratification will strengthen U.S. leadership of global non-proliferation efforts. Our continued involvement in building up the International Monitoring System will help keep other countries' support for developing these verification assets. Bipartisan agreement in the United States on the long-term shape and size of the Stockpile Stewardship Program will be more likely with a clear commitment to Test Ban Treaty.
Net Evaluation
The Test Ban Treaty is important to U.S. security because it plays to our strengths: our superior conventional military forces; our wealth of knowledge from over a thousand nuclear tests, more than half the world's total; our advantage in stockpile stewardship capabilities; and our leadership of like-minded nations seeking to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Perhaps more than any other nation, the United States would be negatively affected by an erosion of the international consensus on the importance of nuclear non-proliferation, by the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries or terrorist groups, or by a perception that nuclear weapons are instruments that could be readily used in regional conflicts. I hope the incoming Administration, working with Congress, will re-evaluate the Test Ban Treaty in light of these considerations.
View the Report on-line at: www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ctbtpage/ctbt_report.html
Office of the Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
For Immediate Release: January 5, 2001
Contact: Damien LaVera 202-647-8646
Summary of Recommendations to the President and the Secretary of State on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation, and the Test Ban Treaty
A. Strengthen bipartisan support for U.S. leadership of an integrated
non-proliferation strategy.
B. Appoint a Deputy National Security Advisor for Non-Proliferation.
C. Conduct a high-level review of Test Ban Treaty-related issues in light
of the Treaty's contributions to an integrated non-proliferation strategy.
D. Continue U.S. moratorium on nuclear tests and build-up of International
Monitoring System to watch for nuclear tests worldwide.
Monitoring, Verification, and Foreign Nuclear Programs
A. Assign higher funding and intelligence collection priorities to
monitoring for nuclear tests and other nuclear weapon activities by other states.
B. Ensure that national intelligence, the international verification
regime, and other data are combined in an all-source approach to verification.
C. Accelerate the transition from research to operational use for new
verification technologies and analytical techniques.
D. Continue preparations for inspections and confidence-building activities.
E. Increase transparency at known nuclear test sites.
Stewardship of the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile
A. Complete a comprehensive review of the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
B. Place the SSP on a multi-year budget cycle, probably with some increase in funds.
C. Continue steps to improve interagency management of stockpile stewardship matters.
D. Ensure that the performance margins of various weapon types are adequate when conservatively evaluated.
E. Exercise strict control over changes to nuclear weapon designs.
F. Establish a high level external advisory mechanism for the SSP.
Minimizing Uncertainty with a Treaty of Indefinite Duration
A. Commit to conducting an intensive Administration-Senate review of the
Test Ban Treaty's net value for national security ten years after U.S.
ratification, and at regular intervals thereafter, with the understanding
that if grave problems that could not be otherwise addressed, the President
would be prepared to withdraw from the Treaty.
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John M.
Shalikashvili and I met this morning to discuss his report concerning the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The report argues
persuasively that ratifying the CTBT would increase our national security,
and that the security benefits of the Treaty outweigh any perceived disadvantages.
The report's recommendations address concerns raised during the
October 1999 Senate debate over CTBT. I urge Congress and the incoming
Bush Administration to act on them.
I also hope the Senate will take up the Treaty at an early date as a
critical component of a bipartisan non-proliferation policy. CTBT is
supported by our friends and allies overseas, and designed to reduce
existing nuclear dangers as well as those that might emerge in the future.
I commend General Shalikashvili for his thorough and rigorous report
and his continued service to the nation.
The "Shali Report" offers a much-needed way out of the partisan morass on
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. The Bush Administration and
Congress can show statesmanship by moving quickly to implement his sound
recommendations to improve management of our nuclear weapons, through the Stockpile Stewardship
Program, and our ability to detect and identify nuclear weapons tests by other countries.
Democrats and Republicans should unite on these steps, and build a new
consensus to achieve the very real benefits to our national security that the Test-Ban Treaty offers.
I call on President-elect Bush to include in the Fiscal Year 2002
budget the funds needed to jump-start the process of repairing our nuclear weapons
facilities and improving our nuclear weapons test monitoring capabilities. I
call on the 107th Congress to authorize and appropriate those funds, so
that the needed work can begin promptly.
During the 1999 debate on the Test-Ban Treaty, concerns were raised by
various parties. But the United States must not evade its responsibility to
lead the world on nuclear non-proliferation, and ratification of the treaty
remains essential to that leadership.
Let 2001 be the year in which we take concrete action to address concerns
over Stockpile Stewardship and verification, as General Shalikashvili wisely
urges. Let us work together to bolster our national security and forge a
consensus for ratification of the Treaty.
Opponents say the treaty would keep the US from developing a new generation
of weapons A general appointed by President Bill Clinton to study a major
nuclear test ban treaty is to recommend that the United States ratify it.
General John Shalikashvili, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the country's highest military council, has concluded that signing the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will aid US efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
The US Senate rejected the treaty by a significant margin in October 1999,
despite strong pressure from President Clinton to approve it.
President-elect George W Bush campaigned against the treaty, calling it
"unenforceable", but his top advisors are divided on the subject.
Powell appoves:
Incoming Secretary of State Colin Powell, who was General Shalikashvili's
predecessor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, favours the treaty, as does
much of the country's top brass.
But Donald Rumsfeld, Mr Bush's nominee for Secretary of Defence, objects to
the CTBT, which he says would prevent the US from developing the next
generation of nuclear weapons.
President Clinton commissioned General Shalikashvili's study after the
Senate rejected the treaty. He also announced a unliateral US moratorium on
nuclear testing, which remains in place.
The Shalikashvili report concludes that approving the treaty would help
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, a major US foreign policy goal.
"While there are risks with this treaty, as with most treaties, the
advantages in helping the fight against proliferation outweigh the
disadvantages", General Shalikashvili told The New York Times.
Recommendations:
In an effort to bring opponents on board, his report recommends more money
for verification measures, greater maintenence of the existing US nuclear
arsenal, and joint reviews by the Senate and administration every 10 years
to confirm that the treaty is still in US interests.
And it dismisses Mr Bush's fears that the treaty provisions will not be
verifiable, saying that Russian or Chinese nuclear tests too small to be
detected would not be useful in developing a new generation of weapons.
President Clinton is eager to have the treaty ratified before he leaves
office on 20 January.
He signed it in 1996, when it was completed. To date, 160 countries have
signed the CTBT and 69 have ratified it, including the UK and France.
Russian ratification:
In an embarrassment for the US, Russia ratified the treaty in April 2000.
It will come into force when the 44 countries with reactors capable of
making nuclear weapons have ratified it.
There have been suggestions that as president, Mr Bush may be willing to
support the CTBT in exchange for Russian and Chinese concessions on his
plan to build an anti-missile defence system.
Opponents of the so-called "Son of Star Wars" anti-missile system -
including many of the US's allies - worry that it would breach the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
But Mr Bush is a strong advocate of the programme, and may be willing to
shelve his objections to the CTBT if that would clear the way to building
the anti-missile system.
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Nuclear-Treaty.html
WASHINGTON (AP) -- President Clinton suggested Friday that the
Senate take up ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty
``at an early date,'' so the United States can better fight the
spread of destructive nuclear weapons.
Clinton met for a half-hour with retired Gen. John Shalikashvili,
former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to receive the review
of the comprehensive test ban treaty that Clinton requested after
Senate Republicans rejected it in 1999.
Mainly, the report laid out a case for the incoming Bush
administration that the treaty is vital to U.S. national security.
President-elect Bush has opposed the pact as unenforceable. One top
Bush adviser, Defense Secretary-designate Donald Rumsfeld, also
opposes it, although another, Secretary of State-designate and
former Joint Chiefs chairman Colin Powell, supports it.
``It is one of the tools we ought to consider in our toolbox that
would help us deal with what, after all, is one of the recognized,
important dangers to our nuclear security,'' Shalikashvili said.
The report recommended, among other things, that the president
appoint a deputy national security adviser to handle nuclear
proliferation issues, and leave in place the U.S. moratorium on
nuclear tests. It also suggested that more funding go into efforts
to monitor nuclear testing and developing by other countries.
``The security benefits of the treaty outweigh any perceived
disadvantages,'' Clinton said. ``I also hope the Senate will take
up the treaty at an early date. (The treaty) is supported by our
friends and allies overseas, and designed to reduce existing
nuclear dangers as well as those that might emerge in the future.''
Shalikashvili said there are three areas in which the United
States could take some steps now to strengthen its position under
the treaty: stewardship of the nuclear stockpile, verifying nuclear
testing elsewhere in the world and developing an ``overarching
strategy'' on nuclear weapons development.
``That ought to be done regardless of the eventual outcome of the
treaty itself,'' Shalikashvili said. ``Like any other treaty, there
are some risks associated with it. The issue is whether we can
mitigate to ensure the advantages far outweigh those risks.''
The report also suggested that the Senate and administration review
the treaty every 10 years, and that the president be allowed to
withdraw from the treaty if that review uncovers ``grave problems
that could not be otherwise addressed.''
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was completed in 1996,
but it cannot take effect until it has been approved by the United
States and 43 other nations that have nuclear research or power reactors.
Britain, France and Russia have signed and ratified the accord.
China has signed the agreement, but has yet to ratify it. North
Korea has not signed, and India and Pakistan, which have engaged in
a nuclear arms race in South Asia, also have not.
The United States signed the treaty Sept. 24, 1996. The Senate rejected its ratification in 1999.
Supporters have argued that U.S. ratification is essential to persuade other nations to accept the treaty.