The protagonists of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan claim that these weapons act as a deterrent against conventional armed conflict. But events in the past three years have put paid to this notion. In 1999 a major conflict erupted in Kargil, Kashmir, and the continued fighting in Kashmir has recently culminated in an unprecedented military stand off.

The current round of hostilities between India and Pakistan is due to several factors. These include the devastating effects of US attacks on al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan and their subsequent dispersion; tentative moves towards reining in religious extremists in Pakistan; terrorist attacks on the Indian parliament; and local political considerations in India, such as the forthcoming elections in Uttar Pradesh. The usual rhetoric has been taken to new heights by irresponsible bluster about first strikes, counterstrikes, and potential victory by one side or the other in a nuclear exchange.2

It is highly debatable if the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan has increased security in the south Asian tinderbox. India and Pakistan do not possess sophisticated nuclear control systems, nor do they share details of their nuclear capacity. The lengthy border between the countries makes it impossible to install early warning systems. As Helfand et al indicate, evidence of attempts by al-Qaeda terrorists to obtain nuclear weapons or materials and the potential of nuclear sabotage have placed the nuclear arsenals of both countries on an entirely different level of security watch.

The costs of developing and maintaining expensive arsenals in the context of extreme poverty and poor social indicators in these countries must also be emphasised. Many of the roots of the growth of militancy and terrorism lie in poverty and social deprivation (which have been exacerbated by the recent conflicts). Between 1944 and 1996 the United States spent $5.5 trillion on nuclear weapons.3 The deployment of such colossal resources on nuclear arsenals seems inexcusable when viewed against the huge needs for human development and child health in developing countries. The incongruity of spending scarce resources on nuclear weapons is especially stark in south Asia. Reddy has stated that "the annual demands of weaponisation (in India) will finance 25% of the yearly incremental costs of sending every Indian child to school."4 The opportunity costs of developing and maintaining nuclear arsenals must also be weighed against the devastation a nuclear holocaust would bring in its wake. 5 6

The horrifying possibility of nuclear conflagration between India and Pakistan is of real and immediate concern. The anguish of families witnessing the severance of the last land link between the countries speaks volumes about their common history, heritage, and culture. Having brought the "Doomsday clock" forward, politicians, who do not speak for the largely disenfranchised masses, must publicly forsake the use of nuclear weapons and resume a political dialogue. Let sanity prevail.

References

1. Bidwai P, Vanaik A. South Asia on a short fuse: nuclear politics and the future of global disarmament. Karachi: Oxford, 2000.

2. "We could take a strike and survive: Pakistan won't". Fernandes. Hindustan Times 30 Dec 2001. (http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/170102/Archive.asp)

3. Schwartz SI. Atomic audit: the costs and consequences of US nuclear weapons since 1940. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1998.

4. Reddy CR. Wages of Armageddon. III. The Hindu 2 Sep 1998;Sect Opinion:12 (col c).

5. Ramana MV. Bombing Bombay? Effects of nuclear weapons and a case study of a hypothetical explosion. Cambridge, MA: International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 1999.

6. Naim SR. "Aadhi Raat Ke Baad" (after midnight). In: Cohen SP, ed. Nuclear proliferation in south Asia: prospects for arms control. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.