1992 Upgrade

The 1992 "upgrading" of Fylingdales met with a great deal of opposition, not least because many (including the Soviet Union) considered it to breach the terms of the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT). The US and the USSR signed the ABMT in Moscow on May 16th 1972. Its aim was to decrease the risk of war by limiting anti-ballistic missile systems on both sides. The idea was to preserve some balance in the ability of each side to destroy the other by curtailing the development of ABM systems designed to locate and destroy incoming nuclear weapons. This was the practical application of the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) which was applied while SALT I and SALT II negotiations attempted to curb the nuclear arms race and take effective measures to reduce strategic arms. The Treaty restricts the anti-missile defences to a hundred fixed land-based interceptor missiles at a single specified site in each party’s national territory.

The Soviet Union built a primitive ABM system around Moscow while the United States built an ABM system that used nuclear missiles to defend a missile silo field at Grand Forks, North Dakota. The US realised that the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) produced by the use of their ABM system, would subsequently wipe out radio communications over an enormous area of the continent. They therefore dismantled their system. The Soviets kept theirs.

The sections of the Treaty that are particularly relevant to the situation at Fylingdales (as part of a possible ABM targeting system) are as follow:

• In Article II of the Treaty, the parties undertake:

• Article III, revised by a Protocol agreed in 1974, permits two large phased-array ABM-guidance radars (PARs) and up to 18 smaller ones inside the designated area.
• By Article VI, the parties bind themselves not to give ABM capabilities to non-ABM systems or to test such systems "in an ABM mode". Each agrees that "radars for early warning of strategic ballistic attack", shall be located "along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward".
• Article VII permits replacement and modernisation of ABM systems or components, subject to the other treaty provisions.
• Article VIII and IX provide for the dismantling of any excess ABM systems and components, beyond the Treaty limits and forbid any transfer of ABM systems or components to other sites.
• An Agreed Statement D, appended to the Treaty, states:

The difficulty with the terms of the Treaty lies with dealing with new or "modernised" equipment that may carry out more than one role. The Reagan administration accused the Soviet Union of breaking the Treaty by constructing a large phased-array radar at Abalakova, near Krasnoyarsk, in central Siberia. The coverage of this radar included most of eastern Siberia and was very difficult to reconcile with the "oriented outward" requirement of the Treaty for early warning radars. Also, the site was hundreds of kilometers from the Soviet border, and was therefore inconsistent with the "along the periphery" requirement. If the Abalakova radar was for early warning of missile attack, its location would have been in breach of the Treaty. Interior siting for a large radar enables a wider ocean area to be watched than would a coastal location "along the periphery". Nowadays, any nuclear missile attack is likely to come from submarines but the Treaty does not cater for systems intended to give early warning of this.

The Soviets responded that the Abalakova radar was a space-track radar and therefore exempt from the limitations placed on early warning radars. However, it would not have added much to the Soviet satellite-tracking capabilities already in existence and its location and construction were more suitable for an anti-satellite weapons system. Even so a study by the British Joint Intelligence Committee considered that, while the Soviets may have a "case to answer", it was "unlikely" that the radar had been designed for ABM missile guidance. In 1985 the Soviets offered to stop work on the PAR at Abalakova if the US abandoned the upgrading of the radars at Thule and Fylingdales. The US rejected the offer.

The PAR systems completed at Thule in 1987 and Fylingdales in 1992 are said to breach the Treaty in a number of ways. Even though the US disputes this, it seems clear that the spirit of the Treaty has been broken by the disturbance in military balance. The Treaty is of unlimited duration (Article XV.1) and allows for the "modernisation and replacement" of an existing ABM system component (Article VII). However, before "modernisation" Fylingdales and Thule were BMEWS not ABM systems and the Treaty places restrictions on the future deployment of large radars for "early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack" (Article VI.b). Since May 1972, large radars for this purpose (i.e. not for ABM battle management or ABM testing, and not primarily for tracking space objects or monitoring arms control agreements) may only be deployed by either party "along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward" (Article VI.b). This is certainly not the case for Thule or Fylingdales.

Under Article IIIb, the installation of a PAR System means that Fylingdales becomes an ABM system component of a United States operation. However, the MoD argue that the new system is an up-date of the old mechanically steered radar system, not a new one. They say that is not a new facility as it is on the same site (although not in exactly the same position) as the old system, and makes use of the same infrastructure such as power supplies, stores, medical facilities, police and fire stations, messes and other facilities.

The US has also been criticised for its "Cobra Dane" PAR in the Aleutians. They have responded by stating that this particular system is for space-tracking, intelligence and early warning. The US "Pave Paws" PAR system is also set some way back from the coast - and their wide field of view over the continental United States means that they could be used as part of a ballistic missile defence (BMD) system. However, the US has explicitly justified the positioning of these radars by referring to their role against SLBMs.

The argument as to whether or not Fylingdales breaks the ABM Treaty may soon be academic. The days of the ABM Treaty may be numbered. A recent article in "The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists" (March/April 1998, pages 14-15) points out that Congress and the President are battling it out over missile defence. The Republicans have managed to increase funds for development and the Senate is calling for deployment of multiple-site national defence and theatre missile defences abroad by 2003. The National Defense Act and the continuation of the Star Wars programme both require that the Treaty be radically altered if not scrapped.

Interestingly the Sunday Telegraph of April 5^th 1998 carried a brief article on how Fylingdales is set to be a major part of "a massive anti-ballistic missile shield around the UK". The reason for this "new development" is that some "unpredictable Middle Eastern states [are] developing missiles with a range of 2,000 miles, enough to reach Britain from Libya, or northern Italy from Iran". So "the Gulf factor" is being used to justify the existence of Fylingdales and even to enhance its status.

It was reported that 300 people are working on the "Technology, Readiness and Risk Assessment Programme" at an initial cost of £8.7 million. Computer war games tests have been conducted in the U.S. (is this really a shield for the U.K.?) and a further one may be carried out at the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency in Malvern, Hereford and Worcester. Wing Commander Phil Angus, commanding officer of Fylingdales was reported in the Telegraph as saying, "There is a substantial proliferation of missiles and they are not just cheap and nasty. As well as the threats from particular countries, there is the cheque book threat – many of these technologies are available on the open market for anyone to buy". However, the Wing Commander thinks it unlikely that a "son of Star Wars" system (costing some £5 billion over 10 years) is unlikely to give complete protection - a "point defence" system is more likely. The British developed "Target Oriented Tracking System" is among those being evaluated.

Current Proposed Upgrade

We now know that the US do wish to upgrade Fylingdales for their US National Missile Defence (NMD) system - which forms part of their Balistic Missile Defence (BMD) or "Star Wars" programme. There is no doubt that the proposed upgrade would break the current ABM Treaty. We also know that the British government has agreed to this upgrade - although there is disagreement between the MoD and the Foreign Office. The MoD realises that the UK defence system is so linked to and dependent on US military systems that, if we wish to keep our ' independent nuclear detterant' we have no choice but to comply. The Foreign Office will be concerned about the destablising effects of breaking the ABM Treaty and the fact that other European governments have expressed grave concern and object to the US going ahead with the Star Wars Programme.

The NMD role for Fylingdales will be one of tracking and identification rather than just detection. The upgraded radar would be used to provide midcourse target tracking information on inbound missiles to cue X-band radars in the continental United States.

In order for the ABM Treaty to accommodate an American NMD, the US says that the Treaty would only have to allow for the move of a single site from North Dakota to Alaska. By moving the site to Alaska, the missile defence system would become national rather than regional due to its location, specifically not allowed in the ABM Treaty. The proposed NMD breaks the Treaty in other areas as well. It calls for the upgrading of early warning radar centres in Thule, Greenland and Fylingdales, UK. This violates Article IX which prohibits deploying ABM components in other countries. Later stages of the NMD require the 'use' of SBIRS (note-space-based infra-red system, an integral part of BMD) in direct contradiction of Article V which prohibits space based components. The changes needed would basically change the entire basis of the treaty. A new treaty would no longer prohibit nation-wide defence, guard against breaking the treaty or prevent a nations ability to indirectly improve an NMD's capabilities. In effect, it would no longer serve the purpose for which it was created.

In order for the US to deploy an NMD and keep the ABM Treaty, Russia would have to agree to these changes. Russia, however, feels that the treaty is a cornerstone of strategic stability. On 3 March 2000 at the UN Conference on Disarmament, Visaly Sidorov of the Russia Federation said that the prevention of an arms race, both in space and on earth, depended on sustaining the ABM Treaty. He said, "the Russian Federation wanted to unambiguously state that it was not holding negotiations on adaptation of the ABM Treaty with the United States. This position, that was based on the supreme interests of strengthening peace and international stability, would not change." He went on to say that the ABM constituted the basis for strategic stability and called for the re-establishment of the Ad-Hoc Committee on this issue in order to block a power struggle in space. French President Jacques Chirac said, "We must avoid any questioning of the ABM Treaty that could lead to a disruption of strategic equilibrium and a new nuclear arms race."