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UK National Political Overview |
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Mark Bromley and
David Grahama |
The National Missile Defence debate in the UK is influenced by a number of contradictory elements and groups. Political judgements jostle with national security concerns and the realities of the ‘special relationship’, including differing transatlantic perceptions on multilateralism and deterrence. The confusion surrounding Labour’s stance on NMD is a result of the variety of forces in play which make a clear decision very difficult. Blair, Straw and the Special Relationship Since the arrival of the Bush administration in the White House, there have been increasing signals from the upper echelons of Government that British support for NMD is increasingly likely. This represents a marked change in thinking. During the Clinton presidency the UK Government was not averse to allowing ministers to raise doubts about the wisdom of the scheme. In March 2000, Peter Hain, the then UK Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs stated “I don't like the idea of a Star Wars programme, limited or unlimited… Any decision it [the US] makes must be done in close co-operation and agreement with the Russians.” Again in December 2000 Hain stated “We have made it clear that any means to go down the road of the National Missile Defence System (NMD) must be, as an absolute pre-condition, by an agreement with the Russians. An agreement to amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would be required. We don't want to see that abrogated unilaterally by the Americans. If this happened, it would be extremely dangerous and could unleash a world arm's race involving Russia, China and so on.” Since the Bush administration came to power, however, there have been various reports of the enormous pressure being placed on the UK Government to abandon this ambiguity and come out in favour of NMD. An article in February 2001, for example, indicated that US administration officials were furious with the UK position. It quoted one as saying “you’re either with us or you’re not.” In the face of these efforts, the UK government has taken a progressively more receptive tone. In May 2001, Tony Blair’s Press Secretary, Alistair Campbell, told reporters that he views missile defence as a “good idea.” Meanwhile, in August, an adviser to Foreign Secretary Jack Straw sent out a briefing paper on NMD. The paper gave the clearest indication yet that the UK Government was prepared to support US proposals. The paper argues: “Missile Defence is not an alternative to our wider non-proliferation effort, but part of it. Proliferators are not irrational. All our non-proliferation instruments - the multilateral Treaties, national and international export controls, interception/disruption operations etc are ultimately aimed at affecting the cost/benefit calculation that all proliferators must make, however crudely. Effective Missile Defence can do the same, by reducing the likely benefit of developing WMD-armed missiles (or by raising the cost, through the need to build more, or more sophisticated, systems). It therefore complements, not replaces, the other tools in the non-proliferation toolbox.” On 30 September, The Observer reported that Blair had given the green light to NMD, telling his colleagues it was “inevitable”. He has hinted recently at such views in public. During Prime Minister's Questions on 24 October, he stated “I do not agree with those who are opposed to it [NMD]. During the summit with President Bush in February, we made it clear that we were prepared to look at defensive as well as offensive systems.” The political reasons for responding to US pressure and voicing support are twofold. First, the Labour Party’s damaging debates on unilateral nuclear disarmament in the 1970s and 1980s left the impression that Labour was weak on defence issues, and were widely attributed to having contributed to its electoral defeats in the 1980s and early 1990s. Blair is keen to avoid a recurrence of these debates and deny the Conservatives a potent political weapon. Central to this agenda is the need to convince the public that Labour is committed to the ‘special relationship.’ Secondly, the close ties between the US and the UK affords Britain political, military and strategic advantages that Blair is keen to preserve. The UK often enjoys unique technology-sharing agreements with the US. Examples include the Trident system, the Tomahawk Cruise missile and the Joint Strike Fighter. Britain also enjoys favourable access to US intelligence operations, particularly through specialist imagery and signals intelligence such as the Echelon system, partly based at Menwith Hill. These benefits guarantee the UK Government a level of international prestige and influence that it might not otherwise enjoy. All of this would be at risk should the UK fail to allow the US the use of radar bases for NMD. It is therefore something of a surprise that the UK Government has yet to openly support the proposals. While in private the Government is keen to placate its American allies, in public it is still sticking to the line it has held since Bush came to power. This line was again reiterated during defence questions on 29 November. Geoff Hoon stated: “We share US concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and that we shall continue to work together to tackle the potential threat with a comprehensive strategy. However, it remains the case that the US has not decided how it wishes to proceed with missile defence and has made no request for the use of facilities in the United Kingdom.” This ongoing reticence reflects the fact that there are still strong forces at all levels of government arguing against NMD. These pressures remain potent and leave the question over the use of UK-based radars wide open. The Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence There are strong concerns in Whitehall policy circles that NMD is a dangerous political exercise, which will be ultimately damaging to Britain’s national security. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office are deeply worried about the strategic instability the project could bring and the threat it poses to multilateral arms control. David Clark, Robin Cook’s special adviser from 1994 till the last election, wrote in July 2001 that Cook never supported NMD and that the Foreign Office remained heavily opposed. Clark wrote that the British Government knows “there is no strategic rationale for NMD” and views the project as “sledgehammer designed to crack a walnut”. The Ministry of Defence is similarly afraid of NMD fearing that funds and attention will drift away from other important defence procurement projects. These concerns were clearly expressed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Michael Boyce, in an interview on 28 July: “There's no point in completely impoverishing ourselves in order to provide ourselves with a defence against one particular system and not being able to do anything else ... As far as I'm concerned there is no way I'm in the position to suggest we can pay for any missile defence technology from within the existing defence budget and carry on doing what we are doing at the moment…We must make sure we don't leave out the Russians or indeed the Chinese... We must be sensible about how we work with them, we - the west in general - and the Americans in particular.” This deep unease with NMD from within the Whitehall establishment reflects the challenge that NMD poses to long-standing UK security thinking. UK security thinking has, for the last fifty years, been based on three tenets; nuclear deterrence, multilateral arms control and national security. US NMD plans represent a full frontal attack on all three of these beliefs. Deterrence is undermined by the possibility that the US could launch a nuclear attack without fear of reprisal, multilateral arms control is being destroyed by challenges to the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty and UK national security is threatened as British involvement makes it a target for attack from enemies of the US. NMD poses a huge threat to conventional thinking both within the FCO and the MoD, but rather than confront the issue head on and risk the anger of the Americans, officials are instead hoping that due to issues of cost and technology, the problem will simply disappear. As David Clark noted “The strategy of the Foreign Office was … to play for time in the hope that events would conspire to get the Government out of its hole; technological failure, spiraling costs, a deal with Russia or even the collapse of North Korea.” Political Opposition This deep unease at the highest levels of the UK Government is matched by increasingly vocal opposition from the rank and file of the Labour Party; its backbench MPs, the Trade Unions and its constituency members. Parliament as a whole appears averse to the idea of NMD. Hence, an Early Day Motion tabled by Malcolm Savidge strongly questioning the wisdom of NMD has collected 280 signatures - a vast number considering that government ministers and whips are not allowed to sign and that very few EDMs collect more that 100 names. The motion: “expresses concern at President Bush's intention to move beyond the constraints of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in developing missile defence; and endorses the unanimous conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, which recommended that the Government voice the grave doubts about NMD in the UK, questioned whether US plans to deploy NMD represent an appropriate response to the proliferation problems faced by the international community and recommended that the Government encourage the USA to explore all ways of reducing the threat it perceives.” This EDM has been supported by the Liberal Democrats who have declared in their manifesto that it was “a threat to international stability and arms control agreements.” Political opposition has also arisen from outside of Parliament with both trade unions and local Labour groups bringing pressure to bear. On 14 June 2001 eighteen Trade Union general secretaries wrote to the Guardian arguing that NMD would do “immense damage to international treaties covering weapons of mass destruction” and that it would be “wholly inappropriate for our Government to support this initiative and [we] strongly urge it not to do so.” Likewise, at the last Labour Party Conference there were 17 motions, mostly from Constituency Labour Parties, voicing concern over Blair’s support for NMD. These were thrown out on the grounds that they were not “contemporary” prompting anger in Labour ranks and charges that Blair was trying to “gag” his party. September 11 and the military campaign Given the current international crisis it is difficult to determine how these different pressures will play out. Prior to September 11th there were clear indications that pressure was building, leading towards an uncomfortable confrontation between the Government and its backbenchers and supporters. Given the present need to sustain a unified coalition, it would seem that such a confrontation is unlikely in the near future. However, as the current military action draws on this may not last. Increased civilian casualties and a possible expansion of military action to Iraq will erode public support for the war and again raise doubts about the direction of US security policy. In this environment, NMD will inevitably return to the fore, again placing the Government in a difficult position. In addition, there are some indications that the Government believes that the current crisis offers it the opportunity to be more strident in raising its concerns with Washington over the direction of US policy. Asked in the House about the US Government's refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, its stated wish to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and continuing efforts to develop NMD, Defence Minister Adam Ingram replied: “Clearly, we can take considerable comfort from the active role played by the US in engaging with its allies and countries with which it would not previously have engaged. We are now in a new international environment and progress can be made on the back of that.” The debate over NMD has momentarily been forced off the political agenda. However, deep concern at all levels of government remain. Whether this concern is sufficient to force the UK Government to stand up to Washington remains to be seen. |