The present US security and foreign policies have not emerged suddenly with the ‘election’ of George Bush. They are part of a long term development from more multilaterally based policies to ones which are essentially unilateral in nature, although pluralateral initiatives feature as well when they support US interests. This development began before the end of the Cold War and has covered Democrat as well as Republican Administrations.

The objective is to reach military, diplomatic and economic global dominance for the US in the search for security for ‘homeland America’ and to protect US ‘interests’ world-wide. The terror attacks of 11th September were a devastating demonstration of the futility of such an approach to security but are being used to fuel the arguments for an acceleration of the development of the present policies. Other horrific statistics, such as the 6,000 children killed by diarrhoea on that same day, demonstrate the consequences of such policies for the ‘poor’ majority of the world but are generally ignored. Menwith Hill is used by the US to gather commercial intelligence even more than military intelligence. This is not shared with Britain or any other state but is used to promote the interests of the US and US companies around the world.

Missile defence and the militarisation of space are at the centre of the development of long reach, full spectrum military global dominance by the US. These programmes seek to make the US and its forces invulnerable to attack and to enhance its first-strike capability and its ability to threaten, wage and ‘win’ nuclear conflict. Deterrence is re-defined but remains at the heart of the security paradigm.

So-called National Missile Defence (NMD) of the US has few supporters outside the US. The development of NMD is seen as destabilising, not only militarily and politically but also in terms of the international disarmament process. Yet the Bush administration continues to peddle the smoke-screen of “rogue states”. In fact this has intensified post-11th September even though the risk of attack on the US by named states using strategic ballistic missiles is infinitesimal.

The new ‘Strategic Stability’, which the US wishes to have with Russia, is to be based on deterrence constructed with much lower numbers of strategic nuclear weapons combined with missile defence. As yet, however, it is unclear whether the (mutual) unilateral reductions in nuclear weapons will be subject to the necessary disarmament principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility. In addition Russia is, quite rightly, worried that the involvement of missile defence, which if it works will enhance the US first-strike capability, will mean that the re-defined deterrence will be virtually one way. But since Russia is desperate, for financial and security reasons, to significantly reduce its nuclear arsenal some sort of ‘deal’ over NMD is very likely even though major amendment of the ABM Treaty remains unlikely.

China and control of the Pacific region remains a primary target of the missile defence programmes. In order to promote missile defence the US has even indicated to China that it would not object if China carried out more nuclear tests in order to develop its nuclear arsenal so that it would not be rendered ineffective by US NMD. This diversion of resources by China and distraction from the development of its economic strength would clearly suit US purposes. By dragging China into an arms race the US would hope to weaken it as a competitor as has happened to the USSR/Russia. With NMD the US would still have an enhanced first strike capability and the ability to win any threatened conflict with China.

Of course any proliferation of nuclear weapons by China would cause India and then Pakistan to further develop their nuclear arsenals. Other states and non-state organisations undoubtedly look to other weapons of mass destruction as ways of trying to combat the awesome military power of the US.

Even the development of so-called Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) by the US in co-operation with Taiwan or Japan is very likely to result in the same response by China. At present China is clear that it would respond whatever form the missile defence takes but that it would not be dragged down economically by trying to achieve parity with the US militarily. Through development of TMD the US has managed to involve many states into missile defence programmes and thus the thrust of the US security policies. It is far from apparent that this involvement is to the security benefit of the other states. The prime example is the UK which, if it allows the US to use Fylingdales, Menwith Hill or other bases in Britain for missile defence, will make Britain even more of a target in the event of conflict. Britain would also incur a financial cost which would put an extra strain on an already over-stretched UK Defence Budget. Further, the TMD systems already deployed are one of the major obstacles to progress towards a peaceful resolution in the Middle East and post-11th September, TMD systems are likely to be viewed by the US as even more essential to their security framework.

The US is now more than ever determined to pursue all options for aggressive and defensive weapon systems. These include Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles, ‘mini-nukes’ (which will blur the boundary between conventional and nuclear weapons), sub-orbital bombers and space based lasers. Missile defence is a ‘stalking horse’ and the ultimate vehicle for US long reach, full spectrum domination is the weaponisation of space.

The US policy with regard to nuclear disarmament and arms control is a perfect example of its move away from the multilateral approach and its developing differences with British policy and interests. While these differences have been publicly obvious any criticism of the US by the UK has been private and muted.

Double standards with regard to inspection and verification regimes seem to be at the heart of the US objections to the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and acceptance of the additional protocols to the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC). The US demands that other states, e.g. Iraq, are subject to rigorous inspection and verification procedures but that the US should be exempt since it perceives such regimes as against its national interest. This is apparent also in that US legislation has been passed which allows the President to limit the inspections for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). At present the US is attempting to roll back the progress that has been made by trying to take the CTBT off the UN agenda and by trying to stop any further discussion on the additional protocols to the BTWC.

The development and deployment of missile defence threatens the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Outer Space Treaty as well as the ABM Treaty. If the US and Russia and/or the US and China ‘do a deal’ over missile defence it will mean the maintenance of nuclear weapons as part of their security framework. That is at variance with their NPT obligations and the commitment they and the other nuclear weapon states made at the NPT Review Conference 2000 to abolish their nuclear arsenals. Missile defence will also feed the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. As such it can not be seen as supplementing non-proliferation efforts.

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva is stalled in major part because the US refuses to negotiate a treaty which would prevent an arms race in outer space (PAROS). All the other states are willing to do so, albeit reluctantly on the part of some. However the US cannot take all the blame for the lack of progress at the CD. The deadlock is, although they would deny it, in the perceived self-interests of China, India and Pakistan who do not want negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty to be concluded before they have produced sufficient fissile material for their developing nuclear arsenals. Of course the deployment of missile defence by the US would increase the perceived need by these states for such nuclear weapons making materials.

While we should clearly be moving away from Cold War processes and strategy the direction chosen by the US is not in the interest of global stability. The ABM Treaty should not just be scrapped or amended into uselessness but rather become irrelevant through the abolition of nuclear weapons and control of ballistic missiles. Although it came into existence to maintain the strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) it led directly to the SALT and START processes on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons.

A major amendment to the Treaty is now very unlikely. Russia, and indeed Putin, has put too much political capital into stating it will not do so to give way in this formal manner. However a ‘deal’ is likely to be struck between the US and Russia concerning the Treaty and reductions in strategic nuclear weapons.

A real possibility is that the US will state that it is only mounting a testing programme for the present. In this case Russia will turn a blind-eye to violations of the Treaty. Perhaps more likely, due to internal pressure and the fact that Bush has invested a great deal of political credibility in delivering missile defence, is that the US will leave the Treaty as it is entitled to do under the terms, if it gives six months notice. If Russia is to accept either of these scenarios without reacting significantly then the price will be a treaty encapsulating the reductions in strategic nuclear weapons which both states have promised. Russia will still be able to say it is no longer taking part in the START process as such.

With the end of the ABM Treaty, whether literally or practically, much of the opposition from governments to missile defence will fade, particularly in Europe, as they accept NMD as a fait accompli. It is therefore even more important that states and NGOs with principle objections to missile defence programmes continue to make their case. We will also need to urge restraint on the part of China and others so that the threatened new arms race does not in fact materialise.

We also need to look to the longer term and focus on calls by Canada and others for a new Outer Space Treaty which would maintain space for peaceful uses. This should not just ban the weaponisation of space but also roll back the militarisation of space. Where, for instance, surveillance satellites are needed these should be under the control of civilian organisations such as the UN itself and Agencies responsible for the inspection and verification processes of treaties. The threat comes not only from the US but also from the new joint European Union and European Space Agency strategy.

Generally we must continue to reject the US security paradigm and highlight an alternative and sustainable paradigm for global security based on international law, multilateral treaties, conflict prevention, regional solutions to regional problems and any necessary military action in the context of a reformed United Nations.