Confidential Memo London June 94

Page 1 of Confidential Memo
Page 1 of Confidential Memo

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY:

Representatives of the Third Air Force and the Embassy attended a meeting on September 22 called by the MoD to discuss continuing incursions at U.S. bases and how to deal with on going U.S. military concerns.

Subjects discussed included an update on progress toward revision of UK by-laws and obtaining an njunction at Lakenheath, UK concerns about actions taken by U.S. security police, and transfer of a complement of UK military defense police (MDP).

END SUMMAY.

BY-LAWS AND INJUNCTIONS UPDATE

3. MoD Acting Director for the Air Secretariat Patrick Lamb opened the meeting by stating that the UK takes its responsibility for U.S. security seriously. He apologized that the revision of by-laws of the Military Lands Act had not yet been finished, as had been promised at the June 27 meeting (Reftel), but hoped that things could be completed expeditiously. It was necessary, however, to be meticulous, as the new by-laws were bound to be challenged.

4. Colonel Copeland, Vice Commander of Third Air Force, said that the U.S. side appreciates all that is being done by the UK on the legal side. However, intrusions continue and something must be done to contain them in the interim.

5. Lamb said that the High Court action against Lindis Percy, a consistent offender on U.S. bases, was set to be heard in March 1995. In addition, committal proceddings against Ms. Percy for breach of the injunction at Menwith Hill were set for October 4.

6. Treasury solicitor Peter Messer, acting for the MoD in this matter, noted that Percy was likely to receive only a suspended sentence as a result of this action, as she presents herself as an innocent, harmless little old lady (she is 52). It is also unlikely that a fine will be levied, as Percy has no resources. He added that the court might have been convinced to move more quickly on the matter if there had been an apparent danger as a result of Ms. Percy's actions - for instance, if warning shots had been fired or a plane had to abort its landing.

UK CONCERNS - REPORTING

7. Lamb said it is necessary that the U.S. accurately report any auctions by intruders. At one point, it had been rumored that Percy had thrown a vial of blood, a serious accusation in the Aids era. Copeland noted the remark and promised in future to distinguish initial reporting from final reports.

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9. The Deputy Chief Constable of the MDP said that U.S. security police and MDPs have a record of working well together. The U.S. is his customer and he wants us to be happy. He added, however, that there is no power of arrest in this case. Trespass is not an offense. Therefore, any U.S. attempt to blindfold or handcuff Ms. Percy could result in three months in prison for a UK officer if he failed to prevent such action. He added that any complaint to the Chief Inspector by Percy must be investigated, at a cost of 1000 pounds (about $1,500) each time. He said we do not to give Percy publicity for her cause. The press has recently reported that she will sue three U.S. officers for her treatment while being removed from RAF Laken heath, and she is being given UK government funds in the form of legal aid to do so.

10. Copeland responded that the U.S. does not agree that handcuffing constitutes assault. Rather it is a standard procedure designed to increase the safety of both the intruder and the security personnel when dealing with an intruder. Security personnel, U.S. and MoD, must be given the means to ensure security, especially in priority security areas. If we are unable to handcuff and blindfold Percy when she enters a weapons storage area, which she has done, we are unable to provide effective security. We must together be able to re-establish security at U.S. bases, as guaranteed under the NATO SOFA. As we talk, intrusions continue; there is the potential for a catastrophe. We must give the MDP the tools they need to do their job.

GUIDELINES FOR MDP

11. The MDP Deputy CHief Constable asked what had become of the guidelines for MDP actions which had been given to the U.S. side for comment in March. Copeland said he would find out and get back with a response. The Deputy Chief Constable also recommended that the MDP Divisional Commander Ray Pritchard get together with Copeland in the near future to discuss the quality of MDP service. Copeland accepted.

BARRIER AT LAKENHEATH

12. Lamb noted that it is comparatively easy to enter RAF Lakenheath in a car. He suggested that the U.S. could help the UK provide security by installing a barrier at the base entrance.

13. Copeland noted that the security at U.S. bases is geared to the outside threat, which remains low in the UK. A barrier would also have a detrimental effect on the ingress and egress of the thousands of base employees. He promised to consider the UK request, however.

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EXTRA MDPS

15. Lamb asked whether the U.S. had made up its mind yet whether to accept the five MDPs which the UK proposed to transfer from Upper Heyford to Croughton by the end of the month at its own expense. Copeland said he would get an answer as soon as possible.

WRAP-UP

16. The Assistant Under Secretary for Security and Counter Terrorism, A.G. Rucker, said that he thought that the UK legal approach through by-laws and injunctions was the proper way to proceed, as the UK was not going to make general trespass an offense. Lamb said he realised that there was no legal redress at the moment, but work was proceeding apace. In the meantime, the sides must continue to remove intruders with minimum force. The U.S. Embassy Representative agreed with this approach, provided security is maintained. If it is not, then the issue might have to be raised at the ministerial level.

Crowe


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